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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
CHAD CHRISTOPHER MCKIE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Supreme Court Case No. 45239 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
HONORABLE GERALD F. SCHROEDER 
VERNON K. SMITH 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
LAWRENCEG. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
000002
ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-MD-2015-12139 








Location: Ada County District Court 
Judicial Officer: Schroeder, Gerald F. 
Chad Christopher McKie Filed on: 08/24/2015 
Appear by: 08/26/2015 
Case Number History: 
Police Reference Number: 519-217 
CASE INFORMATION 
Offense Statute Deg Date Case Type: Criminal 
Jurisdiction: Boise City Police Department 
1. Driving Under the Influence 
TCN: 1110218136 
118-8004 {M} MIS 08/23/2015 
Filed As: Driving Under the Influence-
(Second Offense Within IO Years) MIS 8/24/2015 
Bonds 
Surety Bond #WN005-l0268583 $1,000.00 

















State of Idaho 
CASE ASSIGNMENT 
CR-MD-2015-12139 
Ada County District Court 
10/07/2016 
Schroeder, Gerald F. 
PART\' INFORMATION 
McKie, Chad Christopher 
EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT 
New Case - Criminal 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
New Case Filed - Misdemeanor 
Prosecutor Assigned 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Prosecutor assigned Boise City Prosecutor- Generic 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Hearing Scheduled (DUI Arraignment 08/26/2015 10: 30 AM) 
Bond Posted - Surety 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Bond Posted- Surety (Amount 1000.00) 
Charge Added 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
PAGE I OF 8 
Lead Attorneys 
Boise City Prosecutor- Generic 




















ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-MD-2015-12139 
Charge Filed - Cause Found 
Arraignment 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Hearing result for DUI Arraignment ~cheduled on 08/26/2015 10: 30 AM: Arraignment I First 
Appearance 
A Plea is entered for Charge:* 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
A Plea is entered/or charge: - NG (IJB-8004 {M} Driving Under the Influence) 
Charge Reduced Or Amended 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Charge Reduced Or Amended (IJB-8004 {M} Driving Under the Influence) 
Change Assigned Judge: Administrative 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
3Judge Change: Administrative 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Hearing Scheduled (BC Pretrial Conference 10/19/2015 09:45 AM) 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 11/1212015 08: 15 AM) 
Notice of Hearing 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Notice Of Hearing 
DUI Arraignment (10:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Oths, Michael J.) 
Plea 
I. Driving Under the Influence 
Not Guilty 
TCN: II 10218136 : 
Motion to Suppress 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Motion to Suppress 
Motion to Dismiss 
Motion to Enlarge Time 
Appear & Plead Not Guilty 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Appear & Plead Not Guilty I Smith 
Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Defendant's Request for Discovery 
Motion Denied 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Motion to Suppress I Dismiss I Enlarge Time Denied 
Response to Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
State/City Response to Discovery 


















ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-MD-2015-12139 
Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
State/City Request for Discovery 
Response to Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
State/City Response to Discovery/Supplemental 
Response to Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
State/City Response to Discovery/Supplemental 
Response to Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Defendant's Response to Discovery 
Response to Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
State/City Response to Discovery/ Supplemental 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Magistrate Minutes & Notice of Hearing 
Hearing Vacated 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 11/12/2015 08:15 AM- Hearing Vacated 
Conference Held 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Hearing result for BC Pretrial Conference scheduled on 10/19/2015 09:45 AM· Conference 
Held 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss 11/19/2015 03:30 PM) 
Motion to Dismiss 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Motion To Dismiss 
BC Pretrial Conference (9:45 AM) (Judicial Officer: Swain, Kevin) 
CANCELED Jury Trial (8: 15 AM) (Judicial Officer: Swain, Kevin) 
Vacated 
Response 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 
Memorandum 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Memorandum in Support of Mation to Dismiss 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Magistrate Minutes & Notice of Hearing 
Continued 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Hearing result/or Motion to Dismiss scheduled on 11/1912015 03:30 PM· Continued 




















ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-MD-2015-12139 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/06/201610:30 AM) 
Motion to Dismiss (3:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Swain, Kevin) 
Response to Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Defendant's Response to Discovery/ Supplemental 
Response 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
State's Second Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Magistrate Minutes & Notice of Hearing 
Conference Held 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 01/06/201610:30 AM: Conference Held 
Continued 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on O 1106/2016 10: 30 AM: Continued , 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/08/2016 11 :00 AM) 
Motion Hearing (10:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Swain, Kevin) 
Memorandum 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Memorandum In Response to Timeliness of Motion to Dismiss Citation 
Conference Held 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 02/08/201611:00 AM: Conference Held 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 04/06/2016 08:15 AM) 
Notice of Hearing 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Notice Of Hearing 
Motion Hearing (11:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Swain, Kevin) 
Motion for Reconsideration 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Motion to Reconsider Definition of Motot Vehicle Within Jury Instructions 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 


















ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-MD-2015-12139 
Defendant's Motion Left to 4/612016 
Response to Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
State/City Response to Discovery I Supplemental 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Requested Inclusion of Motor Vehicle Definition, and Exclusions, Within Jury Instructions 
Objection 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Objection to the Defendant's Request for Jury Instructions 
Response to Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
State/City Response to Discovery I Supplemental 
Stipulation 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Stipulation to Continue JI' 
Continued 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 04/06/2016 08:15 AM: Continued 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 06/28/2016 08: 15 AM) 
Notice of Hearing 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Notice Of Hearing 
Jury Trial (8:15 AM) (Judicial Officer: Swain, Kevin) 
Amended Complaint Filed 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Amended Complaint Filed 
Hearing Vacated 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 06/28/2016 08: 15 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 08/19/2016 02:00 PM) 
Stipulation 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Stipulation to Facts 
Notice of Hearing 
Party: Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Notice Of Hearing 
CANCELED Jury Trial (8:15 AM) (Judicial Officer: Swain, Kevin) 
Vacated 
ffl Pretrial Memorandum 











ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-MD-2015-12139 
Notice of Hearing 
Sentencing (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Swain, Kevin) 
08/19/2016 Continued to 09/30/2016- Cont- Other-McKie, Chad Christopher 
Amended Plea (Judicial Officer: Swain, Kevin) 
1. Driving Under the Influence 
Guilty 
TCN: 1110218136 : 
Disposition (Judicial Officer: Swain, Kevin) 
I. Driving Under the Influence 
Guilty 
TCN: 1110218136 : 
Sentence (Judicial Officer: Swain, Kevin) 
1. Driving Under the Influence 
Misdemeanor Sentence 
Condition - Adult: 
I. Alcohol Education, 09/30/2016, 09/30/2016 
2. Unsupervised Probation, Obey all laws. Notify Court of change of address., 
09/30/2016- 09/30/2018, 09/30/2016 
Fee Totals: 





Comment ($1000 Suspended) 
Confinement 
Type: 
Facility: Ada County Jail 
Term: 180 Days 
Suspended: 160 Days 
Effective Date: 09/30/2016 
Pre-Sentence Credit for Time Served 
Credit Term: 1 Day 
Other: 
Duration: 19 Days 
License Suspension 
Type: Driver's License 
Duration: 365 Days 













ffl Notice of Defendant Responsibilities after Sentencing 
ffl Judgment of Conviction 
ffl Notification of Subsequent/Enhanced Penalties 
ffl Order Suspending Driving Privileges, Notice to Defendant-DOT 





















ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-MD-2015-12139 
Case Final Judgment Entered 
ffl Appeal Filed in District Court 
Notice of Appeal 
fflMotion 
Motion to Stay Sentence and Judgment of Conviction, Pending Appeal(s) 
ffl Order 
To Stay Sentence And Judgment Of Conviction, Pending Appea/(s) 
fflorder 
Governing Procedure on Appeal 
fflEstimate 
of Appeal 





of Lodging Transcript 
ffl Miscellaneous 
Transcript Lodged 
ffl Deferred Payment Agreement 
ffl Transcript Filed 
fflNotice 
of Filing Transcript on Appeal 
ffl BriefFiled 
Appellant's Opening Brief 
fflMotion 




to Augment Clerk's Record on Appeal 
fflMotion 
to Augment Clerk's Record on Appeal 











ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE NO. CR-MD-2015-12139 
fflorder 
to Augment the Record on Appeal 
ffl Brief Filed 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
Notice of Hearing 
ffl Oral Argument (2:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Schroeder, Gerald F.) 
Events: 03/27/2017Notice of Hearing 
~ Court Minutes 
ffl Decision or Opinion 
on Appeal 
ffl Notice of Appeal 
Appeal Filed in Supreme Court 
Defendant McKie, Chad Christopher 
Total Charges 
Total Payments and Credits 
Balance Due as of 8/23/2017 
FINANCIAL INFORMATION 




Printed on 08/23/2017 at 2:38 PM 
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BOISE POLICE DEPT. " . . ·# 1454043 .,. 
IDAHO UNIFORM CITATION 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 4TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF I· ' 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO COMPLAINT AND s·uMMONS 
' l D Infraction Citation ' 
) D Misdemeanor Citation n~ G?~ (.' ~ D Accident Involved 
-------+,~La~st~N-a-me-~---~~) D Commercial Vehicle ,, 
VS. 
CL~ G ) Driven by this Driver 







_A_D_A __ County, Idaho. 
~ 
Video 
-~~~--- 0 YO NqPOLICE DEPT. 
Serial #/Address ..,, 
Date Witnessing Officer Serial #/Address Dept. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT: 
I ! ' . ' j 
You are hereby summoned to appear before the Clerk of the Magistrate's Court of the 
District Court of ADA County, BOISE , Idaho: 
located at 200 W. FRONT STREET on or after -----~ 20 __ ., 
but dil>r before i , 20 __ _, at 8 A.M.-4 o'clock PM. 
lU f;Q -- -
I ac~wlefirecefi-)of this summo'71, <W19?.W'Pn:1ise to appe·ar at the time indicated. 
- -49 ~ ' t,~-~~-tW 
W c-., § Defendant's Signature I 
I he~ ce!t' ser,&i upon the defe ~on 8 · ef? ,20 L5 ---
a: "O Officer 
NOTICE: See reve~ side of your copy for PENALTY an 
COURT COPY VIOLATION #1 le .. riv· --~--------
000011
- • IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) MAGISTRATE MINUTES/ NOTICE OF HEARING 





) Event Date: ----1..4~~~LP~:__-J.~.LLILLr-JL..dt...i-4.!~~ 
) 
) Judge: ---\:-----:::,-..__.,n-'-____,_~---· 
) 
) Case Called: ---+-----'c-::,,e.-"-'=---+---
Defendant. ) 
-------------------,c----( ) Interpreter: ---::::::~::::::::::;:---+--t--------
D AC 'ti'sc IT.AD GC D MC ___;;_f--..,..S.~b"----'-1.~~f--- PD/ Private 
Defen~;nt: ~-Present D Not Present D In Gust dy D PD Appointed 
D Defendant failed to appear. Bond forfeited/ROR revoked. 
pdvised Right Not Guilty D Guilty / Admit D 
__________________________ D Release Defendant, This Case Only 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
D Sentencing on _____________ at _____ am/pm w/ Judge _______ _ 
D Court Trial Conference on _________ at _____ am/pm w/ Judge _______ _ 
D Court Trial o~ 
~ Pre-Trial Co~n 
~ at am/pm w/ Judge _______ _ al~ at -----am/pm w/ Judge--------
b Jury Trial on ______________ at _____ am/pm w/ Judge _______ _ 
D _________ on _________ at _____ am/pm w/ Judge _______ _ 
D Contact the Ada County Public Defender, 200 W. Front St., Rm. 1107, Boise, ID 83702, telephone (208) 287-7400. 
You must appear as scheduled above. Failure to do so will result in a warrant being issued for your arrest, or 
default judgment may be entered if you are charged with an infraction. 
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE, 200 W. FRONT STREET, BOISE, ID 83702 
I hereby certify that copies of this notice were served as follows: 
Defendant: Hand Delivered D Via Counsel D 
lntdept Mail D 
lntdept Mail D 
Signature ______________ _ 
Defense Atty: Hand Delivered D 








VERNON K. SMITH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Idaho State Bar No. 1365 
Telephone: (208) 345-1125 
Fax: (208) 345-1129 
Attorney for Defendant 
VERNON K SMITH • PAGE 02 
:~======~FIUiO~PMiir-i.~~--
Sfp O+ 20f5 
CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH 
By MAURA 0, e.... • Clerk DePUTY-vN 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FORTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN ANO FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 












Case No. CR-MD-2015-0012139 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
MOTION TO ENLARGE TIME 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Chad C. McKie, by and through his attorney 
of record, Vernon K. Smith, and does request this Court to suppress any evidence 
illegally obtained in this action in accordance with Rule 12 (b) (3), I.C.R., and 
Dismiss the action for such reasons as may be found to exist which require such 
action, which, upon discovery, may include any violations of Defendant's 
Constitutional rights, such as Double Jeopardy, unlawful search and seizure and 
any statutory rights as may be provided for by the Statutes of the State of Idaho. 
At present, Defendant's counsel is unable to articulate the precise category 
of evidence to be suppressed or precise grounds and cause for dismissal, without 
first obtaining and reviewing all responses to Defendant's Discovery Request as 
000013
.. t:l15 13: 35 20834 • VERNON K SMITH. 
PAGE 03 
filed in this action, and any related administrative actions that may have been taken 
against Defendant by any agency, including such agencies as the Department of 
Transportation, the Idaho State Tax Commission, and the disclosure of multiple 
citations as may be alleged against Defendant for the same act or omission, and 
the further need to determine what probable cause existed for any action as may 
have been undertaken in the first instance. Upol'! receiving all responses from the 
State of Idaho, along with review of all tape recordings, police reports, probable 
cause hearings, determinations relative to search warrants, B.A.C. Hearings or 
other determinations and reviews of probable cause issues, disclosure of multiple 
citations, or administrative proceedings, then, at that time Defendant, through 
counsel, may then supplement the pleadings in support of these Motions and 
schedule the same for further Hearing. Defendant does move this Court to enlarge 
the time within which to schedule any needed hearing on this Motion, as Defendant 
cannot presently go forward with any hearings with such issues of suppression and 
dismissal till a later date. 
That Defendant will notice his Motion for hearing and produce testimony as 
needed at the hearing upon his Motion to Supp 
Dated This 4th day of September 2 15. 
· MOT~Ou\J DENIED 
· (\ emon K. Smith ·'N Q he-£\ ~ yO ( Attorney for Defendant 
Y'IW~TP'f'\ 0-.1 ~h \~ ~j ,~+?" 
,~ 
MOTIONTOSUPPRESSP.2 ' °\- )i7- )'~ 
000014
_o:115 13: 36 VERNON K SMIT. 
PAGE 04 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 4th day of September 2015, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following 
persons at the following addresses as follows: 
Clerk of the Court 
Fourth Judicial District 
Ada County 
200 West Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Boise City Attorneys 
P.O. Box500 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS P. 3 
( } 





{ } U.S. Mail 
( x ) Fax 384-4454 
-----r··-·------ "t··---------1::@nd Delivered 
''""-. 
000015






VERNON K. SMITH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Idaho State Bar No. 1365 
Telephone: (208) 345-1125 
Fax: (208) 345-1129 
Attorney for Defendant 
AJ#.., ____ n.t-~~+--
SEP 04 2015 
CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH, Clerk 
By MAURA OLSON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 













Case No. CR-MD-2015-0012139 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
WITH NOT GUil TY PLEA 
TO: THE STATE OF IDAHO, PLAINTIFF, BOISE CITY PROSECUTING 
ATTORNEY, AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
YOU AND EACH OF YOU Will please take notice that the undersigned 
hereby makes an appearance as Attorney of Record for the Defendant in the 
above-entitled action. 
Furthermore, said Defendant, Marvin P. Blake, by and through his attorney, 
Vernon K. Smith, enters a plea of not guilty and demands a speedy trial in 
accordance with Idaho Code, § 18-8005(A). to the alleged violation of Driving 
Under the Influence Idaho Code § 49-456(3), to the alleged violation of Fictitious 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE P. 1 
000016
A/2015 13:36 VERNON K SMITH -
PAGE 06 
Display of Plate or Registration Card and Idaho Code §49-1232, to the alleged 
violation of Failure to Provide Proof of Insurance. 
Dated this 4th day of September 201q,:'/,, 
\~, 
Vernon K. Smith 
Attorney for Defenda 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
\, 
\, 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 4th day of September 2015, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following 
persons at the following addresses as follows: 
Cieri< of the Court 
Fourth Judicial District 
Ada County 
200 West Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Boise City Prosecutor 
P.O. Box500 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE P. 2 
( ) 











- -IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT ~--izr--:D~'!?:::-,~,LE~O ----, l,,,L l~r P.M ___ _ OCT 1 9 2015 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADACHRtSTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By VICKY EMERY 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) MAGISTRATE MINUTES / NOTICE OF ~XRING 









) Case Called: _________ _ 
Defendant. ) 
________________ ) D Interpreter: ___ N..,,._..i.A:.....__ ________ _ 
DAc~D EAD GcD MC PD / Private V }<CS ----------
Defendant: D Present D Not Present D In Custody D PD Appointed D PD Denied D Waived Attorney 
D Defendant failed to appear. Bond forfeited/ROR revoked. Bench Warrant issued. Bond $ _______ _ 
D Advised Rights D Not Guilty D Guilty/ Admit D Written Guilty Plea D No Contact D Pre-Trial Release Order 
/JJ.. ~J clo±,, Q>:) O,l,em<.1.ti.Ji 14 m(J~~ i<: O«~ 
_________________________ D Release Defendant, This Case Only 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
D Sentencing on _____________ at ____ am/pm w/ Judge ______ _ 
D Court Trial Conference on _________ at ____ am/pm w/ Judge ______ _ 
D Court Trial on _____________ at ____ am/pm w/ Judge ______ _ 
D Pre-Trial Conference on at ---------- -------
D Jury Trial on------------~ I moh1on 
D Contact the Ada County Public Defender, 200 W. Front St., Rm. 110 , oise, ID 83702, tele one (208) 2 
I hereby certify that copies of this notice were served as follows: 
Defendant: Hand Delivered D Via Counse;Y Signature ,L~~~~2",E...-:::::::=,,,,,-~-~,---
Defense Atty: Hand Delivere~ lntdept Mail D 
Prosecutor: Hand Delivere~ lntdept Mail D 
Magi trate Judge (for Pre-Trial Memorandum) 




02/03 VERNON K SMIT. 
NQ __ -t--"t--~~----
VERNON K. SMITH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Idaho State Bar No. 1365 
Telephone: (208) 345-1125 
Fax: (208) 345-1129 
Attorney/or Defendant 
A.M _____ _....r, -----
OCT 1 9 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By KATRINA CHRISTENSEN 
OEPUT'f 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FORTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE Of IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plamtiff, 
v. 












Case No. CR-l\1D-2015-0012139 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Chad C. McKie, by and through his attorney of 
record, Vernon K. Smith, and does herewith move this Court to dismiss this action currently 
pending against this Defendant, for the reasons the alleged acts of this Defendant do not 
come under the purview of§ 18-8004, Idaho Code, as the Defendant was operating a moped, 
not a motor vehicle as defined under the Statutes of the State of Idaho, and therefore this 
Defendant is not subject to the provisions of Title 18. Chapter 80, Statutes of the State of 
Idaho regarding the operation of a "motor vehicle", under the influence of alcohol. This 
pending charge should be dismissed by the Court, as this Court does not have subject matter 
jurisdiction over this Defendant, as mopeds, as defined by the Statute of Idaho are not 
considered "motor vehicles", and consequently not subject to the title or registration 
MOTION TO DISMISS P. 1 
ORIGINAL 
000019
.1.8/2015 18: 39 VERNON K SMIT. PAGE 03/03 
requirements, and any person operating a moped is not subject to the criminal offense of 
operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. 
Thls·issue has been presented previously to the magistrate court in Ada County, and 
Defendant will submit his memorandum setting forth this 
for dismissal prior to the scheduled hearing to be con 
Dated th.is 18th day of October, 2015. 
Vernon K. Smith, 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 18th day of October 2015, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregomg to be delivered to the following persons as follows: 
Clerk of the Court 
Fourth Judicial District 
Ada County 
· 200 West Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Boise City Attomey 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500 
( ) 
( X ) 
( ) 









ADA COUNTY MAGISTRATE MINUTES 
Chad Christopher McKie CR-MD-2015-0012139 DOB:
Scheduled Event: Motion to Dismiss Thurs y, November 19, 2015 03:30 PM 
Judge: Kevin Swain Clerk: L.£---l,l.':...L.l.~..:1i:::1,.,, 
Prosecuting Agency: _AC / EA _GC _MC 
Interpreter: f.o/'\ n fl • ....:.~ I) A R...Q_QQ 
Pro: v~ CY~ t/ 
"7( Attorney V)( bin/ di 
• 1 118-8004 M Driving Under the Influence M 
____ Case Called Defendant:~ Present Not Present __ In Custody 
__ Advised of Rights __ Waived Rights __ PD Appointed __ Waived Attorney 
__ Guilty Plea/ PV Admit N/G Plea __ Advise Subsequent Penalty 
Bond $ _____ _ ROR __ Pay/Stay 
~ In Chambers PT Memo __ Written Guilty Plea 
__ Payment Agreement 
No Contact Order 
Finish Release Defendant 
CR-MD-2015-0012139 
000021
• I : . ~ ard-lf 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL TRICT NOV 1 9 2015 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA CHRISTOPHER o. RICH, Clerk 
ey VICKY EMERY 













Case Number: ~1)\$--()l) }~\3°\ 
Event Date: 1-\ E:J J I\ - JC\-}: . · 
Judge:S~ ,., Clerk: '-~i':1 · 
) Case Called: _________ _ __)a'.:1n Chambers 
) 
_________________ ) D Interpreter:------~--...--_.......,._ ____ _ 
------PD/ Private _\)..,.____.,._,,:v~---=-S---~~tflJ..-...:!-.',.__\ --DA~ BC D EA D GC D MC 
Defendant: D Present D Not Present D In Custody D PD Appointed D PD Denied D Waived Attorney 
D Defendant failed to appear. Bond forfeited/ROR revoked. Bench Warrant issued. Bond $ ________ _ 
D A vised Rights D Not uilty D Guilty/ Admit D Written _G ilty Plea ~"1)~ct ) ?-T~I Re a~e 0 
-~ 
D Release Defendant, This Case Only 
D Sentencing on at am/pm w/ Judge 
D Court Trial Conference on at am/pm w/ Judge 
D Court Trial on at am/pm w/ Judge 
D Pre-Trial Conference on at 
D Jury Trial on ------------=----at _______ _ 
~ ~cs onJ(;\Y\_ ~, 1~ at~-
D Contact the Ada County Public Defender, 200 W. Front St., Rm. 1107, Bois , 
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Prosecutor: Hand DeliveredJ' lntdept Mail D 
Magis rate Judge (for Pre-Trial Memorandum) 
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OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
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TRIAL STATUS MEMORANDUM 
Defendant. 
Appearances: Prosecutor __ G~....,.cA . ... ·~~----.------=--T----------
Defense Counsel :sJ:t:1 ITT f\ S dJ. \ a: h 
.lSf This case is ready for trial. 
D Discovery has been completed. 
~ Cut off date for discovery is 3-' $ - f 6 
State is to prepare a formal complaint for trial. (by _____________ _, 
D Parties are to prepare proposed jury instruction Gf'I the ololl'leRts- of ceunt(s~ bJ::.x $- £, -Jl 
a · e . '- LJ er"' / - }6 
The State may amend the charge to I ,Nk .. f.-Mlr ~ ±n~~ 
D The parties anticipate the case can be tried in one day. 
~ Courtroom media equipment will be needed. (The attorneys are responsible for the 
presentation of evidence.) 
~ Motions subject o Idaho Criminal Rule 1 b) hav 
~ Other -\ ., _,1 <'\, 
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VERNON K. SMITH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Idaho State Bar No. 1365 
Telephone: (208) 345-1125 
Fax: (208) 345-1129 
Attorney for Defendant 
• 
NO. FILED ::29<,; 
A.M ____ __.P.M-'-----
FEB 2 5 2016 
CHRiSTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By ARIC SHANK 
\JJ;i\_ .~ ~ L/-£-Jb 
~\-- ~I 15-
?-d--)'b 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FORTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF -.) 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 




) Case No. CR-MD-2015-0012139 
) 
) MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
) DEFINITION OF MOTOR 
) VEHICLE WITHIN 
) JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
) 
) 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Chad C. McKie, by and through his attorney 
of record, Vernon K. Smith, and does request this Court to reconsider its current position as 
to how the Court intends to instruct the jury as to the law that applies in this case, relative to 
the definition of "motor vehicle", as it is currently defined by statute. To date, the 
Prosecution had chosen to cite this Court to review only a Court of Appeal's Decision 
issued in 2014, entitled State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 318 P.3d 955 (Ct. of Appeals, 
2014), which dealt with a UTV, and therein spoke only to a portion of the definition of 
"motor vehicle" as defined within the Idaho statute. In the Trusdall case, the Court of 
Appeals had a UTV to consider, and considered its classification as a "motor vehicle" 
when reviewing the more comprehensive statutory enactment that has come to define 
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what is, and what is not, a "motor vehicle", under Idaho law. The recent statutory 
enactment incorporates specific exclusions to the definition of motor vehicle, and those 
exclusions were not at issue in the Trusdall case during their discussion regarding a 
UTV, as UTV s are not identified within the exclusionary language of that statute. That 
statutory amendment, as was cited in Trusdall, came into being by Legislative 
amendment after the Carpenter and Barnes Decisions had been issued from the Idaho 
Supreme Court (addressed in our prior briefing to this Court). As this Court will recall, 
the Trusdall appeal focused only upon what was then before it, being a UTV, a vehicle 
that has an engine capacity that exceeds 600 cc 's, and nothing by virtue of its makeup to 
allow a UTV to be considered within any of the exclusionary provisions of the motor 
vehicle definition. In defining "motor vehicle," for purposes of § 18-8004, Idaho Code, 
that Court of Appeals recognized the Idaho Supreme Court had relied on §49-123(2)(g), 
Idaho Code, for the definition of "motor vehicle", as it was then being stated in State v. 
Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 381, 987 P.2d 290, 293 (1999). The Court in Barnes determined 
snowmobiles were motor vehicles because they were "self-propelled" as the definition of 
motor vehicle had then ben so,included to be defined. The legislature amended §49-123, 
Idaho Code, to then include part (2)(h), Idaho Code, in subsequent years as identified in 
the code reference cited below, adding certain specific exclusionary aspects of the 
definition of motor vehicle within the statute, so as to therein confirm that certain 
vehicles are specifically exempted, and as also specifically defined in §49-107, Idaho 
Code, which states: 
"Motor vehicle" does not include vehicles that moved solely by human power, 
electric personal assistive mobility devices, motorized wheelchairs, or other such 
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vehicles that are specifically exempt from titling "or" registration requirements under 
Title 49, Idaho Code. (Emphasis by black-underline and quotations added.). The entire 
statutory citation of §49-123, Idaho Code, including Sub-Part (2)(h), Idaho Code, is set 
forth herein, and the relevant portion is highlighted for the convenience of the Court, as 
follows: 
4 9-123. DEFINITIONS V. ( 1) "Variable load 
suspension axle" means an axle or axles designed to support 
a part of the vehicle and load and which can be regulated 
to vary the amount of load supported by such an axle or 
axles and which can be deployed or lifted by the operator 
of the vehicle. ( See also section 4 9-11 7, Idaho Code) 
(a) "Fully raised" means that the variable load suspension 
axle is in an elevated position preventing the tires on 
such axle from having any contact with the roadway. 
(b) "Fully deployed" means that the variable load 
suspension axle is supporting a portion of the weight of 
the loaded vehicle as controlled by the preset pressure 
regulator valve. 
(2) "Vehicl.e" means: 
(a) General. Every device in, upon, or by which any person 
or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a 
highway, excepting devices used exclusively upon stationary 
rails or tracks. 
(b) Assembled vehicle or vessel. A vehicle or vessel, not 
including a salvage vehicle or vessel, that has been 
constructed using major component parts from two ( 2) or 
more vehicles or vessels or that has been repaired using 
new factory major component parts so that the resulting 
vehicle or vessel has the same appearance as a vehicle or 
vessel that was manufactured under a specific make and 
model by a manufacturer. A vehicle or vessel utilizing a 
kit for the entire body or a glider kit vehicle is not an 
assembled vehicle. 
(c) Authorized emergency vehicle. Vehicles operated by any 
fire department or law enforcement agency of the state of 
Idaho or any political subdivision of the state, 
ambulances, vehicles belonging to personnel of voluntary 
fire departments while in performance of official duties 
only, vehicles belonging to, or operated by EMS personnel 
certified or otherwise recognized by the EMS bureau of the 
Idaho department of health and welfare while in the 
performance of emergency medical services, sheriff's search 
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and rescue vehicles which are under the immediate 
supervision of the county sheriff, wreckers which are 
engaged in motor vehicle recovery operations and are 
blocking part or all of one ( 1) or more lanes of traffic, 
other emergency vehicles designated by the director of the 
Idaho state police or vehicles authorized by the Idaho 
transportation board and used in the enforcement of laws 
specified in section 40-510, Idaho Code, pertaining to 
vehicles of ten thousand (10,000) pounds or greater. 
(d) Commercial vehicle or commercial motor vehicle. For 
the purposes of chapters 3 and 9 of this title, driver's 
licenses and vehicle equipment, a motor vehicle or 
combination of motor vehicles designed or used to transport 
passengers or property if the motor vehicle: 
( i) Has a manufacturer's gross combination weight rating 
(GCWR) in excess of twenty-six thousand (26,000) pounds 
inclusive of a towed unit with a manufacturer's gross 
vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of more than ten thousand 
(10,000) pounds; or 
(ii) Has a manufacturer's gross vehicle weight rating 
(GVWR) in excess of twenty-six thousand (26,000) pounds; or 
(iii) Is designed to transport sixteen (16) or more people, 
including the driver; or 
(iv) Is of any size and is used in the transportation of 
materials found to be hazardous for the purposes of the 
hazardous material transportation act and which require the 
motor vehicle to be placarded under the hazardous materials 
regulations (49 CFR part 172, subpart F). 
For the purposes of chapter 4, title 49, Idaho Code, motor 
vehicle registration, a vehicle or combination of vehicles 
of a type used or maintained for the transportation of 
persons for hire, compensation or profit, or the 
transportation of property for the owner of the vehicle, or 
for hire, compensation, or profit, and shall include fixed 
load specially constructed vehicles exceeding the limits 
imposed by chapter 10, title 49, Idaho Code, and including 
drilling rigs, construction, drilling and wrecker cranes, 
log j ammers, log loaders, and similar vehicles which are 
normally operated in an overweight or oversize condition or 
both, but shall not include those vehicles registered 
pursuant to sections 4 9-4 02 and 4 9-4 02A, Idaho Code, or 
exempted by section 49-426, Idaho Code. A motor vehicle 
used in a ridesharing arrangement that has a seating 
capacity for not more than fifteen (15) persons, including 
the driver, shall not be a "commercial vehicle" under the 
provisions of this title relating to equipment 
requirements, rules of the road, or registration. 
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(e) Farm vehicle. A vehicle or combination of vehicles 
owned by a farmer or rancher, or by their designated agent, 
which are operated over public highways, and used 
exclusively to transport unprocessed agricultural products 
raised, owned or grown by the owner of the vehicle to 
market or place of storage; and shall include the 
transportation by the farmer or rancher of any equipment, 
supplies or products purchased by that farmer or rancher 
for his own use, and used in the farming or ranching 
operation or used by a farmer partly in transporting 
agricultural products or livestock from the farm of another 
farmer that were originally grown or raised on the farm, or 
when used partly in transporting agricultural supplies, 
equipment, materials or livestock to the farm of another 
farmer for use or consumption on the farm but not 
transported for hire, and shall not include vehicles of 
husbandry or vehicles registered pursuant to sections 4 9-
402 and 49-402A, Idaho Code. 
( f) Foreign vehicle. Every vehicle of a type required to 
be registered under the provisions of this title brought 
into this state from another state, territory or country 
other than in the ordinary course of business by or through 
a manufacturer or dealer and not registered in this state. 
(g) Glider kit vehicle. Every large truck manufactured 
from a kit manufactured by a manufacturer of large trucks 
which consists of a frame, cab complete with wiring, 
instruments, fenders and hood and front axles and wheels. 
The "glider kit" is made into a complete assembly by the 
addition of the engine, transmission, rear axles, wheels 
and tires. 
(h) Motor vehicl.e. Every vehicle which is self-propelled, 
and for the purpose of titling and registration meets 
federal motor vehicle safety standards as defined in 
section 49-107, Idaho Code. Motor vehicl.e does not incl.ude 
vehicles moved solely by human power, electric personal 
assistive mobility devices and motorized wheelchairs or 
other such vehicl.es that are speci£ical.l.y exempt £rom 
titl.ing or registration requirements under titl.e 49, Idaho 
Code. 
(i) Multipurpose passenger vehicle (MPV). For the purposes 
of section 49-966, Idaho Code, a motor vehicle designed to 
carry ten (10) or fewer persons which is constructed either 
on a truck chassis or with special features for occasional 
off-road operation. 
(j) Neighborhood electric vehicle (NEV). A self-propelled, 
electrically powered, four-wheeled motor vehicle which is 
emission free and conforms to the definition and 
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requirements for low-speed vehicles as adopted in the 
federal motor vehicle safety standards for low-speed 
vehicles under federal regulations at 4 9 CFR part 571. An 
NEV shall be titled, registered and insured according to 
law as provided respectively in chapters 4, 5 and 12, title 
i2_, Idaho Code, and shall only be operated by a licensed 
driver. Operation of an NEV on a highway shall be allowed 
as provided in section 49-663, Idaho Code. 
(k) Noncommercial vehicle. For the purposes of chapter 4, 
title 49, Idaho Code, motor vehicle registration, a 
noncommercial vehicle shall not include those vehicles 
required to be registered under sections 4 9-4 02 and 4 9-
4 02A, Idaho Code; and means all other vehicles or 
combinations of vehicles which are not commercial vehicles 
or farm vehicles, but shall include motor homes. A 
noncommercial vehicle shall include those vehicles having a 
combined gross weight not in excess of sixty thousand 
(60,000) pounds and not held out for hire, used for 
purposes related to private use and not used in the 
furtherance of a business or occupation for compensation or 
profit or for transporting goods for other than the owner. 
(1) Passenger car. For the purposes of section 49-966, 
Idaho Code, a motor vehicle, except a multipurpose 
passenger vehicle, motorcycle or trailer, designed to carry 
ten (10) or fewer persons. 
(m) Rebuilt salvage vehicle or vessel. Every vehicle or 
vessel previously determined or declared to be a salvage 
vehicle that has been rebuilt or repaired using like make 
and model parts and visually appears as a vehicle or vessel 
that was originally constructed under a distinctive 
manufacturer. This includes a salvage vehicle or vessel 
which is damaged to the extent that a II rebuilt salvage 11 
brand is required to be added to the title. 
(n) Replica vehicle or vessel. A vehicle or vessel made to 
replicate any vehicle or vessel previously manufactured, 
using metal, fiberglass or other composite materials. 
Replica vehicles must look like the original vehicle being 
replicated but may use a more modern drive train. At a 
minimum, replica vehicles shall meet the same federal motor 
vehicle safety and emission standards in effect for the 
year and type of vehicle being replicated. 
( o) Salvage vehicle or vessel. Any vehicle or vessel for 
which a salvage certificate of title, salvage bill of sale 
or other documentation has been issued showing evidence 
that the vehicle or vessel has been declared salvage or 
which has been damaged to the extent that the owner, or an 
insurer, or other person acting on behalf of the owner, 
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determines that the cost of parts and labor minus the 
salvage value makes it uneconomical to repair or rebuild. 
When an insurance company has paid money or has made other 
monetary settlement as compensation for a total loss of any 
vehicle or vessel, such vehicle shall be considered to be a 
salvage vehicle or vessel. 
(p) Specially constructed vehicle or vessel. Every vehicle 
or vessel of a type required to be registered not 
originally constructed under a distinctive name, make, 
model or type by a generally recognized manufacturer of 
vehicles or vessels and not materially altered from its 
original construction and cannot be visually identified as 
a vehicle or vessel produced by a particular manufacturer. 
This includes: 
(i) A vehicle or vessel that has been structurally 
modified so that it does not have the same appearance as a 
similar vehicle or vessel from the same manufacturer; or 
(ii) A vehicle or vessel that has been constructed 
entirely from homemade parts and materials not obtained 
from other vehicles or vessels; or 
(iii) A vehicle or vessel that 
using major component parts 
manufactured vehicles or vessels 
as a specific make or model; or 
has been constructed by 
from one ( 1) or more 
and cannot be identified 
(iv) A vehicle or vessel constructed by the use of a 
custom kit that cannot be visually identified as a specific 
make or model. All specially constructed vehicles of a type 
required to be registered shall be certified by the owner 
to meet all applicable federal motor vehicle safety 
standards in effect at the time construction is completed, 
and all requirements of chapter 9, title 49, Idaho Code. 
(q) Specialty off-highway vehicle. A specialty off-highway 
vehicle as defined in section 67-7101, Idaho Code. 
(r) Tank vehicle. 
(i) Any commercial motor vehicle transporting, or designed 
to transport, any liquid or gaseous materials within: 
1. A tank that is either permanently or temporarily 
attached or secured to the vehicle or chassis and has a 
rated capacity of one thousand (1,000) gallons or more; or 
2. Multiple tanks either permanently or temporarily 
attached or secured, when the aggregate rated capacity of 
those tanks is one thousand (1,000) gallons or more, as 
determined by adding the capacity of each individual tank 
with a capacity of more than one hundred nineteen ( 119) 
gallons. 
(ii) If a commercial motor vehicle transports one ( 1) or 
more tanks that are manifested either as empty or as 
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residue and that are actually empty or contain only 
residue, those tanks shall not be considered in determining 
whether the vehicle is a tank vehicle. 
(s) Total loss vehicle. Every vehicle that is deemed to be 
uneconomical to repair. A total loss shall occur when an 
insurance company or any other person pays or makes other 
monetary settlement to the owner when it is deemed to be 
uneconomical to repair the damaged vehicle. The 
compensation for total loss as defined herein shall not 
include payments by an insurer or other person for medical 
care, bodily injury, vehicle rental or for anything other 
than the amount paid for the actual damage to the vehicle. 
( 3) "Vehicle identification number." ( See 
"identifying number," section 49-110, Idaho Code) 
( 4) "Vehicle salesman" means any person who, for a 
salary, commission or compensation of any kind, is employed 
either directly or indirectly, or regularly or occasionally 
by any dealer to sell, purchase or exchange, or to 
negotiate for the sale, purchase or exchange of vehicles. 
(See also ''full-time salesman," section 49-107, Idaho Code, 
and "part-time salesman," section 49-117, Idaho Code) 
(5) "Vessel." (See section 67-7003, Idaho Code) 
( 6) "Veteran." ( See section 65-502, Idaho Code) 
( 7) "Violation" means a conviction of a misdemeanor 
charge involving a moving traffic violation, or an 
admission or judicial determination of the commission of an 
infraction involving a moving traffic infraction, except 
bicycle infractions. 
History: 
[49-123, added 1988, ch. 265, sec. 2, p. 569; am. 
1989, ch. 285, sec. 4, p. 703; am. 1989, ch. 310, sec. 6, 
p. 777; am. 1989, ch. 318, sec. 2, p. 818; am. 1990, ch. 
45, sec. 10, p. 83; am. 1990, ch. 295, sec. 1, p. 815; am. 
1991, ch. 272, sec. 5, p. 692; am. 1991, ch. 288, sec, 2, 
p. 741; am. 1992, ch. 115, sec. 4, p. 351; am. 1993, ch. 
376, sec. 1, p. 1377; am. 1994, ch. 296, sec. 1, p. 934; 
am. 1995, ch. 122, sec. 2, p. 528; am. 1996, ch. 308, sec. 
1, p. 1010; am. 1997, ch. 355, sec. 1, p. 1047; am. 1999, 
ch. 298, sec. 1, p. 746; am. 2000, ch. 469, sec. 110, p. 
1566; am. 2002, ch. 160, sec. 3, p. 470; am. 2005, ch. 183, 
sec. 3, p. 562; am. 2006, ch. 51, sec. 18, p. 159; am. 
2008, ch. 84, sec. 1, p. 215; am. 2008, ch. 198, sec. 4, p. 
636; am. 2008, ch. 330, sec. 2, p. 904; am. 2009, ch. 11, 
sec. 18, p. 28; am. 2009, ch. 157, sec. 5, p. 462; am. 
2014, ch. 38, sec. 3, p. 70; am. 2014, ch. 91, sec. 2, p. 
245; am. 2015, ch. 208, sec. 3, p. 639.] 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER DEFINITION OF MOTOR VEHICLE WITHIN JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS. P. 8 
000034
-
§49-114, Idaho Code, including Sub-Part (m)(9) Idaho Code, is the statutory 
provision that specifically exempts mopeds from titling requirements, thereby 
establishing the exemption mentioned to exist from within §49-123(2)(h), Idaho Code, as 
set forth above, and the relevant portion of this exclusionary provision, that addresses the 
titling exemption, is 49-114(m)(9), Idaho Code, and is highlighted for the convenience of 
the Court, as follows: 
4 9-114. DEFINITIONS -- M. ( 1) "Maj or component part" 
for vehicles means a rear or rear clip, frame or subframe, 
body or center, passenger area, cab, front or front end 
assembly or front clip or nose section or roof of passenger 
compartment. "Maj or component part" for vessels means a 
hull, bow, gunnel, stern or transom, or permanently 
attached propulsion unit. 
( 2) "Manifest" means a form used for identifying the 
quantity, composition, origin, routing, waste or material 
identification code and destination of hazardous material 
or hazardous waste during any transportation within, 
through, or to any destination in this state. 
(3) "Manufactured home." (See section 39-4105, Idaho 
Code) 
( 4) "Manufacturer" means every person engaged in the 
business of. constructing or assembling vehicles of a type 
required to be registered at an established place of 
business in this state. The term, for purposes of sections 
49-1613 through 49-1615, 49-1617, 49-1622 and 49-1623, 
Idaho Code, shall include a distributor and other factory 
representatives. 
( 5) "Manufacturer's year designation" means the model 
year designated by the vehicle manufacturer, and not the 
year in which the vehicle is, in fact, manufactured. 
( 6) "Maximum gross weight" means the scale weight of 
a vehicle, equipped for operation, to which shall be added 
the maximum load to be carried as declared by the owner in 
making application for registration. When a vehicle against 
which a registration fee is assessed is a combination of 
vehicles, the term "maximum gross weight" means the 
combined maximum gross weights of all vehicles in the 
combination. 
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(7) "Metal tire." (See "Tires," section 49-121, Idaho 
Code) 
( 8) "Mileage" means actual distance that a vehicle 
has traveled. 
(9) "Moped" means a 1imited-speed motor-driven cyc1e 
having: 
(a) Both motorized and peda1 propu1sion that is not 
capab1e 0£ prope11ing the vehic1e at a speed in excess 0£ 
thirty (30) mi1es per hour on 1eve1 ground, whether two (2) 
or three (3) whee1s are in contact with the ground during 
operation. I£ an interna1 combustion engine is used, the 
disp1acement sha11 not exceed £i£ty (50) cubic centimeters 
and the moped sha11 have a power drive system that 
£unctions direct1y or automatica11y without c1utching or 
shi£ting by the operator a£ter the drive system is engaged; 
or 
(b) Two (2) wheels or three ( 3) wheels with no pedals, 
which is powered solely by electrical energy, has an 
automatic transmission, a motor which produces less than 
two (2) gross brake horsepower, is capable of propelling 
the device at a maximum speed of not more than thirty (30) 
miles per hour on level ground and as originally 
manufactured, meets federal motor vehicle safety standards 
for motor-driven cycles. A moped is not required to be 
tit1ed and no motorcycle endorsement is required for its 
operator. 
( 10) "Motorbike" means a vehicle as defined in section 
67-7101, Idaho Code. Such vehicle shall be titled and may 
be approved for motorcycle registration pursuant to section 
49-402, Idaho Code, upon certification by the owner of the 
installation and use of conversion components that make the 
motorbike compliant with federal motor vehicle safety 
standards. 
( 11) "Motorcycle" means every motor vehicle having a 
seat or saddle for the use of the rider, designed to travel 
on not more than three (3) wheels in contact with the 
ground or designed to travel on two ( 2) wheels in contact 
with the ground which is modified by the addition of two 
( 2) stabilizing wheels on the rear of the motor vehicle, 
that meets the federal motor vehicle safety standards as 
originally designed, and includes a converted motorbike, 
but does not include a motor-driven cycle, a motorbike, a 
tractor or a moped. 
( 12) "Motor carrier" means an indi victual, partnership, 
corporation or other legal entity engaged in the 
transportation by motor vehicle of persons or property in 
the furtherance of a business or for hire. 
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(13) "Motor-driven cycle" means a cycle with a motor 
that produces five ( 5) brake horsepower or less as 
originally manufactured that meets federal motor vehicle 
safety standards as originally designed, and does not 
include mopeds. Such vehicle shall be titled and a 
motorcycle endorsement is required for its operation. 
(14) "Motor home" means a vehicular unit designed to 
provide temporary living quarters, built into an integral 
part or permanently attached to a self-propelled motor 
vehicle chassis. The vehicle must contain permanently 
installed independent life support systems which meet the 
national fire protection association (NFPA) 1192 standard 
on recreational vehicles, and provide at least four (4) of 
the following facilities: cooking, refrigeration or icebox, 
self-contained toilet, heating and/or air conditioning, a 
potable water supply system, including a faucet and sink, 
separate 110-125 volt electrical power supply and/or LP-gas 
supply. 
( 15) "Motorized wheelchair" means a motor vehicle with 
a speed not in excess of eight (8) miles per hour, designed 
for and used by a person with a disability. 
( 16) "Motor number." ( See "Identifying number," 
section 49-110, Idaho Code) 
(17) "Motor vehicle." (See "Vehicle," section 49-123, 
Idaho Code) 
( 18) "Motor vehicle liability policy" means an owner's 
or operator's policy of liability insurance, certified as 
provided in section 49-1210, Idaho Code, as proof of 
financial responsibility, and issued by an insurance 
carrier duly authorized to transact business in this state, 
to or for the benefit of the person named therein as 
insured. 
(19) "Motor vehicle record" means any record that 
pertains to a motor vehicle registration, motor vehicle 
title or identification documents or other similar 
credentials issued by the department or other state or 
local agency. 
History: 
[49-114, added 1988, ch. 265, sec. 2, p. 560; am. 
1989, ch. 285, sec. 2, p. 701; am. 1989, ch. 310, sec. 3, 
p. 773; am. 1994, ch. 234, sec. 2, p. 732; am. 1995, ch. 
339, sec. 1, p. 1120; am. 1997, ch. 80, sec. 5, p. 177; am. 
1998, ch. 392, sec. 3, p. 1200; am. 1999, ch. 81, sec. 3, 
p. 240; .am. 1999, ch. 383, sec. 4, p. 1056; am. 2000, ch. 
418, sec. 3, p. 1333; am. 2001, ch. 73, sec. 1, p. 155; am. 
2005, ch. 145, sec. 1, p. 456; am. 2006, ch. 360, sec. 1, 
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p. 1097; am. 2008, ch. 198, sec. 3, p. 634; am. 2008, ch. 
409, sec. 2, p. 1127; am. 2009, ch. 11, sec. 17, p. 26; am. 
2010, ch. 235, sec. 35, p. 570; am. 2013, ch. 39, sec. 1, 
p . 8 0 ; am . 2 0 14 , ch . 3 8 , sec . 1 , p . 6 6 . ] 
This Court must appreciate that a direct and specific reference is made to what is 
exempted from the definition of motor vehicles, and that includes vehicles that are exempt 
from titling or registration requirements under Title 49, Idaho Code. A moped is 
specifically exempted from the titling requirement, making it exempt from being 
defined as a motor vehicle. 
Though, in Trusdall, it was argued that UTV s do not meet federal motor vehicle 
safety standards (FMVSS), (which in many cases that is a very true statement, and for 
that reason, there may have been a basis to seek review with the Idaho Supreme Court), 
but with regard to our case, the more important factor to be gleaned directly from the 
Trusdall case is that UTV s are not identified to be specifically exempted from the titling 
requirements, as are mopeds, declared to be a matter of Idaho law. Trusdall did not 
engage in any discussion that dealt with any of the exclusionary language included and 
embraced within the statutory definition of what does not constitute a "Motor Vehicle" 
as a UTV was not a vehicle that qualified for exemption from within Title 49. Added to 
this analysis is the further determination that our Idaho Supreme Court has already 
addressed the concept of a moped, and specifically recognized such exempt status as it 
was then being identified in a California case that is cited in one of our Idaho Supreme 
Court 2006 decisions, when discussing within their analysis what is and what is not a 
motor vehicle. See Armstrong v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 143 Idaho 135, 139 P.3d 737 
(May 25, 2006), wherein the Court stated: 
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"The Armstrongs argue that this phrase "arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance, or use of any vehicle other than your insured car" is not clear, precise or 
specific. They rely upon Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Galvin, 170 Cal.App.3d 1018, 
1023, 216 Cal.Rptr. 844, 846 (Cal.Ct.App.1985), which held that "a reasonable insured 
could have believed that the term motor vehicle did not include mopeds." At issue in 
Galvin was a provision excluding coverage for injuries sustained by a person occupying a 
motor vehicle owned by the insured but not covered in the policy. A father had obtained 
coverage for his 1979 Dodge, but not his moped, and his son was injured while riding 
the moped. The father contended that the exclusion for other owned motor vehicles did 
not apply to the moped because it was not a motor vehicle. The Galvin court agreed, 
relying upon the facts that mopeds were designed to be propelled by pedaling in addition 
to their motors; that they were exempt from registration under the Vehicle Code; and that 
while motorcycles were defined as being motor vehicles under the Vehicle Code, mopeds 
were not. It stated that while a motorcycle had been held to be motor vehicle under a 
similar exclusionary clause, "the implied analogy between mopeds and motorcycles is 
tenuous and cannot be relied upon as the basis for finding that a moped is a motor 
vehicle." 170 Cal.App.3d at 1022, 216 Cal.Rptr. at 846. The instant case involves a 
motorcycle, not a moped. A motorcycle is defined as a motor vehicle under the Idaho 
motor vehicle code. LC.§ 49-114(10)." 
The current statutory citation for what now defines a motorcycle is now contained 
within §49-114 (m)(l 1), Idaho Code, and that specific definition also takes the occasion 
to specifically exclude mopeds from its definition. That statute now provides as follows: 
(11) "Motorcycle" means every motor vehicle having a seat or saddle for the use of 
the rider, designed to travel on not more than three (3) wheels in contact with the ground or 
designed to travel on two (2) wheels in contact with the ground which is modified by the 
addition of two (2) stabilizing wheels on the rear of the motor vehicle, that meets the federal 
motor vehicle safety standards as originally designed, and includes a converted motorbike, 
but does not include a motor-driven cycle, a motorbike, a tractor or a moped. 
The Supreme Court of Idaho frequently looks to California for its authority, as 
cited below, and Idaho has adopted a statute that similarly relates to the exclusionary 
effects of mopeds from "motor vehicles" in California, just as Idaho has now done, and 
Idaho has cited with approval the case law out of California concerning the statutory 
language that mopeds are not defined as motor vehicles in California, just as they are now 
also specifically exempted from the definition of motor vehicles in Idaho. 
When there is no specific authoritative case on point from an Idaho decision, our 
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courts look to other states to determine if the issue before it for decision has been decided 
elsewhere, and if cases from those other jurisdictions are found, they present persuasive 
authority. Trapp v. Sagle Volunteer Fire Dept., 122 Idaho 655,664,837 P.2d 781, 790 
(1992); Stephens v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 92 Idaho 537,539,447 P.2d 14, 16 (1968). 
The general rule of statutory interpretation that applies in this particular situation is 
that when the Idaho Legislature enacts a statute that has been previously enacted in another 
jurisdiction, there arises a presumption that this statute has been adopted with the "prior 
construction placed upon it by the courts of such other jurisdiction." Hoskins v. Howard, 
132 Idaho 311, 315, 971 P.2d 1135, 1139 (1998) (quoting Nixon v. Triber, 100 Idaho 198, 
200,595 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1979)). See also, People v. Ah Choy, 1 Idaho 317,319 (1870) 
("The laws of this territory are conceded to be copies from the laws in force in California; 
that being so, the Supreme Court ofldaho may very properly, in construing its laws, follow 
the decisions of the Supreme Court in California."). 
The discussion set forth above out of the Idaho Supreme Court in 2006 in the 
Armstrong case addressed the definition of a motorcycle that is used for off-road type hill 
climbing, under what then was §49-114(10), Idaho Code, (now §49-114(m)(l 1), Idaho 
Code), and the clear statutory distinction, by statutory definition, is made readily apparent 
by the separate and distinct definitions as to what motorcycles are defined to be, and that 
mopeds are specifically excluded from that definition, as a moped is addressed 
separately above in (m)(9), where it is listed in the preceding paragraphs above the 
definitions cited for a "motorcycle" and for a "motorbike". 
From the indications given by this Magistrate Court, at the Hearing held on 
February 8, 2016, this Court leaves the impression it intends to endorse a truncated and 
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incomplete definition of "motor vehicle" , not apparently concerned with the exclusionary 
provisions set forth above, and instead intends to focus on only that which is "self-
propelled", without incorporating the specific exemptions within that required definition, and 
for this Magistrate Court to limit the definition to that which is incomplete, renders the 
instruction on the law to be both inaccurate and incomplete, and this Defendant does not 
want to be accused of engaging in "invited error", by holding back, failing to give this lower 
court the opportunity to embrace the correct definition and list of exemption(s) that apply to 
this case, waiting then to file an appeal over the erroneous instructions, following our 
vehement objection and record created over the erroneous instructions given, when we are 
aware of what appears to be the state of the statutory and case law on mopeds in Idaho, and 
the case would need to be remanded for a new trial, as the court would have failed to 
correctly instruct the jury upon the applicable and relevant aspects of the law on mopeds, 
and that, as a matter of law, they are not motor vehicles, as they are vehicles that are 
specifically exempted from that statutory definition. 
These exemptions must also be addressed when considering the definition, 
especially when it is that specific type of vehicle at issue and in question, and this Court may 
now better appreciate the cited language identified in the Armstrong case that was decided 
by our Supreme Court in 2006, as providing the clear authority of Idaho's awareness of 
these vehicles, and the existing authority that specifically addresses the fact mopeds are not 
to be considered as a motor vehicle. The opinion left with this court, opined by the 
prosecution as a result of the State's reference to the Trusdall case, is not the controlling 
authority and law for this Court to rely upon and employ, as a UTV was not among the 
exemptions to the definition of a motor vehicle, as it goes beyond just an analysis of "self-
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propelled" when it relates to specific exemptions declared to be exempt from the definition. 
This Court must appreciate the language used in the Armstrong case, as it speaks to 
the definition of a moped to be exempt from the statutory definition of a motor vehicle, 
citing such treatment from the statutory language from California, which in that 2006 
decision, it preceded the amendment that has been made to "motor vehicle" in recent years 
in Idaho, but now it has become statutorily recognized that mopeds have been made exempt 
in Idaho as well, and that fact exists as a matter of law. Because it now becomes a matter of 
statutory definition and therefore to be and become the applicable law to be applied and 
cited in this case, it would appear there is no rational basis to have a jury trial over what is 
clearly defined to be excluded from what is statutorily defined not to be a motor vehicle 
under Idaho law, as to tell a jury this vehicle is not a motor vehicle, serves only to instruct 
the jury to return a verdict of not guilty, as that is the element that controls this case. 
If this Court harbors any further reservation in this matter, it would be proposed that 
an order be fashioned by the Court, so as to allow a permissive appeal of the issue to the 
Idaho Supreme Court, as the premise upon which the analysis of the Armstrong case is the 
prevailing authority and logic upon which our Suprem~-vui will again a 
of a moped, and its exclusionary status from eing defined as a motor vehicle. 
Dated this 25th day of February, 2016. 
Vernon K. Smitli, 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 25th day of February, 2016, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons as follows: 
Clerk of the Court 
Fourth Judicial District 
Ada County 
200 West Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Boise City Attorney 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, Idaho 83701-05 0 
( ) 
( ) 
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
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) Case No. CR-MD-2015-0012139 
) 
) REQUESTED INCLUSION 
) OF MOTOR VEHICLE 
) DEFINITIONS, AND EXCLUSIONS, 
) WITHIN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
) 
) 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Chad C. McKie, by and through his attorney 
of record, Vernon K. Smith, and does request this Court include the motor vehicle 
definitions, and exclusions, within any jury instructions to be submitted to the jury, in the 
event this case is submitted to a jury for trial. This Court intends to instruct the jury as to the 
law that applies in this case, relative to the definition of "motor vehicle", as it is currently 
defined by statute. The classification of a "motor vehicle" when reviewing the more 
comprehensive statutory enactment that has come to define what is, and what is not, a 
"motor vehicle", under Idaho law. The recent statutory enactment incorporates specific 
exclusions to the definition of motor vehicle, and those exclusions are relevant to this 
case, and must be incorporated in any instructions to the jury, as this exclusionary 
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language is part of the existing statutory scheme on the definition of "Motor Vehicle" in 
Idaho's statutes. 
In defining "motor vehicle," for any purposes, including that of § 18-8004, Idaho 
Code, The legislature enacted their amendment to §49-123, Idaho Code, to then include 
part (2)(h), Idaho Code, adding certain specific exclusionary aspects ofthe definition of 
motor vehicle within the statute, so as to confirm that certain vehicles are specifically 
exempted, as specifically defined in §49-107, Idaho Code, which states: 
"Motor vehicle" does not include vehicles that moved solely by human power, 
electric personal assistive mobility devices, motorized wheelchairs, or other such 
vehicles that are specifically exempt from titling "or" registration requirements under 
Title 49, Idaho Code. (Emphasis by black-underline and quotations added.). The entire 
statutory citation of §49-123, Idaho Code, including Sub-Part (2)(h), Idaho Code, is set 
forth herein, and the relevant portion is highlighted for the convenience of the Court, to 
be included in any jury instructions, as follows: 
4 9-123. DEFINITIONS V. ( 1) "Variable load 
suspension axle" means an axle or axles designed to support 
a part of the vehicle and load and which can be regulated 
to vary the amount of load supported by such an axle or 
axles and which can be deployed or lifted by the operator 
of the vehicle. ( See also section 4 9-11 7, Idaho Code) 
(a) "Fully raised" means that the variable load suspension 
axle is in an elevated position preventing the tires on 
such axle from having any contact with the roadway. 
(b) "Fully deployed" means that the variable load 
suspension axle is supporting a portion of the weight of 
the . loaded vehicle as controlled by the preset pressure 
regulator valve. 
(2) "Vehicl.e" means: 
(a) General. Every device in, upon, or by which any person 
or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a 
highway, excepting devices used exclusively upon stationary 
rails or tracks. 
REQUESTED INCLUSION OF MOTOR VEHICLE DEFINITIONS, AND EXCLUSIONS, 
WITHIN JURY INSTRUCTIONS P. 2 
000045
-
(b) Assembled vehicle or vessel. A vehicle or vessel, not 
including a salvage vehicle or vessel, that has been 
constructed using major component parts from two ( 2) or 
more vehicles or vessels or that has been repaired using 
new factory major component parts so that the resulting 
vehicle or vessel has the same appearance as a vehicle or 
vessel that was manufactured under a specific make and 
model by a manufacturer. A vehicle or vessel utilizing a 
kit for the entire body or a glider kit vehicle is not an 
assembled vehicle. 
(c) Authorized emergency vehicle. Vehicles operated by any 
fire department or law enforcement agency of the state of 
Idaho or any political subdivision of the state, 
ambulances, vehicles belonging to personnel of voluntary 
fire departments while in performance of official duties 
only, vehicles belonging to, or operated by EMS personnel 
certified or otherwise recognized by the EMS bureau of the 
Idaho department of health and welfare while in the 
performance of emergency medical services, sheriff's search 
and rescue vehicles which are under the immediate 
supervision of the county sheriff, wreckers which are 
engaged in motor vehicle recovery operations and are 
blocking part or all of one (1) or more lanes of traffic, 
other emergency vehicles designated by the director of the 
Idaho state police or vehicles authorized by the Idaho 
transportation board and used in the enforcement of laws 
specified in section 40-510, Idaho Code, pertaining to 
vehicles of ten thousand (10,000) pounds or greater. 
(d) Commercial vehicle or commercial motor vehicle. For 
the purposes of chapters 3 and 9 of this title, driver's 
licenses and vehicle equipment, a motor vehicle or 
combination of motor vehicles designed or used to transport 
passehgers or property if the motor vehicle: 
( i) Has a manufacturer's gross combination weight rating 
(GCWR) in excess of twenty-six thousand (26,000) pounds 
inclusive of a towed unit with a manufacturer's gross 
vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of more than ten thousand 
(10,000) pounds; or 
(ii) Has a manufacturer's gross vehicle weight rating 
(GVWR) in excess of twenty-six thousand (26,000) pounds; or 
(iii) Is designed to transport sixteen (16) or more people, 
including the driver; or 
(iv) Is of any size and is used in the transportation of 
materials found to be hazardous for the purposes of the 
hazardous material transportation act and which require the 
motor vehicle to be placarded under the hazardous materials 
regulations (49 CFR part 172, subpart F). 
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For the purposes of chapter 4, title 49, Idaho Code, motor 
vehicle registration, a vehicle or combination of vehicles 
of a type used or maintained for the transportation of 
persons for hire, compensation or profit, or the 
transportation of property for the owner of the vehicle, or 
for hire, compensation, or profit, and shall include fixed 
load specially constructed vehicles exceeding the limits 
imposed by chapter 10, title 49, Idaho Code, and including 
drilling rigs, construction, drilling and wrecker cranes, 
log j ammers, log loaders, and similar vehicles which are 
normally operated in an overweight or oversize condition or 
both, but shall not include those vehicles registered 
pursuant to sections 4 9-4 02 and 4 9-4 02A, Idaho Code, or 
exempted by section 4 9-42 6, Idaho Code. A motor vehicle 
used in a ridesharing arrangement that has a seating 
capacity for not more than fifteen (15) persons, including 
the driver, shall not be a "commercial vehicle" under the 
provisions of this title relating to equipment 
requirements, rules of the road, or registration. 
(e) Farm vehicle. A vehicle or combination of vehicles 
owned by a farmer or rancher, or by their designated agent, 
which are operated over public highways, and used 
exclusively to transport unprocessed agricultural products 
raised, owned or grown by the owner of the vehicle to 
market or place of storage; and shall include the 
transportation by the farmer or rancher of any equipment, 
supplies or products purchased by that farmer or rancher 
for his own use, and used in the farming or ranching 
operation or used by a farmer partly in transporting 
agricultural products or livestock from the farm of another 
farmer that were originally grown or raised on the farm, or 
when used partly in transporting agricultural supplies, 
equipment, materials or livestock to the farm of another 
farmer for use or consumption on the farm but not 
transported for hire, and shall not include vehicles of 
husbandry or vehicles registered pursuant to sections 4 9-
402 and 49-402A, Idaho Code. 
( f) Foreign vehicle. Every vehicle of a type required to 
be registered under the provisions of this title brought 
into this state from another state, territory or country 
other than in the ordinary course of business by or through 
a manufacturer or dealer and not registered in this state. 
(g) Glider kit vehicle. Every large truck manufactured 
from a kit manufactured by a manufacturer of large trucks 
which consists of a frame, cab complete with wiring, 
instruments, fenders and hood and front axles and wheels. 
The "glider kit" is made into a complete assembly by the 
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addition of the engine, transmission, rear axles, wheels 
and tires. 
(h) Motor vehicl.e. Every vehicle which is self-propelled, 
and for the purpose of titling and registration meets 
federal motor vehicle safety standards as defined in 
section 49-107, Idaho Code. Motor vehicl.e does not incl.ude 
vehicles moved solely by human power, electric personal 
assistive mobility devices and motorized wheelchairs or 
other such vehicl.es that are speci£ical.1.y exenq,t £rom 
titl.ing or registration requirements under titl.e 49, Idaho 
Code. 
(i) Multipurpose passenger vehicle (MPV). For the purposes 
of section 49-966, Idaho Code, a motor vehicle designed to 
carry ten (10) or fewer persons which is constructed either 
on a truck chassis or with special features for occasional 
off-road operation. 
(j) Neighborhood electric vehicle (NEV). A self-propelled, 
electrically powered, four-wheeled motor vehicle which is 
emission free and conforms to the definition and 
requirements for low-speed vehicles as adopted in the 
federal motor vehicle safety standards for low-speed 
vehicles under federal regulations at 49 CFR part 571. An 
NEV shall be titled, registered and insured according to 
law as provided respectively in chapters 4, 5 and 12, title 
_!2, Idaho Code, and shall only be operated by a licensed 
driver. Operation of an NEV on a highway shall be allowed 
as provided in section 49-663, Idaho Code. 
(k) Noncommercial vehicle. For the purposes of chapter 4, 
title 4 9, Idaho Code, motor vehicle registration,. a 
noncommercial vehicle shall not include those vehicles 
required to be registered under sections 4 9-4 02 and 4 9-
402A, Idaho Code, and means all other vehicles or 
combinations of vehicles which are not commercial vehicles 
or farm vehicles, but shall include motor homes. A 
noncommercial vehicle shall include those vehicles having a 
combined gross weight not in excess of sixty thousand 
(60,000) pounds and not held out for hire, used for 
purposes related to private use and not used in the 
furtherance of a business or occupation for compensation or 
profit or for transporting goods for other than the owner. 
(1) Passenger car. For the purposes of section 49-966, 
Idaho Code, a motor vehicle, except a multipurpose 
passenger vehicle, motorcycle or trailer, designed to carry 
ten (10) or fewer persons. 
(m) Rebuilt salvage vehicle or vessel. Every vehicle or 
vessel previously determined or declared to be a salvage 
vehicle that has been rebuilt or repaired using like make 
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and model parts and visually appears as a vehicle or vessel 
that was originally constructed under a distinctive 
manufacturer. This includes a salvage vehicle or vessel 
which is damaged to the extent that a "rebuilt salvage" 
brand is required to be added to the title. 
(n) Replica vehicle or vessel. A vehicle or vessel made to 
replicate any vehicle or vessel previously manufactured, 
using metal, fiberglass or other composite materials. 
Replica vehicles must look like the original vehicle being 
replicated but may use a more modern drive train. At a 
minimum, replica vehicles shall meet the same federal motor 
vehicle safety and emission standards in effect for the 
year and type of vehicle being replicated. 
( o) Salvage vehicle or vessel. Any vehicle or vessel for 
which a salvage certificate of title, salvage bill of sale 
or other documentation has been issued showing evidence 
that the vehicle or vessel has been declared salvage or 
which has been damaged to the extent that the owner, or an 
insurer, or other person acting on behalf of the owner, 
determines that the cost of parts and labor minus the 
salvage value makes it uneconomical to repair or rebuild. 
When an insurance company has paid money or has made other 
monetary settlement as compensation for a total loss of any 
vehicle or vessel, such vehicle shall be considered to be a 
salvage vehicle or vessel. 
(p) Specially constructed vehicle or vessel. Every vehicle 
or vessel of a type required to be registered not 
originally constructed under a distinctive name, make, 
model or type by a generally recognized manufacturer of 
vehicles or · vessels and not materially altered from its 
original construction and cannot be visually identified as 
a vehicle or vessel produced by a particular manufacturer. 
This includes: 
(i) A vehicle or vessel that has been structurally 
modified so that it does not have the same appearance as a 
similar vehicle or vessel from the same manufacturer; or 
(ii) A vehicle or vessel that has been constructed 
entirely from homemade parts and materials not obtained 
from other vehicles or vessels; or 
(iii) A vehicle or vessel that 
using major component parts 
manufactured vehicles or vessels 
as a specific make or model; or 
has been constructed by 
from one ( 1) or more 
and cannot be identified 
(iv) A vehicle or vessel constructed by the use of a 
custom kit that cannot be visually identified as a specific 
make or model. All specially constructed vehicles of a type 
required to be registered shall be certified by the owner 
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to meet all applicable federal motor vehicle safety 
standards in effect at the time construction is completed, 
and all requirements of chapter 9, title 49, Idaho Code. 
(q) Specialty off-highway vehicle. A specialty off-highway 
vehicle as defined in section 67-7101, Idaho Code. 
(r) Tank vehicle. 
(i) Any commercial motor vehicle transporting, or designed 
to transport, any liquid or gaseous materials within: 
1. A tank that is either permanently or temporarily 
attached or secured to the vehicle or chassis and has a 
rated capacity of one thousand (1,000) gallons or more; or 
2. Multiple tanks either permanently or temporarily 
attached or secured, when the aggregate rated capacity of 
those tanks is one thousand ( 1,000) gallons or more, as 
determined by adding the capacity of each individual tank 
with a capacity of more than one hundred nineteen (119) 
gallons. 
(ii) If a commercial motor vehicle transports one ( 1) or 
more tanks that are manifested either as empty or as 
residue and that are actually empty or contain only 
residue, those tanks shall not be considered in determining 
whether the vehicle is a tank vehicle. 
(s) Total loss vehicle. Every vehicle that is deemed to be 
uneconomical to repair. A total loss shall occur when an 
insurance company or any other person pays or makes other 
monetary settlement to the owner when it is deemed to be 
uneconomical to repair the damaged vehicle. The 
compensation for total loss as defined herein shall not 
include payments by an insurer or other person for medical 
care, bodily injury, vehicle rental or for anything other 
than the amount paid for the actual damage to the vehicle. 
( 3) "Vehicle identification number." ( See 
"identifying number," section 49-110, Idaho Code) 
( 4) "Vehicle salesman" means any person who, for a 
salary, commission or compensation of any kind, is employed 
either directly or indirectly, or regularly or occasionally 
by any dealer to sell, purchase or exchange, or to 
negotiate for the sale, purchase or exchange of vehicles. 
(See also "full-time salesman," section 49-107, Idaho Code, 
and "part-time salesman," section 49-117, Idaho Code) 
( 5) "Vessel." ( See section 67-7 003, Idaho Code) 
( 6) "Veteran." ( See section 65-502, Idaho Code) 
( 7) "Violation" means a conviction of a misdemeanor 
charge involving a moving traffic violation, or an 
admission or judicial determination of the commission of an 
infraction involving a moving traffic infraction, except 
bicycle infractions. 
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With respect to the statute that specifically exempts mopeds, §49-114, Idaho 
Code, including Sub-Part (m)(9) Idaho Code, is the statutory provision that specifically 
exempts mopeds from titling requirements, thereby establishing the exemption 
mentioned to exist from within §49-123(2)(h), Idaho Code, as set forth above, and the 
relevant portion of this exclusionary provision, addressing the titling exemption, is 49-
l l 4(m)(9), Idaho Code, highlighted for the convenience of the Court, for the formation of 
the needed jury instruction to be taken from this statutory enactment, as follows: 
4 9-114. DEFINITIONS -- M. ( 1) "Maj or component part" 
for vehicles means a rear or rear clip, frame or subframe, 
body or center, passenger area, cab, front or front end 
assembly or front clip or nose section or roof of passenger 
compartment. "Maj or component part" for vessels means a 
hull, bow, gunnel, stern or transom, or permanently 
attached propulsion unit. 
( 2) "Man if est" means a form used for identifying the 
quantity, composition, origin, routing, waste or material 
identification code and destination of hazardous material 
or hazardous waste during any transportation within, 
through, or to any destination in this state. 
(3) "Manufactured home." (See section 39-4105, Idaho 
Code) 
( 4) "Manufacturer" means every person engaged in the 
business of constructing or assembling vehicles of a type 
required to be registered at an established place of 
business in this state. The term, for purposes of sections 
49-1613 through 49-1615, 49-1617, 49-1622 and 49-1623, 
Idaho Code, shall include a distributor and other factory 
representatives. 
( 5) "Manufacturer's year designation" means the model 
year designated by the vehicle manufacturer, and not the 
year in which the vehicle is, in fact, manufactured. 
( 6) "Maximum gross weight" means the scale weight of 
a vehicle, equipped for operation, to which shall be added 
the maximum load to be carried as declared by the owner in 
making application for registration. When a vehicle against 
which a registration fee is assessed is a combination of 
vehicles, the term' "maximum gross weight" means the 
REQUESTED INCLUSION OF MOTOR VEHICLE DEFINITIONS, AND EXCLUSIONS, 
WITHIN JURY INSTRUCTIONS P. 8 
000051
- -
combined maximum gross weights of all vehicles in the 
combination. 
(7) "Metal tire." (See "Tires," section 49-121, Idaho 
Code) 
( 8) "Mileage" means actual distance that a vehicle 
has traveled. 
(9) "Moped" means a l.imited-speed motor-driven cycl.e 
having:. 
(a) Both motorized and pedal. propul.sion that is not 
capabl.e of propel.l.ing the vehicl.e at a speed in excess of 
thirty (30) mil.es per hour on l.evel. ground, whether two (2) 
or three (3) wheel.s are in contact with the ground during 
operation. I£ an internal. combustion engine is used, the 
displ.acement shal.l. not exceed fifty (50) cubic centimeters 
and the moped shal.l. have a power drive system that 
£unctions directl.y or automa tical.l.y without cl.utching or 
shifting by the operator after the drive system is engaged; 
or 
(b) Two (2) wheels or three ( 3) wheels with no pedals, 
which is powered solely by electrical energy, has an 
automatic transmission, a motor which produces less than 
two (2) gross brake horsepower, is capable of propelling 
the device at a maximum speed of not more than thirty (30) 
miles per hour on level ground and as originally 
manufactured, meets federal motor vehicle safety standards 
for motor-driven cycles. A moped is not required to be 
titl.ed and no motorcycle endorsement is required for its 
operator. 
(10) "Motorbike" means a vehicle as defined in section 
67-7101, Idaho Code. Such vehicle shall be titled and may 
be approved for motorcycle registration pursuant to section 
49-402, Idaho Code, upon certification by the owner of the 
installation and use of conversion components that make the 
motorbike compliant with federal motor vehicle safety 
standards. 
( 11) "Motorcycle" means every motor vehicle having a 
seat or saddle for the use of the rider, designed to travel 
on not more than three (3) wheels in contact with the 
ground or designed to travel on two ( 2) wheels in contact 
with the ground which is modified by the addition of two 
( 2) stabilizing wheels on the rear of the motor vehicle, 
that meets the federal motor vehicle safety standards as 
originally designed, and includes a converted motorbike, 
but does not include a motor-driven cycle, a motorbike, a 
tractor or a moped. 
(12) "Motor carrier" means an indi victual, partnership, 
corporation or other legal entity engaged in the 
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transportation by motor vehicle of persons or property in 
the furtherance of a business or for hire. 
( 13) "Motor-driven cycle" means a cycle with a motor 
that produces five ( 5) brake horsepower or less as 
originally manufactured that meets federal motor vehicle 
safety standards as originally designed, and does not 
include mopeds. Such vehicle shall be titled and a 
motorcycle endorsement is required for its operation. 
(14) "Motor home" means a vehicular unit designed to 
provide temporary living quarters, built into an integral 
part or permanently attached to a self-propelled motor 
vehicle chassis. The vehicle must contain permanently 
installed independent life support systems which meet the 
national fire protection association (NFPA) 1192 standard 
on recreational vehicles, and provide at least four (4) of 
the following facilities: cooking, refrigeration or icebox, 
self-:-contained toilet, heating and/or air conditioning, a 
potable water supply system, including a faucet and sink, 
separate 110-125 volt electrical power supply and/or LP-gas 
supply. 
( 15) "Motorized wheelchair" means a motor vehicle with 
a speed not in excess of eight (8) miles per hour, designed 
for and used by a person with a disability. 
( 16) "Motor number." ( See "Identifying number, " 
section 49-110, Idaho Code) 
(17) "Motor vehicle." (See "Vehicle," section 49-123, 
Idaho Code) 
( 18) "Motor vehicle liability policy" means an owner's 
or operator's policy of liability insurance, certified as 
provided in section 49-1210, Idaho Code, as proof of 
financial responsibility, and issued by an insurance 
carrier duly authorized to transact business in this state, 





other state or 
(19) "Motor vehicle record" means any 
pertains to a motor vehicle registration, 
title or identification documents or 
credentials issued by the department or 
local agency. 
A moped is specifically exempted from the titling requirement, making it 
exempt from being defined as a motor vehicle. 
Added to this analysis is the further determination the Idaho Supreme Court has 
already addressed the concept of a moped, and specifically recognized such exempt 
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status as it was then being identified in a California case cited in the Idaho Supreme 
Court 2006 decision, when discussing within their analysis what is and what is not a 
motor vehicle, as addressed in Armstrong v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 143 Idaho 135, 
139 P.3d 737 (May 25, 2006), wherein the Court stated: 
"At issue in Galvin was a provision excluding coverage for injuries sustained by a 
person occupying a motor vehicle owned by the insured but not covered in the policy. A 
father had obtained coverage for his 1979 Dodge, but not his moped, and his son was 
injured while riding the moped. The father contended that the exclusion for other owned 
motor vehicles did not apply to the moped because it was not a motor vehicle. The Galvin 
court agreed, relying upon the facts that mopeds were designed to be propelled by 
pedaling in addition to their motors; that they were exempt from registration under the 
Vehicle Code; and that while motorcycles were defined as being motor vehicles under the 
Vehicle Code, mopeds were not. It stated that while a motorcycle had been held to be 
motor vehicle under a similar exclusionary clause, "the implied analogy between mopeds 
and motorcycles is tenuous and cannot be relied upon as the basis for finding that a 
moped is a motor vehicle." 170 Cal.App.3d at 1022, 216 Cal.Rptr. at 846. The instant 
case involves a motorcycle, not a moped. A motorcycle is defined as a motor vehicle 
under the Idaho motor vehicle code. J.C. § 49-114(10)." 
The current statutory citation for a motorcycle is now contained within §49-114 
(m)(l 1), Idaho Code, and that specific definition takes the occasion to specifically 
exclude mopeds from its definition. That statute now provides as follows: 
(11) "Motorcycle" means every motor vehicle having a seat or saddle for the use of 
the rider, designed to travel on not more than three (3) wheels in contact with the ground or 
designed to travel on two (2) wheels in contact with the ground which is modified by the 
addition of two (2) stabilizing wheels on the rear of the motor vehicle, that meets the federal 
motor vehicle safety standards as originally designed, and includes a converted motorbike, 
but does not include a motor-driven cycle, a motorbike, a tractor or a moped. 
The discussion set forth above out of the Idaho Supreme Court in 2006 in the 
Armstrong case addressed the definition of a motorcycle that is used for off-road type hill 
climbing, under what then was §49-114(10), Idaho Code, (now §49-114(m)(ll), Idaho 
Code), and the clear statutory distinction, by statutory definition, is made readily apparent 
by the separate and distinct definitions as to what motorcycles are defined to be, and that 
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mopeds are specifically excluded from that definition, as a moped is addressed 
separately above in (m)(9), where it is listed in the preceding paragraphs above the 
definitions cited for a "motorcycle" and for a "motorbike". 
These exemptions must also be addressed when considering the definition, 
especially when it is that specific type of vehicle at issue and in question, and that vehicle 
Dated this 31 st day of March, 2016. 
Vernon K. Smith, 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 31st day of March, 2016, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons as follows: 
Clerk of the Court 
· Fourth Judicial District 
Ada County 
200 West Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Boise City Attorney 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500 
( ) 
( ) 
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ROBERT B. LUCE 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY 
Jack W. Relf 
Deputy City Attorney 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500 
Telephone: (208) 384-3870 
Idaho State Bar No. 9762 
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JUN 2 8 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By VICKY EMERY 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 











Case No. CR-MD-2015-0012139 
,\~I~ COMPLAINT 
___________ ) 
PERSONALLY APPEARED Before me this 2-?J~ day of -=3_),-.» , 2016, -------
~v/(_ \,J . f{ ~ LJ , Deputy City Attorney, in the city of Boise, county of 
Ada, state of Idaho, who, being first duly sworn, complains and says that Chad Christopher 
McKie, on or about the 23rd day of August, 2015, in the city of Boise, county of Ada, and state 
of Idaho, did commit the crime(s) of: Count I: DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS WITH A BAC OF .20 OR HIGHER, a misdemeanor, which is in 
violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004(1 )( a) and 18-8004C; as follows, to-wit: 




That the Defendant, Chad Christopher McKie, on or about the 23rd day of August, 2015, 
in the city of Boise, county of Ada, state of Idaho, did unlawfully drive or be in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle, to-wit: a red Honda, upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public 
or private property open to the public, at or about Joyce and Donald, while under the influence of 
alcohol, and/or drugs, with an alcohol concentration of .20 or more as shown by analysis of 
his/her blood, urine, or breath, which is in violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004(1)(a) and Idaho 
Code § l 8-8004C. 
All of which is contrary to the form, force, and effect of the statute, and against the peace 
and dignity of the state of Idaho. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that Defendant may be dealt with according to law. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this __ day of ______ 2016. 
Magistrate Judge 




ROBERT B. LUCE 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY 
Jack W. Relf 
Deputy City Attorney 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500 
Telephone: (208) 384-3870 
Idaho State Bar No. 9762 
-:.1a~38( 
I ----
JUN 2 8 2016 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
V. 











Case No. CR-MD-2015-0012139 
STIPULATION TO FACTS 
---------------) 
COMES NOW, the state of Idaho, by and through Jack W. Relf, Deputy City Attorney, 
and Chad Christopher McKie, by and through his attorney of record Vernon K. Smith, and 
stipulate to the following facts: 
1. On August 23rd, 2015, at 2:37 in the morning, the Defendant, Chad C. McKie, date of 
birth was in actual physical control of and was driving a vehicle, in the 
bicycle lane, westbound on Boise Ave. near Beacon St. in Boise, Ada County, Idaho, 
which is a publicly maintained roadway and open to the public. 
2. As he drove he was wobbling in his lane and the tail light of the vehicle was not 
functioning properly. 
3. A traffic stop was initiated by Officer Adam Schloegel of the Boise Police Department. 
Officer Schloegel observed what he perceived to be signs of intoxication exhibited by the 




4. The vehicle driven by the Defendant is a self-propelled vehicle as defined by Idaho Code 
49-123(h). 
5. The vehicle driven by the Defendant is a moped as defined by Idaho Code 49-114(M)(9). 
It is a limited-speed motor-driven cycle having both motorized and pedal propulsion that 
is not capable of propelling the vehicle at a speed in excess of thirty (30) miles per hour 
on level ground, with two (2) wheels in contact with the ground during operation. Its 
internal combustion engine does not exceed fifty (50) cubic centimeters in displacement, 
and its power drive system functions directly or automatically without clutching or 
shifting by the operator after the drive system is engaged. 
6. The moped driven by the Defendant was neither titled nor registered. 
7. Officer Steve Moore of the Boise Police Department responded to the scene, and 
subjected the Defendant to the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests (SFSTs). Officer Steve 
Moore is trained and certified to perform those tests. 
8. The Defendant met the decision points for arrest on all SFSTs, and was arrested for 
driving under the influence (DUI). 
9. Officer Moore attempted to have the Defendant provide a breath sample, but such sample 
was not obtained as the Defendant first burped during the fifteen (15) minute waiting 
period. 
10. The Defendant would not consent to a blood draw, so Officer Moore obtained a warrant 
to draw the Defendant's blood, and the Defendant's blood was drawn pursuant to that 
warrant. 
11. Laboratory analysis revealed his blood alcohol concentration to be 0.253 g of ethyl 
alcohol per 100 ccs of blood, in excess of the .20 limit provided by Idaho Code 18-
8004C(l ). 
STIPULATION TO FACTS jwr 
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STIPULATION TO FACTS 
Vernon K. Smith 





Judgment of Conviction 
146851 -
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~III I IIIIII II IIII Ill lllll 1111111111111111 
IN 1 Mt: DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, ADA COUNTY 
~DGMENT OF CONVICTION 
~BATION ORDER 
D WITHHELD JUDGMENT 
Expires __________ _ 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT STATE OF IDAHO vs. 
DEFENDANT having been charged with the following offenses: 




CASE NO. ffi0:-15- t:~ J Cf/ 
Deputy 
Digitals :i. /()8,l{ 
OGC OMC Prosecuting Agenc~ ~ DEC 
State's Attorney~-----------------
Count 3. ______________________ _ 
Count 2-----------~------------- Count4. ______________________ _ 
DEFENDANT WAS: '#.i=imt .Q 12 Custody D Not Present D Interpreter Present 0 Advised of all rights and penalties per ICR 5, 11, IMCR 5(f) 
~Ro13re::;ented by: ----=C"'IYU;Ol_,._,_,,e.=---=--c....L.---------- COURT ENTERS JUDGMENT AFTER: ~uilty Plea O Trial - Found Guilty 
Defendant Waived Right~nse~ainst Self-lncriminatio~ Jury Tri~ Confront and Cross Examine Accuser(s) DTo Counsel 
~ERED: DEFENDANT'S DRIVING PRIVILEGES SUSPENDED ~&"ginning (}.-..2Q-/(p ; or 
D CONSECUTIVE TO ANY CURRENT SUSPENSION D Absolute Suspension ____ days D Interlock from ____ to ___ _ 
~ERED: DEFE~NTTQPAY TO THE CLERK: !" A D Apply cash bond$ 
Count 1: Fine/Penalty$ W/ $ ~ cxx;J Suspended + CT Costs $~Q'""""-~L----'~---- = $ ______ _ 
Count 2: Fine/Penalty $ ________ WI$. _______ Suspended+ CT Costs$ _______ =$ ______ _ 
Count 3: Fine/Penalty $ ________ WI$ _______ Suspended+ CT Costs$ _______ =$ ______ _ 
Count 4: Fine/Penalty $ ________ WI$ ______ ~ Suspended+ CT Costs$ _______ =$ ______ _ 
D Reimburse~$~----- D Workers' Co .60/hr) $_____ TOTAL = $ 
Restitution$ ~0 Defendant shall make _~~EQUAL MONTHLY PAYMENTS BEGINNING ONE MONTH FROM TODAY 
~DE/~EFENDANy JCUJE INCARCERATED }N: ~n~~a~ h Juvenile Detention Center / a 
Count 1: days w/_+/ ....lfd.L .... ~~.Suspended - Credit _~L __ Total = ~ / ,7toTAL DAYS TO SERVE=---~· ~L~----
Count 2: ____ days w/ ____ Suspended - Credit ____ Total = ____ D Concurrent to Case number(s): _______ _ 
Count 3: ____ daysw/ ____ Suspended-Credit ____ Total = ___ _ 
Count 4: days w/ Suspended - Credit ____ Total = ___ _ D Concurrent D Consecutive 
to all cases to any other cases 
D ___ days must be fully completed, with NO OPTIONS available. D ____ days must be fully completed, with INTERIM JAIL available. 
D Pay or Stay$ ___ _ D In-Custody ___ SAP ABC D Interlock Funds (after use of any cafeteria funds) 
D If approved by the Ada County Sheriffs Office, defendant is allowed to serve in __________ County at defendant's expense. 
HE FOLLOWING options~~ed by the County Sheriff are available to the defendant only !E defendant meets requirements of the program. 
II Options ___ ...,L_7 ·~---- days; D If defendant is in custody, release and re-book for any options. 
,.._,E ~ny combo of the following Options: Wk Rls __ days; SLD __ days; SGS __ hours; Hs. Arr. (2/1) __ daY9~ys 
~BATION CONDITIONS: Supervised Probation Expires: ________ Unsupervised Probation Expires: -~-1----e.~_.....c..__,__~---
0 No new crimes D Classes/treatment per P.O. D Discretionary jail to P.O.___ D Alcohol Monitor Device Authorized 
Pro~-~s Ordered: (Defined on R7ponsibilities Form) D No Alcohol Poss/Consume D Refuse no evidentiary test for drugs/alcohol (BAC) 
~ohol/Drug Trtmt Lvl D Anger Management hrs___ D Tobacco Ed hrs__ D Driving School hrs __ _ 
D Victim's Panel Theft classes hrs___ D Domestic Violence Treatment Weeks___ D Cog Self Change ___ _ 
D OTHER --r--r-----,6,,C.--~""-------r------------------------------
DEFENDANT 
D Release Defendant this case only 




FILED A.M ____ _, M._ __ _ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OS THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA EP 3 O 201S 
IN THE MATTER OF THE SUSPENSION OF THE 
DRIVER'S LICENSE OF: 
Chad Christopher McKie 
403 Iowa 















) ____________________ ) 
CMRISTOPHER D. RiCH, C19rk 
!iy N. FAHPff .. AN6ER 
C::PUTY 
Citation No: 1454043 
Case No: CR-MD-2015-0012139 
ORDER SUSPENDING DRIVER'S LICENSE 
FOR A PLEA OF GUil TY OR FINDING OF 
GUil TY OF OFFENSE 
WJ __ Interlock Device __ 
Interlock Start: __ _ End: ----
' TO: THE IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT AND THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT f6;._~vf! 
The Defendant having f ft,::ui ~ of the offense of Driving Under the lnfluencef'i(, 
violation of Section 118-8004 M, which authorizesorrquires the suspension of the driving privileges of the 
Defendant by the Court, and the Court having considered the same. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that~ te . . g privileges and driver's license of the above 
named Defendant is hereby suspended for a period of ~?5 commencing on 
~ 9-/!()--ft+, ; or 3 
D at the end of any current suspension. 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED, that the expiration of the period of this suspension does not reinstate your 
driver's license and you must make application to the Idaho Transportation Department for reinstatement of 
your driver's license after the suspension period expires. ~
Dated: C\ --?(Q-)-b Judge: ---::::::::: 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of the original Order Suspending Driver's License 
For a Plea of Guilty or Finding of Guilty of Offense entered by the Court and on file in this office. I further 
certify that copies of this Order were served as follows: 
Defendant: Chad Christopher McKie 









ORDER SUSPENDING DRIVER'S LICENSE FOR A PLEA OF GUILTY 
Hand Delivered X 
Hand Delivered --
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 






Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Suzanne Simon, Deputy Clerk
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VERNON K. SMITH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Idaho State Bar No. 1365 
Telephone: (208) 345-1125 
Fax: (208) 345-1129 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FORTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 












Case No. CR-MD-2015-0012139 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Notice is hereby given that the above named Defendant, Chad C. McK.ie does appeal 
from that conditional plea of guilty and final Judgment of conviction entered September 30, 
2016, in the Magistrate Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and for 
the County of Ada, the Honorable Kevin Swain presiding, pursuant to Rule 54.1, I.C.R., to 
the District Court. That pursuant to the provision of Rule 54.1, !.C.R., Defendant does set 
forth and contain herein the following information and statements: 
a) The title of the action is: the State of Idaho, Plaintiff, v. Chad Christopher McK.ie, 
Defendant, as shown above. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL P. I 
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b) The title of the Court which heard the proceedings appealed from is the Magistrate 
Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Ada, the Honorable Kevin Swain presiding Magistrate. 
c) The case number assigned to the action by the Magistrate Court (trial court) is CR-
MD-2015-0012139, as shown above. 
d) The title of the Court to which this appeal is taken is the District Court of the Fourth 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada. 
e) The date and hearing of the Jud1,,'IIlent from which this appeal is taken is September 
30, 2016, entitled Judgment of Conviction, which was entered upon a conditional 
plea of guilty, reserving the right of appeal to address the application of Idaho 
Statutory and Idaho Case Law upon the stipulated facts of the case, dated June 28, 
2016, and filed of record with the Court. 
f) This appeal is taken upon maters of Idaho Statutes and Idaho Case Law, as applied 
to the stipulated facts set forth and contained within the Stipulation to Facts, entered 
into between the State ofldaho and the Defendant on June 28, 2016, from which the 
conditional plea of guilty was tendered, reserving the right of appeal to secure an 
appellate determination that Defendant is not guilty of the alleged crime of operating 
a "motor vehicle", as he was riding a "Moped", not a motor vehicle, as a matter of 
Idaho Law, and the conditional plea should be set aside and the case dismissed, as 
no criminal act has been committed by this Defendant. 
g) The proceedings, regarding the entry of the stipulated facts, the conditional plea, the 
disposition, the intended appeal, and the agreed stay of the sentence and judgment 
imposed, were processed through hearings and recorded by an electronic recording 
NOTICE OF APPEAL P. 2 
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mechanism located in the Court room No. 207, located on the second tloor of the 
Ada County Courthouse, and the Magistrate Court and Clerk personnel would be in 
possession of any such recording(s). 
h) This Notice of Appeal has been served by mailing same to the Boise City 
Prosecuting Attorney's Office, P.O. Box 500, Boise, Idaho, 83701-0500, directed to 
the attention of Robert B. Luce, City Attorney, and his Deputy City Attorney, Jack 
W.Ralf. 
i) A statement of the issues on appeal that the Defendant-Appellant intends to assert is 
that the Defendant was operating a Moped, being a self-propelled vehicle, (defined 
by IC §49-123 (h)), but exempted by Idaho Law that defines a "Moped" in LC. §49-
114 (M)(9); that this Moped vehicle was neither titled nor registered, as is exempted 
and excluded from the definition of "motor vehicle" by Idaho Law, as confirmed by 
LC. §49-123 that declared in part (2) (h), the exclusionary aspects to the definition of 
"motor vehicle", confirming certain vehicles are specifically exempted, including 
"Mopeds", as specifically defined through the provisions of LC. §49-107, which 
states: "Motor vehicles" does not include vehicles that move solely by human 
power, electronic personal assistive mobility devices, motorized wheelchairs, or 
such other vehicles that are specifically exempt from titling "or" registration 
requirements under title 19, Idaho Code; that a Moped, pursuant to LC. §49-114 
(M)(9) is specifically exempted from titling requirements, thereby establishing 
exemption of a "Moped" from the definition of "motor vehicle" within LC. §49-123 
(2)(h), and consequently, as a matter of law, Defendant was not operating a "motor 
vehicle", on the date, time, and location as alleged, as the fundamental element of 
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such a criminal charge of operating a "motor vehicle", required under LC. § 18-8004, 
is absent from the nature of the act, as Defendant was operating a mode of 
transportation defined by law to be a "Moped", excluded from the definition of 
"motor vehicle", as a matter ofldaho law. 
Dated this 4th day of October, 2016. 
Vernon K. Smith, 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 4th day of October 2016, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons as follows: 
Clerk of the Court 
Fourth Judicial District 
Ada County 
200 West Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Boise City Attorney 
P.O. Box500 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500 
( ) 
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X) /E~ 
) / Hand / livered 
! 
Vernon K. Smith 
NOTICE OF APPEAL P. 4 
Electronically Filed
10/4/2016 4:46:54 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Suzanne Simon, Deputy Clerk
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VERNON K. SMITH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Idaho State Bar No. 1365 
Telephone: (208) 345-1125 
Fax: (208) 345-1129 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FORTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 












Case No. CR-MD-2015-0012139 
MOTION TO STAY SENTENCE 
AND JUDGMENT OF 
CONVICTION, PENDING 
APPEAL(S) 
COMES NOW the above named Defendant-Appellant, Chad Christopher McKie, by 
and through his attorney of record, Vernon K. Smith, and pursuant to Rule 54.5 !.C.R., does 
move this Court to enter an Order, staying that Judgment of Conviction and sentence 
imposed upon Defendant on September 30, 2016, pursuant to the agreement of Court and 
counsel that a stay shall be entered in this matter, pending the final disposition upon the 
appeal taken to the Appellant Court( s) regarding the operation of Mopeds on the streets and 
roads in the City of Boise, Ada County, Idaho. In support of this motion, Defendant-
Appellant does represent to the Court as follows: 
MOTION TO STAY SENTENCE AND JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION, PENDING APPEAL(S) 
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I) That the Defendant entered a plea of not guilty to the alleged offense of operating a 
motor vehicle while llllder the influence of alcohol, as reflected in the records of the 
Magistrate Court proceedings; 
2) That the case was scheduled for trial, and pursuant to preparation of jury 
instructions, the Defendant proposed instructions that included the appropriate 
statutory reference that exempts Mopeds from the definition of motor vehicle, as 
disclosed within the briefings submitted to the Court; 
3) That the parties entered into a Stipulation of Facts on JLU1e 28, 2016, and thereupon 
agreed the matter needed to be decided by the Idaho Supreme Court as it rested upon 
a matter of statutory interpretation and application of Idaho Law; 
4) That Defendant thereupon agreed to enter a conditional plea of guilty, pursuant to 
the Stipulation of Facts entered JLU1e 28, 2016, reserving the right to appeal, 
including appellant review by the Idaho Supreme Court, to secure a judicial 
disposition upon the exempt status of a Moped as a mode of transportation from the 
definition of "motor vehicle", thereby precluding the State from alleging the offense 
of operating a motor vehicle while LU1der the influence of alcohol, stemming from 
the operation ofa mode of transportation defined as a "Moped", LU1der Idaho Law; 
5) That the Court consented to the entry of the conditional plea, accepted the 
conditional plea entered by the Defendant, and Court and coLU1sel agreed that an 
Order would be entered, staying the sentence and disposition imposed through the 
Judgment of Conviction, and enable Defendant to engage in the appellant process to 
reach a resolution of this ongoing controversy. 
MOTION TO STAY SENTENCE AND JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION, PENDING APPEAL(S) 
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6) That pursuant to Rule 54.5 (a) the sentence imposed and the Judgment of Conviction 
entered by the Magistrate Court is to be stayed, pursuant to the agreement of Court 
and counsel, and the Order shall be entered by the Magistrate or District Court, as 
provided for by in Rule 46 and Rule 54.5. 
Dated this 4th day of October, 2016. 
Vernon K. Smith, 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 4th day of October 2016, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons as follows: 
Clerk of the Court 
Fourth Judicial District 
Ada County 
200 West Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Boise City Attorney 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500 
( ) 
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VERNON K. SMITH 
A TIORNEY AT LAW 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Idaho State Bar No. 1365 
Telephone: · (208) 345-1125 
Fax: (208) 345-1129 
Attorney for Defendant 
FILED By: NF Deputy Clerk 
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FORTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 












Case No. CR-MD-2015-0012139 
ORDER TO STAY SENTENCE 
AND JUDGMENT OF 
CONVICTION, PENDING 
APPEAL(S) 
TIITS MA TIER having come before the Court upon Defendant-Appellant' s Motion 
to Stay Sentence and Judgement of Conviction, Pending Appeal(s), as entered by the 
Magistrate Court in the above matter on September 30, 2016, and pursuant to the agreement 
made upon entry of the conditional plea by the Defendant, including the stipulation of facts, 
the entry of a conditional plea, and the agreement the sentence and Judgment of conviction 
would be stayed by the Court throughout the appellant process of this matter, and good 
cause appearing therefore; 
IT IS HEREWITH ORDERED that the execution upon the sentence imposed in this 
matter, and the Judgement of conviction entered on September 30, 2016, is herewith stayed, 
ORDER TO ST A Y SENTENCE AND JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION, PENDING APPEAL(S) 
P. I 
Signed: 10/6/2016 03:39 PM






suspended and held in abeyance, pending disposition to the appellant process, to and 
including a decision to be rendered by the Idaho Supreme Court. 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the _ day of October 2016, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons as follows: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Boise City Attorney 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Ada County Sheriff's Office 
7200 Banister Drive 
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FILED P.M ___ _ 
OCT O 7 2016 
GHRlSTOPHEP D. RICH, Clerk 
Bv RIC NELSON 
r.EPUtY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
CHAD C. MACKIE, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. CRMD15-12139 
ORDER GOVERNING 
PROCEDURE ON APPEAL 
Notice of Appeal having been filed herein, and it appearing that a transcript of all the 
testimony of the original trial or hearing is required by Appellant to resolve the issues on appeal: 
It is ORDERED: 
1) That Appellant shall order and pay for the estimated cost of the transcript within 14 
days after the filing of the notice of appeal. 
2) That Appellant's brief shall be filed and served within 35 days of the date of the notice 
of the filing of the transcript. 
3) That Respondent's brief shall be filed and served within 28 days after service of 
appellant's brief. 
4) That Appellant's reply brief, if any, shall be filed and served within 21 days after service 
ofrespondent's brief. 
ORDER GOVERNING PROCEDURE ON APPEAL - Page 1 
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5) That either party may notice the matter for oral argument in writing after all briefs are 
filed, and that if within fourteen ( 14) days after the final brief is filed, neither party does so notice 
for oral argument, the Court may deem oral argument waived and decide the case on the briefs and 
the record. 
6) That chambers copies of all briefs to be provided. 
Dated this 7th day of October, 2016. 
GERALD F. SCHROEDER 
Senior District Judge 
ORDER GOVERNING PROCEDURE ON APPEAL - Page 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 7th day of October, 2016. I mailed (served) a true and 
correct copy of the within instrument to: 
Vernon K. Smith Jr. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1900 WMain 
Boise, ID 83 702 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY 
VIA: INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
ADA COUNTY TRANSCRIPTS DEPARTMENT 
VIA: INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 






ROBERT B. LUCE 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY 
 
Jack W. Relf 
Deputy City Attorney 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 
150 N. Capitol Blvd. 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, Idaho  83701-0500 
Telephone: (208) 608-7950 
Facsimile: (208) 384-4454 
Idaho State Bar No. 9762 
Email: BCAO@cityofboise.org  
 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
  
 JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
 The Defendant, Chad Christopher McKie, shall pay restitution to the victim(s), Boise 
Police Department, in the amount of $142.66, Representative of  Idaho State Police Forensic 
Services, in the amount of $100.00, through the Magistrate Court. 
 DATED this _______ day of ______________________, 2016. 
        
 
       _______________________________ 
       Magistrate





















Case No. CR-MD-2015-0012139 
 
 
ORDER FOR RESTITUTION 
 
ORDER FOR RESTITUTION - 2   
Signed: 11/9/2016 07:35 AM
Signed: 11/16/2016 03:29 PM
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FILED By: A/ J:' De puty Cle rk 
Fourth f~dicial District, Ad a County 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that on _______________________, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:  
Vernon K. Smith 
Attorney at Law  
1900 West Main Street 
Boise Idaho  83702 
          US MAIL 
          INTERDEPARTMENT MAIL 
          FACSIMILE     






CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - 3  jk 
Signed: 11/16/2016 03:29 PM
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N;<J \! l 6 2016 
CH?.t':~·-'.""'. -!ER D. R~CH, Clerk 
ti!-} HAE ANN NIXON 
DEPUT( 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 











To: BOISE CITY PROSECUTOR, 
To: VERNON K. SMITH, 
,Z1'\5 
Case No. CRMD-2Gt'6-0012139 
NOTICE OF LODGING 
APPEAL TRANSCRIPT 
Attorney for Respondent. 
Appearing Appellant 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT a transcript of the proceeding in this action was 
lodged with the Court on November 16, 2016. 
YOU ARE NOTIFIED that you may pick up a copy of said transcript at the 
District Clerk's Office, Ada County Courthouse, 200 West Front Street, Boise, ID 83702. 
Unless objections to the content of the transcript are received within twenty-one 
(21) days from the date of mailing of this notice, such transcript shall be deemed settled. 
Date this 16TH day of November, 2016 
RAE ANN NIXON 
Deputy Clerk of the District Court 







I hereby certify that on this 16TH day of November, 2016, a true and correct copy of the 
Notice of Lodging was sent via US Mail to: 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
POST OFFICE BOX 500 
BOISE ID 83701-055 
VERNON K. SMITH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1900 W. MAIN ST. 
BOISE ID 83702 
NOTICE OF LODGING 
RAE ANN NIXON 
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Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Maura Olson, Deputy Clerk
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. 
Nature Of The Case 
This case involves an issue as to what constitutes a "motor vehicle" in relation to the 
application of the DUI laws of Idaho. Chad C. McKie, a Boise resident, was charged with 
operating a "motor vehicle", upon a public street in the City of Boise, while under the influence 
of alcohol, in violation of J.C. §18-8004 and J.C. §18-8005(4) (originally charged as a 2nd 
offense, later amended to an "excessive"). Mr. McKie was actually operating a "moped" in the 
designated bicycle lane along Boise Avenue, on August 23, 2015, which is now defined by the 
various statutory amendments made by the 2008 Legislative sessions to be a slow moving, 




The lower court's perception of a "motor vehicle", however, was based upon the phrase 
"self-propelled" only, concluding that phrase made a "moped" a "motor vehicle", apparently 
choosing to ignore the exclusionary provisions created by the 2008 Legislature. The lower 
court's analysis was based upon State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 3 I 8 P.3d 955 (Idaho App. 
2014), wherein the Court of Appeals addressed a UTV, which is "self-propelled", but also, by 
statute, defined to be a recreational "motor vehicle". Because the lower court informed the 
Parties it would instruct the jury that Mr. McKie was operating a "motor vehicle", rejecting Mr. 
McKie's reliance upon a statutory interpretation from the 2008 Legislative amendments 
expressly excluding a "moped" from the definition of "motor vehicle", as mopeds were 
specifically exempted from titling requirements, an appeal in one fashion or another was in the 
making. 
Despite the lower court's focus upon "self-propelled" only, the statute declared a UTV to 
be a motor vehicle, defined in LC. §67-7101(17), in the following manner: 
(17) "Utility type vehicle" or "UTV" means any recreational MOTOR 
VEHICLE other than an ATV, motorbike or snowmobile as defined in this 
section, designed for and capable of travel over designated roads, traveling on 
four (4) or more tires, maximum width less than seventy-four (74) inches, 
maximum weight less than two thousand (2,000) pounds, and having a wheelbase 
of one hundred ten (110) inches or less. A utility type vehicle must have a 
minimum width of fifty (50) inches, a minimum weight of at least nine hundred 
(900) pounds or a wheelbase of over sixty-one (61) inches. Utility type vehicle 
does not include golf carts, vehicles specially designed to carry a disabled person, 
implements of husbandry as defined in section 49-110(2), Idaho Code, or vehicles 
otherwise registered under title 49, Idaho Code. A "utility type vehicle" or "UTV" 
also means a recreational off-highway vehicle or ROV. 
The controversy in this case is centered on a "moped", and the manner in which the 
Legislature's definition of "motor vehicle" was modified, and how the Legislature then defined a 
"moped", essential in the formulation of jury instructions with regard to Idaho's DUI laws. The 
2008 Legislative amendments expressly excluded mopeds from the definition of "motor 
6 
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vehicle", just as a bicycle is not a "motor vehicle", as they are exempted from being titled. Of 
interest, a horse is "self-propelled", and if you ride a horse down the streets of Boise, under the 
influence of alcohol, no one can charge you with a DUI offense in Idaho (North Carolina 
specifically made it a DUI offense if you ride an animal under the influence, while Utah 
announces the general rule otherwise ).Consequently, being "self-propelled" is a facet of what 
constitutes a "motor vehicle" in Idaho, and is not the complete defining characteristic of a "motor 
vehicle", as other exclusions may necessarily apply, as the 2008 Legislative amendments so 
established. 
The "nature of this case" may be considered one of statutory interpretation, presenting an 
issue (question of law) whether a "moped" is excluded from what constitutes a "motor vehicle" 
under Idaho law, and whether the lower court erred when it determined Mr. McKie committed a 
criminal act when he operated his Moped on Boise Avenue under the influence of alcohol, 
essentially no different than a bicyclist riding a bike along Boise Avenue, or riding a horse on 
Boise Avenue, while under the influence of alcohol. 
II 
The Standard Of Review And Applicable 
Law On Statutory Interpretations 
The case authority is well established the standard of review for statutory interpretation is 
one of free review, and the court's objective is to give effect to the legislative intent with respect 
to the interpretation of the Legislature's enactments. The most recent analysis is found in Hoffer 
v. Shappard, 160 Idaho 870, 380 P.3d 681 (2016), wherein our Supreme Court reiterated the 
court's objective regarding statutory interpretation. It states: 
"The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative 
intent." State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007). 
"when interpreting a statute, the Court begins with the literal words of the 
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statute .... " Williams v. Blue Cross of Idaho, 151 Idaho 515, 521, 260 P.3d 1186, 
1192 (20 I I). "If the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed 
intent of the legislative body must be given effect .... " Idaho Youth Ranch, Inc. v. 
Ada Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 157 Idaho 180, 184-85, 335 P.3d 25, 29-30 (2014) 
(internal quotations omitted) ( quoting St. Lukes Reg' l Med Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd of 
Comm 'rs of Ada Cnty., 146 Idaho 753, 755, 203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009)). This 
Court does not have the authority to modifv an unambiguous legislative 
enactment. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg' l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 895, 265 
P.3d 502, 508 (2011) (quoting Berry v. Koehler. 84 Idaho 170, 177, 369 P.2d 1010, 
1013 (1962))." (Emphasis added). 
In State v. Lee, 37213 (Idaho Ct. of Appeals, 6-29-201 I) Docket No. 37213, filed June 29, 
201 I, the Court of Appeals provided reference to the standard of review and objective of 
statutory interpretation to be always to give effect to the plain language used in a statute. It 
states: 
"This Court exercises free review over the application and construction of 
statutes. State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct. App. 2003). 
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give 
effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v. 
Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999); State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 
654, 659, 978 P.2d 214,219 (1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 
67 (Ct. App. 2000). The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and 
rational meaning. Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219. If the language is 
clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to legislative 
history or rules of statutory interpretation. Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389, 3 P.3d at 67. 
When this Court must engage in statutory construction, it has the duty to ascertain 
the legislative intent and give effect to that intent. Rhode, 133 Idaho at 462, 988 
P.2d at 688. To ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only must the literal words 
of the statute be examined, but also the context of those words, the public policy 
behind the statute and its legislative history. Id it is incumbent upon a court to give a 
statute an interpretation which will not render it a nullity. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 
641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001). Constructions of a statute that would 
lead to an absurd result are disfavored. State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 275, 92 P.3d 
521, 525 (2004); State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 690, 85 P.3d 656, 666 (2004). The 
Court will not deal in subtle refinements of the legislation. but will ascertain and 
give effect to the purpose and intent of the legislature, based on the whole act and 
every word therein, lending substance and meaning to the provisions. State v. 
Payne, 146 Idaho 548,575, 199 P.3d 123, 150 (2008)." (Emphasis added). 
See also Ada County v. Gibson, 126 Idaho 854, 893 P. 2d 801 (1995), wherein the 
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appellate court stated: 
"Interpretation of an ordinance, like construction of a statute, is an issue of 
law. Therefore, this Court exercises free review of the district court's decision. See 
State v. Nelson, 119 Idaho 444,446,807 P.2d 1282, 1284 (Ct.App.1991). It 
is axiomatic that the obiective in interpreting a statute or ordinance is to derive 
the intent of the legislative body that adopted the act. Ada County Assessor v. 
Roman Catholic Diocese of Boise, 123 Idaho 425,428, 849 P.2d 98, 101 (1993); 
Cox v. Department of Insurance, 121 Idaho 143, 146, 823 P.2d 177, 180 
(Ct.App.1991). Anv such analvsis begins with the literal language of the 
enactment. Matter of Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho 819, 823, 828 P.2d 848, 852 
(1992); Local 1494 of Intern. Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 99 
Idaho 630, 639, 586 P.2d 1346, 1355 (1978); Messenger v. Burns, 86 Idaho 26, 
29-30, 382 P.2d 913, 915 (1963). Where the statutory language is unambiguous, 
the clearly expressed intent of the legislative bodv must be given effect, and 
there is no occasion for a court to consider rules of statutory construction. Ada 
County v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 123 Idaho at 428, 849 P.2d at 101; Matter of 
Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho at 823,828 P.2d at 852; Sherwoodv. Carter, 119 
Idaho 246, 254, 805 P.2d 452, 460 (1991). Where the language of a statute or 
ordinance is ambiguous, however, the court looks to rules of construction for 
guidance, Lawless v. Davis, 98 Idaho 175, 560 P.2d 497 (1977), and may consider 
the reasonableness of proposed interpretations. Umphrey v. Sprinkel, I 06 Idaho 
700, 706, 682 P.2d 1247, 1253 (1983). Constructions that would lead to absurd or 
unreasonably harsh results are disfavored. Gavica v. Hanson, IO I Idaho 58, 60, 
608 P.2d 861, 863 (1980); Lawless, 98 Idaho at 177, 560 P.2d at 499." (Emphasis 
added). 
In Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 14 7 Idaho 257, 207 P.3d 988 (2009), the 
appellate court again stated: 
"When interpreting a statute, this Court must strive to give force and 
effect to the legislature's intent in passing the statute. Davaz v. Priest River 
Glass Co., Inc., 125 Idaho 333, 336, 870 P.2d 1292, 1295 (1994). "It must begin 
with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, 
usual, and ordinarv meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole." 
McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 
(2006) ( citations omitted). "Where the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without 
engaging in statutory construction." State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 
P.2d 685, 688 (1999). However, if the result is "palpably absurd," this Court must 
engage in statutory construction. Id. When engaging in statutory construction, 
this Court has a " dutv to ascertain the legislative intent, and give effect to that 
intenl" Id. " [T[he Court must con.~true a statute as a whole, and consider all 
sections of applicable statutes together to determine the intent of the 
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legislature." Davaz, 125 Idaho at 336, 870 P.2d at 1295 (internal citation 
omitted). "[The Court] also must take account of all other matters such as the 
reasonableness of the proposed interpretations and the policy behind the statute." 
Id." (Emphasis added). 
In State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965,318 P.3d 955 (Idaho App. 2014), the Court of Appeals 
therein confirmed what the standard was and the application to be, stating the following: 
"This Court exercises free review over the application and construction of 
statutes. State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct.App.2003). 
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give 
effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v. 
Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999); State v. Escobar, 134 
Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct.App.2000). The language of the statute is to be 
given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 
P.2d at 219. If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for the 
court to resort to legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation. Escobar, 
134 Idaho at 389, 3 P.3d at 67. When this Court must engage in statutory 
construction because an ambiguity exists, it has the duty to ascertain the 
legislative intent and give effect to that intent State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641,646, 
22 P.3d I 16, 121 (Ct.App.2001). To ascertain such intent, not only must the literal 
words of the statute be examined, but also the context of those words, the public 
policy behind the statute and its legislative history. Id. It is [318 P.3d 959] 
incumbent upon a court to give an ambiguous statute, an interpretation which will 
not render it a nullity. Id. Constructions of an ambiguous statute that would lead to 
an absurd result are disfavored. State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 275, 92 P.3d 521, 
525 (2004)." 
"Additionally, if a criminal statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity applies 
and the statute must be construed in favor of the accused. State v. Morrison, 143 
Idaho 459, 461, 147 P.3d 91, 93 (Ct.App.2006). However, where a review of the 
legislative history and underlying public policy makes the meaning of the statute 
clear, the rule oflenity will not apply. State v. Bradshaw, 155 Idaho 437,440,313 
P.3d 765, 768 (Ct.App.2013). If the ambiguity remains after examining the text, 
context, history, and policy of the statute, the interpretive tie between the two or 
more reasonable readings is resolved in favor of the defendant. Id. at 440-41, 313 
P.3d at 768-69." 
III. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of Proceedings Below 
Mr. McKie was stopped by a Boise City Police Officer for a tail light failure, while 
operating what the Officer described to be a "small motorcycle" in the bicycle lane, along Boise 
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Avenue, on August 23, 2015, at 2:37 a.m .. The officer charged Mr. McKie with two citations, 
No. 1454043, alleging the act of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol 
(second offense), and a second Citation, alleging two violations, No. 1454044, therein alleging 
he was operating a motor vehicle with fictitious display, and Failure to carry or show proof of 
liability insurance while operating a motor vehicle. 
In this case an initial plea of not guilty was entered; discovery exchanged, a motion to 
dismiss filed, though deemed untimely by the lower court, though perceived by Defense counsel 
as a jurisdictional issue under Rule 12(b)(2), !.C.R., capable of being raised any time during the 
proceedings. Following that denial, briefing ensued in the course of addressing what instructions 
would be given to the jury. 
Mr. McKie was knowingly operating a "moped", not a "motor vehicle", defined by Idaho 
law, and from that definition, no criminal act could take place as charged, believing the lower 
court had no statutory authority to require Mr. McKie to stand trial on a factually and legally 
flawed charge. After the lower court held the motion to dismiss untimely, and not a jurisdictional 
issue, the controversy centered upon jury instructions, creating a debate that served to posture the 
case for eventual appeal over the jury instructions, as the lower court was unwilling to instruct 
the jury with the statutory language in Idaho, as expressly declared by the 2008 Legislature. 
On the morning of the scheduled jury trial, the court and counsel met in chambers to 
discuss the controversy further, and concurred the dispute centered on whether the act of 
operating a "moped" on the streets of Boise, constituted the operation of a "motor vehicle", 
for purposes of the application of Idaho's DUI laws. Through that discussion, the parties 
agreed to structure the issue for appellate review in a manner that would avoid a trial and a 
dispute over jury instructions, and instead have the appellate courts determine the current law 
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since 2008 when the Idaho Legislature declared a "moped" to be excluded and exempted 
from the definition of "motor vehicle" under the 2008 Legislative amendments, when defining 
a "moped" to be a "slow moving, limited speed, motor driven cycle, not to be titled, and by 
virtue of the Senate Committee minutes of the 2008 Legislature, not to be registered, and 
expressly excluding it (along with other vehicles) from what constitutes a "motor vehicle" by 
such exclusionary language, using the plain and ordinary meaning of the words in defining a 
"Motor Vehicle", and what is not a motor vehicle , when identifying several exclusions from 
"motor vehicle" in their statutory amendments, specifically expressed in various locations 
within the amendments. 
The actual "statutory amendments" themselves ( other than as referenced in 
Defendant's briefing) were not fully included as a separate entry in the record of this case on 
appeal, but the relevant portions were incorporated and cited within the briefing that was 
presented to the lower court during the debate as to the applicable law to be included within 
the jury instructions. On appeal an appellate court can take judicial notice of any matter on 
which the court of original jurisdiction could have taken judicial notice. City of Lewiston v. 
Frary, 91 Idaho 322,325-27, 420 P.2d 805, 808-10 (1966); J.C.§ 9-101; Rule 201, I.R.E.; See 
also, Crawford v. Department of Correction, 133 Jdaho'633, 636 n. !, 991 P.2d 358, 361 n. 1 
(1999) ("We take judicial notice of House Bill 73, which was not submitted as part of the 
record on appeal, but is contained in the public records maintained by the Office of 
Legislative Services located in the State Capitol Building. I.R.E. 201(f); Trautman v. Hill, 116 
Idaho 337,340,775 P.2d 651,654 (Ct.App. 1989); State v. Howell, 122 Idaho 209, [213], 832 
P.2d 1144, [1148] (Ct.App. 1992)." (Bracketed references added)). For the convenience of 
this court, these 2008 Legislative amendments are contained in the public records maintained 
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by the Office of Legislative Services located in the State Capitol Building, and to further 
assist the Court, Appellant will undertake to present a formal motion before this appellate 
court to request this court to take Judicial Notice of those 2008 Legislative amendments 
located in the State Capitol Building, if the court indicates that preference or required to be 
undertaken by this Appellant. 
The Parties elected to advance the case upon appellate review through a conditional plea, 
and formulated their stipulation of facts, eliminating need for a jury trial, and pursuant to those 
discussions, the court, Boise City Attorney, Mr. McKie, and defense counsel formulated the 
factual presentation entitled STIPULATION TO FACTS, filed June 28, 2016, entered the 
conditional plea of guilty the morning of June 28, 2016, with disposition entered September 30, 
2016, from which the Appeal to the District Court was filed October 4, 2016, and entry of the 
Stay of Execution filed October 14, 2016. 
IV. 
Pictorial Evidence In The Record 
And Stipulation To Facts 
Mr. Mc Kie 's counsel provided the lower court and Boise City Attorneys' Office 
photographic depiction of the physical features of Mr. McKie's moped, which pictorial 
presentation is within the Court file, initially intended for use as exhibits at trial, and now available 
in this appellate review. This moped Mr. McKie personally constructed, with the assembly of used 
component parts from several salvaged small cycles that had been available from cycle shops. In 
addition to the pictorial representation of the moped, Defense counsel offered to produce the 
moped itself, for physical inspection by the jury, to demonstrate the composition and manner of 
operation. Mr. McK.ie had identified an expert to testify as well, who had operated the moped, had 
personal knowledge as to its construction, mechanical composition, method of movement, use of 
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pedals to start it, and the option to operate it along with the limited speed, small engine 
displacement under 50cc in size, achieving the literal words and precise criteria defining a 
"moped" under Idaho law. 
The stipulated facts by the Parties is recited as the following: 
I. On August 23 rd, 2015, at 2:37 in the morning, the Defendant, Chad C. 
McKie, date of birth was in actual physical control of and 
was driving a vehicle, in the bicycle lane, westbound on Boise Ave. near 
Beacon St. in Boise, Ada County, Idaho, which is a publicly maintained 
roadway and open to the public. 
2. As he drove he was wobbling in his lane and the tail light of the vehicle 
was not functioning properly. 
3. A traffic stop was initiated by Officer Adam Schloegel of the Boise Police 
Department. Officer Schloegel observed what he perceived to be signs of 
intoxication exhibited by the Defendant. 
4. The vehicle driven by the Defendant is a self-propelled vehicle as defined 
by Idaho Code 49-123(h). 
5. The vehicle driven by the Defendant is a moped as defined by Idaho Code 
49-114(M)(9). It is a limited-speed motor-driven cycle having both 
motorized and pedal propulsion that is not capable of propelling the 
vehicle at a speed in excess of thirty (30) miles per hour on level ground, 
with two (2) wheels in contact with the ground during operation. Its 
internal combustion engine does not exceed fifty (50) cubic centimeters in 
displacement, and its power drive system functions directly or 
automatically without clutching or shifting by the operator after the drive 
system is engaged. 
6. The moped driven by the Defendant was neither titled nor registered. 
7. Officer Steve Moore of the Boise Police Department responded to the 
scene, and subjected the Defendant to the Standardized Field Sobriety 
Tests (SFSTs). Officer Steve Moore is trained and certified to perform 
those tests. 
8. The Defendant met the decision points for arrest on all SFSTs, and was 
arrested for driving under the influence (DUI). 
9. Officer Moore attempted to have the Defendant provide a breath sample, 
but such sample was not obtained as the Defendant first burped during the 
fifteen (15) minute waiting period. 
I 0. The Defendant would not consent to a blood draw, so Officer Moore 
obtained a warrant to draw the Defendant's blood, and the Defendant's 
blood was drawn pursuant to that warrant. 
11. Laboratory analysis revealed his blood alcohol concentration to be 0.253 
g of ethyl alcohol per 100 ccs of blood, in excess of the .20 limit provided 




Issues Presented On Appeal 
I. Whether the Title 49 definitions apply in determining what qualifies as a 
"motor vehicle" for purposes of a DUI conviction under LC. § 18-8004? 
2. Whether the 2008 amendments to the Idaho motor vehicle code eliminated 
"mopeds" from the definition of"motor vehicles" under Idaho law? 
3 Did the magistrate court err - as a matter of law - in refusing to find that 
Defendant McKie's moped was not a "motor vehicle" under Idaho law, 
whose operation could be the basis for a violation ofldaho's LC.§ 18-
8004 DUI law? 
4. Did the magistrate court err - as a matter of law - in convicting Defendant 




The Magistrate Court Erred In Convicting Defendant McKie For 
DUI Under I.C. § 18-8004 Because A "Moped," Which He Was 
Operating At The Time That Offense Was Charged, Is Not Classified 
As A "Motor Vehicle" In The Idaho Motor Vehicle Code 
When a criminal statute is constitutionally vague, such as with respect to the 
interpretation of statutory language that becomes a specific element of the criminal act, that 
serves to suggest the statute is either constitutionally flawed, or the Rule of Lenity will apply. 
(See State v. Lopez, 98 Idaho 581, 570 P.2d 259 (1976), wherein a statute was held 
unconstitutionally vague, as it did not further define the terms used in the statute, nor did it 
apprise the defendant such conduct violated the statute. In that case the court focused upon the 
complaint to determine whether it charged a criminal offense, i. e., whether it alleged conduct 
with sufficient particularity the defendant would be informed what conduct constituted the 
criminal offense. That court held the complaint defective because it did not describe an offense. 
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A due process right exists to have the description of the offense, and a defendant must be 
adequately apprised regarding the elements of the criminal offense. 
Since the Idaho Legislature excluded a moped from definition of "motor vehicle" in 
2008, the element of "a motor vehicle" is missing from the factual allegations in the complaint 
alleged against Mr. McKie, as the State has acknowledged Mr. McKie operated a moped, as 
defined by Idaho law, wherein a moped cannot be considered a motor vehicle. 
A fundamental element in Idaho's DUI law is the element there must exist the operation 
of a motor vehicle (to drive or be in actual physical control), while under the influence of 
alcohol. As this appellate court is infinitely familiar, the Idaho Jury Instruction defines the crime: 
Idaho Jury Instructions Criminal Instructions 
SECTION 1000. DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OR 
WITHOUT PRIVILEGES 
ICJI 1000. DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
INSTRUCTION NO -----
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Driving under the Influence the state 
must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about [date] 
2. in the state ofldaho 
3. the defendant [name], [drove] [or] [was in actual physical control of] 
4. a [commercial] motor vehicle 
5. upon a highway, street or bridge or upon public or private property 
open to the public, 
6. [while under the influence of (a combination of) (alcohol) (or) (drugs) 
(or) (an intoxicating substance).] (Emphasis added) 
This appellate court is similarly familiar with the fact there is no definition of "motor 
vehicle" in Title I 8, and the only definition relating to a definition of "motor vehicle" is 
contained in Title 49. As the appellate Court observed and so stated in State v. Knott, 132 Idaho 
476,974 P.2d I 105 (1999): 
"There is a close interaction between the Title 49 statutes and similar 
statutory provisions in Title 18, particularly the DUI provision found in section 
I 8-8004. The statutes relate to the same subject matter and on occasions have 




After further observing that it was in 1984 that the DUI statute was transferred from Title 
49 to Title 18, the Court then concluded that when identical terms are used in both sections they 
should be construed by reference to the common definitions provided in the Code. It stated: 
"Idaho Code §73-113 [now LC. §73-113(3)] indicates that words and 
phrases used in the Idaho Code are to be "construed according to the context and 
approved usage of the language." Given that identical terms are used in the 
statutes, and the legislature amended the relevant phrase to statutes in both Title 
49 and Title 18 in the same bill after the DUI statute was transferred to the 
criminal code, the "context and approved usage" of the relevant phrase indicates 
that its meaning is the same in both titles." 132 Idaho at 479, 974 P.2d at 1008 
(bracketed reference to change in statutory citation added). 
Therefore, a Magistrate must go to Title 49 (as does the Supreme Court), and if 
Magistrates come to "different opinions" as to what a "motor vehicle" is defined to be, that only 
serves to raise a question as to the constitutionality of the DUI laws, or the application of the 
Rule ofLenity, when the essential element of the crime (a "motor vehicle") is being inadequately 
defined or materially mis-understood, as every defendant must be adequately apprised what 
conduct constitutes the criminal act before he can be charged, and this should require a clear 
statutory definition as to what constitutes a "motor vehicle", and to be understood by the public, 
promulgated by the legislature, and correctly enforced by the courts, giving effect to the 
legislative intent as to their intended definition is regarding "motor vehicle". 
This Defendant relied entirely upon the judicial determination that had been rendered by 
an Ada County Magistrate that declared Idaho's 2008 Legislature defined a "moped" to be 
expressly excluded and exempted from the definition of "motor vehicle", and for any 
prosecutorial agency to dispute that legislative intent, and to contradict the judicial interpretation 
of the Statutory definition, that serves to open the door to the inevitable conclusion the DUI 
Statute may be unconstitutionally flawed, or the Rule of Lenity must be applied, as that renders a 
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fundamental element of the crime to be vague, ambiguous, uncertain, and subject to dispute, 
when different Magistrates in the same judicial district would find the occasion to define 
differently what constitutes a "motor vehicle". That being the apparent situation, such a 
consequence serves to benefit any defendant, such as Mr. McKie, under the Rule of Lenity in 
criminal cases. For example, in State v. Alley, 155 Idaho 972, 318 P.3d 962 (Ct App 2014), the 
Court there held: 
"Additionally, if a criminal statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity applies 
and the statute must be construed in favor of the accused. State v. Dewey, 131 
Idaho 846, 848, 965 P.2d 206, 208 (Ct.App.1998); State v. Martinez, 126 Idaho 
801, 803, 891 P.2d 1061, 1063 (Ct.App.1995). However, where a review of the 
legislative history makes the meaning of the statute clear, the rule of lenity will 
not be applied. State v. Bradshaw, 155 Idaho 437, 440, 313 P.3d 765, 768 
(Ct.App.2013); State v. Jones, 151 Idaho 943, 947, 265 P.3d 1155, 1159 
(Ct.App.2011). The rule of lenity applies only when grievous ambiguity or 
uncertainty in a criminal statute that is not resolved by looking at the text, 
context, legislative historv. or underlying policy of the statute allows for 
multiple reasonable constructions. Bradshaw, 155 Idaho at 441, 313 P.3d at 
769." (Emphasis added). 
In State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 318 P.3d 955 (Idaho App. 2014), the Court of Appeals 
in that case also confirmed when the Rule of Lenity is applied, stating the following: 
"Additionally, if a criminal statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity applies 
and the statute.must be construed in favor of the accused. State v. Morrison, 143 
Idaho 459,461, 147 P.3d 91, 93 (Ct.App.2006). However, where a review of the 
legislative history and underlying public policy makes the meaning of the statute 
clear, the rule oflenity will not apply. State v. Bradshaw, 155 Idaho 437,440,313 
P.3d 765, 768 (Ct.App.2013). If the ambiguity remains after examining the text, 
context, history, and policy of the statute, the interpretive tie between the two or 
more reasonable readings is resolved in favor of the defendant. Id. at 440-41, 313 
P.3d at 768-69." 
More recently, in State v. Olsen, No. 43496-2015, the Supreme Court of Idaho on 
December 21, 2016, our Supreme Court held: 
"Statutory interpretation is a question of law over which this Court 
exercises free review. 'The rule of lenity states that criminal statutes must be 
strictly construed in favor of defendants.'" State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 
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I 03, 175 P.3d 788, 792 (2008)." (Emphasis added). 
The Legislative amendments undertaken in 2008 made the exclusionary language they 
used to be unambiguous and expressly clear that a moped is not titled, and non-titled vehicles are 
excluded from the definition of "motor vehicle", as a matter of law, and the Legislature, during a 
Senate Transportation Committee meeting on March 6, 2008, stated there was no registration 
requirement for this particular type of limited speed motor driven cycle, as discussed hereafter. 
The authority reviewed to determine what must be titled and what must be registered came 
to confirm that mopeds are not "titled", and as reflected in the Idaho Legislator's Senate 
Transportation Committee minutes in March 6, 2008, mopeds were not required to be "registered" 
in Idaho. That was the ruling by another Ada County Magistrate, and also there is no requirement 
for the operator of a moped to have a driver's license, or any motorcycle endorsement 
certification, or obtain any certificate of liability insurance to operate a moped on public streets, as 
a "moped" is expressly excluded and exempt by the acts of the 2008 Legislature that declared a 
moped is not a "Motor Vehicle", is not "titled", and need not be "registered" under Idaho law. 
(a). What Constitutes A "Motor Vehicle" Under Idaho Law 
The classification of a "motor vehicle", when reviewing the comprehensive statutory 
enactments resulting from the series of Legislative amendments in 2008, incorporated specific 
exclusions to the definition of "motor vehicle", and those exclusions are relevant to mopeds, as 
involved in this case, and essential to instruct a jury, when a Defendant is operating a vehicle 
defined within the exclusionary language, confirming what is not a "Motor Vehicle" under in 
Idaho law, as it is defined to be a "moped". 
In defining what would be construed to be "motor vehicle", in 2008 the Legislature 
enacted a series of amendments to LC. §49-123, with full knowledge of the DUI criminal statutes 
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identified in Title I 8, being LC. § 18-8004. Knowing the law, the Legislature then included part 
(2)(h), thereby adding specific exclusionary aspects to the definition of motor vehicle, so as to 
confirm that certain vehicles are specifically exempted, as specifically defined in J.C. §49-1071 
as J.C. §49-123(2)(h) states: 
"Motor vehicle" does not include vehicles that moved solely by human 
power, electric personal assistive mobility devices, motorized wheelchairs, Q!. 
other such vehicles that are specifically exempt from titling "or" registration 
requirements under Title 49, Idaho Code. (Emphasis added.). 
The essential portions of J.C. §49-123, with the relevant portion highlighted for the 
convenience of the Court, provides as follows: 
(a) .... . 
(b) .... . 
(c) .... . 
(d) .... . 
(e) .... . 
(f) .... . 
(g) .... . 
49-123. DEFINITIONS -- V. 
(I) ..... 
(2) "Vehicle" means: 
(h) Motor vehicle. Every vehicle which is self-propelled, and for the purpose of 
titling and registration meets federal motor vehicle safety standards as defined in 
section 49-107, Idaho Code. Motor vehicle DOES NOT INCLUDE vehicles 
moved solely by human power, electric personal assistive mobility devices and 
motorized wheelchairs OR OTHER SUCH VEHICLES THAT ARE 
SPECIFICALLY EXEMPT FROM TITLING OR REGISTRATION 
REQUIREMENTS UNDER TITLE 49, IDAHO CODE. (Emphasis added) 
With respect to the exemption of "mopeds", J.C. §49-114, through the inclusion of Sub-
Part (M)(9), excludes "mopeds" from titling requirements, so they are among those vehicles that 
are excluded and exempted by J.C. §49-123(2)(h), through the exemption from titling or 
registration, and the relevant portion of this exclusionary provision that announces the titling 
exemption, is LC. §49-114(M)(9), with relevant portions (highlighted for convenience of the 
Court), states the following: 
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(9) "Moped" means a limited-speed MOTOR-DRIVEN CYCLE having: 
(a) Both motorized and pedal propulsion that is not capable of 
propelling the vehicle at a speed in excess o(thirtv (30) miles per hour on level 
ground, whether two (2) or three (3) wheels are in contact with the ground 
during operation. If an internal combustion engine is used, the displacement 
shall not exceed fiftv (50) cubic centimeters and the moped shall have a power 
drive system that functions directly or automatically without clutching or 
shifting by the operator after the drive system is engaged; or 
(b) Two (2) wheels or three (3) wheels with no pedals, which is powered solely by 
electrical energy, has an automatic transmission, a motor which produces less 
than two (2) gross brake horsepower, is capable of propelling the device at a 
maximum speed of not more than thirty (30) miles per hour on level ground and 
as originally manufactured, meets federal motor vehicle safety standards for 
motor-driven cycles. A MOPED IS NOT REQUIRED TO BE TITLED AND 
NO MOTORCYCLE ENDORSEMENT IS REQUIRED FOR ITS 
OPERATOR. 
(10) "Motorbike" means a vehicle as defined in section 67-7101, Idaho 
Code. Such vehicle SHALL BE TITLED and MAY BE APPROVED FOR 
MOTORCYCLE REGISTRATION pursuant to section 49-402, Idaho Code, upon 
certification by the owner of the installation and use of conversion components 
that make the motorbike COMPLIANT WITH federal motor vehicle safety 
standards. 
(11) "Motorcycle" means every MOTOR VEHICLE having a seat or 
saddle for the use of the rider, designed to travel on not more than three (3) 
wheels in contact with the ground or designed to travel on two (2) wheels in 
contact with the ground which is modified by the addition of two (2) stabilizing 
wheels on the rear of the motor vehicle, that meets the federal motor vehicle 
safety standards as originally designed, and includes a converted motorbike, BUT 
DOES NOT INCLUDE A motor-driven cycle, a motorbike, a tractor or a 
MOPED. 
(12) ..... 
(13) "MOTOR-DRIVEN CYCLE" means a CYCLE with a motor that 
produces five (5) brake horsepower or less as originally manufactured that meets 
federal motor vehicle safety standards as originally designed, AND DOES NOT 
INCLUDE MOPEDS. Such vehicle shall be titled and a motorcycle endorsement 




(15) "Motorized wheelchair" means a motor vehicle with a speed not in 
excess of eight (8) miles per hour, designed for and used by a person with a 
disabi Ii ty. 
(16) ..... 
(17) "Motor vehicle." (See "Vehicle," section 49-123, Idaho Code) 
(18) "Motor vehicle liability policy" means an owner's or operator's policy 
of liability insurance, certified as provided in section 49-1210, Idaho Code, as 
proof of financial responsibility, and issued by an insurance carrier duly 
authorized to transact business in this state, to or for the benefit of the person 
named therein as insured. 
(19) "Motor vehicle record" means any record that pertains to a motor 
vehicle registration, motor vehicle title or identification documents or other 
similar credentials issued by the department or other state or local agency. 
(Emphasis added). 
Prior to the 2008 amendments, the Idaho Supreme Court referred to mopeds in 2006, 
whereby our appellate courts acknowledged and addressed the concept of a moped, and 
specifically recognized it had exempt status in California, as it was then being identified in 
relation to a California case that was then cited within the Idaho Supreme Court decision 
rendered in 2006, when discussing what is and what is not a motor vehicle. This issue was 
raised and addressed in Armstrong v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 143 Idaho 135, 139 P.3d 737 
(May 25, 2006), wherein the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
"At issue in Galvin was a provision excluding coverage for injuries 
sustained by a person occupying a motor vehicle owned by the insured but not 
covered in the policy. A father had obtained coverage for his 1979 Dodge, but not 
his moped, and his son was injured while riding the moped. The father contended 
that the exclusion for other owned motor vehicles did not apply to the moped 
because it was not a motor vehicle. The Galvin court agreed, relying upon the 
facts that mopeds were designed to be propelled by pedaling in addition to their 
motors; that they were exempt from registration under the Vehicle Code; and 
that while motorcycles were defined as being motor vehicles under the Vehicle 
Code, mopeds were not. It stated that while a motorcycle had been held to be 
motor vehicle under a similar exclusionary clause, "the implied analogy between 
mopeds and motorcycles is tenuous and cannot be relied upon as the basis for 
finding that a moped is a motor vehicle." 170 Cal.App.3d at 1022, 216 Cal.Rptr. 
at 846. The instant case involves a motorcvcle, not a moped. A motorcycle is 
defined as a motor vehicle ander the Idaho motor vehicle code. l.C. § 49-
114(10)." (Now J.C.§ 49-l 14(M)(l l), after 2008. (Emphasis added) 
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The current statutory citation for motorcycle, after the 2008 Legislative amendments, is 
LC. §49-l l 4(M)(l l ), and that specific definition excludes mopeds from the definition of 
motorcycle, by the express language in the statute, which now provides as follows: 
(11) "Motorcycle" means every MOTOR VEHICLE having a seat or 
saddle for the use of the rider, designed to travel on not more than three (3) 
wheels in contact with the ground or designed to travel on two (2) wheels in 
contact with the ground which is modified by the addition of two (2) stabilizing 
wheels on the rear of the motor vehicle, THAT MEETS the federal motor vehicle 
safety standards as originally designed, and includes a converted motorbike, BUT 
DOES NOT INCLUDE a motor-driven cycle, a motorbike, a tractor or a 
MOPED. (Emphasis added) 
The discussion within Armstrong, supra, had focused upon the definition of 
"motorcycle", "motor vehicle", and also California's exclusion of a "moped" as a moped was 
defined (prior to 2008) under California law to be excluded from "motor vehicle". Idaho's 
definition of a motorcycle in 2006 was before identified in I.C. §49-114(10), and now is 
identified in I.C. §49-l 14(M)(l l)), which expressly excludes "mopeds", because a moped is not 
a "motor vehicle" like all motorcycles are, a critical component to the definition of a 
"motorcycle". When the Idaho Legislature took the initiative in 2008 to amend its definitions of 
various vehicles and modes of transportation, they apparently chose to embrace aspects of 
California law, as the analysis in Armstrong, supra, would suggest that took place. It appears 
Idaho's Legislature embraced the California definition(s), and Idaho expressly excluded mopeds 
from "motor vehicle", as well as a motorcycle, so a moped would never be regarded a 
motor vehicle under Idaho law. The definition of moped is now addressed in LC. §49-
l 14(M)(9), referred to as a "limited speed, motor driven cycle", not titled, having no motorcycle 
endorsement requirements, and defined separately from "motor vehicles", separately from 
"motorcycle" and also separately from "motorbike". 
These exemptions must be taken into account when a moped is the issue, as they are 
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exempt from what constitutes a motor vehicle because thev are not titled eve/es. 
What may have the appearance of a "motorized bicycle" is now specifically defined in 
LC. §49-l 14(M)(9), and that physical "mechanism" is what the Idaho Legislature has chosen to 
call a "moped", sometimes referred to by the public as a "motorized bike", but not to be 
mistaken or confused with what is defined to be a "Motorbike" as that is another concept under 
Idaho law, meant to reference a "recreational vehicle", defined in LC. §49-114(M)(I0), and 
expressly identified to be a vehicle as defined in section 67-7101, Idaho Code (where there they 
are called a self-propelled two wheeled motorcycle, and all motorcycles are defined to be a 
motor vehicle [§49-114(M)(ll) "Motorcycle" means every MOTOR VEHICLE], and a 
"motorbike" SHALL BE TITLED and MAY BE APPROVED FOR MOTORCYCLE 
REGISTRATION (as declared in LC. §49-114(M)(l l)), pursuant to the provisions of LC. §49-
402. Typically, a recreational "motorbike" is a cycle designed for off road use, and is again 
specifically identified in LC. §67-7 I 01 (9), wherein a "motorbike" is a vehicle designed for off 
road recreation, at times referred to as trailbikes, enduro bikes, mountain trail bikes, motocross 
bikes or dual purpose motorcycles, and relate to such recreational activities like mountain bike 
climbing or hill climbing activities. 
"Mopeds" are expressly declared to be very different, and quite the contrary, ~ 
titled, and never used for off road recreational activities, as they are grossly underpowered for 
any such use in their intended application as what could be considered instead to be a "motorized 
bike" on city streets. 
Mopeds are allowed to be constructed only with an engine that is 50cc's or less, not 
"geared" for high speed, and must move slower that 30 mph. A "motorized bike" or "motorized 
bicycle", as colloquially used in the context of a "moped", typically has a slip clutch that can be 
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lever activated or foot activated, or automatically activated in conjunction with the rotation of the 
wheel-engine revolution, and the engine is designed for a pedal/chain start so you can start the 
engine while riding and pedaling the bike. The typical speed that can be achieved on a moped 
"motorized bike" is usually between 20 and 25 mph, never exceeding 30 mph, as it has very 
limited speed potential because of the very small cylinder displacement, and the limited horse 
power available, together with the weight of the bike itself and the weight of the rider, all of 
which weight friction limits the forward movement capabilities. The chain drive mechanism 
typically requires a sprocket reduction on the rear wheel assembly, and during prior test runs 
conducted with this moped, while being operated by this Defendant, his maximum speed was 
less than 25 mph, even on a slope, as the weight of the rider, the friction and drag caused through 
the moving parts from the limited engine output, as it transitions to the chain, to the sprocket, and 
to the friction of the road surface against the tire, consumes all the torque and power output 
generated. 
(b). Prior Determination "Mopeds" Are Not 
"Motor Vehicles" 
Under Idaho's Motor Vehicle Laws 
The operation of a moped was decided in another case represented by defense counsel 
involving the question whether a driver's license was required to operate a moped. 
That issue was addressed in the case entitled State of Idaho v. Elijah c. Udeochu, 
Case NO. CR-MD-2011-0005485 (4th District Court, Ada County, 2011), then being prosecuted by 
Garden City officials (Garden City, Idaho), and the focus in that case was the current definition of 
"Motor Vehicle", given the recent amendments in 2008, wherein mopeds were excluded-exempted 
from the definition of "motor vehicle". 
Mr. Udeochu's counsel undertook research to address this statutory interpretation after 
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the exclusions and exceptions were adopted by the Legislature in 2008. That case brought forth a 
decision from an Ada County Magistrate, the Honorable Michael J. Oths, wherein that 
Magistrate announced a "moped" is specifically exempt from "titling" requirements, and Idaho 
law specifically states vehicles specifically exempted from titling or registering requirements are 
not "motor vehicles", as defined within Title 49, Idaho Code. 
The court went on to reason that a statutory requirement in Idaho, requiring an operator of a 
"Motor Vehicle" to have a driver's license, is an issue governed by Title 49, Chapter 3, and if the 
mode of transportation (moped) is not a "motor vehicle", then a driver's license is not required for 
its operation. The requirement for a "Motor Vehicle" Driver's License is contained in LC. §49-
301, which provides: 
No person, except those expressly exempted by the proV1s10ns of this 
chapter, shall drive any nwtor vehicle upon a highway unless the person has a 
current and valid Idaho driver's license. 
Judge Oths concluded in his Order that: 
"a moped is specifically exempt from titling requirements, that vehicles that 
are specifically exempt from titling are not 'motor vehicles,' and that a moped is 
thus not a motor vehicle. Therefore, a driver's license is not required to operate a 
moped on a public highway, nor is liability insurance required. A lingering 
question remains as to whether it is possible to legally operate a moped on a 
public highway. Trying to read all of the statutes in concert is a daunting task, but 
it appears there is a way to legally ride a moped on a public highway. Idaho Code 
§49-402(10) prohibits registration of a vehicle for use on public highways unless 
it meets federal safety standards. Presumably if a moped were to meet the federal 
standards it could be registered and/or used on a public highway. Nothing would 
require the vehicle to be titled, nor would the operator need to be licensed . . . 
Should this matter proceed to trial, jury instructions consistent with the above 
opinion would be given." Order Re: Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, at 4-5. 
It was that very Order rendered by the Honorable Michael J. Oths in the Udeochu case 
that Mr. McK.ie thereupon chose to rely when he undertook to construct his moped, pursuant to the 
statutory definition and description contained within Idaho's 2008 Legislative amendments, and he 
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chose to operate that moped rather than to operate a "motor vehicle", when he might consume any 
alcoholic beverages, following his prior experience and prior encounter with the law. 
The Order issued by the Honorable Michael J. Oths reflects the analysis undertaken by an Ada 
County Magistrate declaring a "moped", to be excluded from what is a "motor vehicle", just as the 
language in the statute requires, following the 2008 Legislative amendments, as that cycle is excluded 
from "motor vehicle", because it is specifically exempted from titling and/or registration requirements. 
Garden City was also involved in a case prior to the Udeochu case, supra, also in 2011, 
entitled State v. Davis, Case No. CR FE-2011-0001299 (4 th District Court, Ada County, 2011), 
regarding a vehicle with a larger engine displacement which exceeded the 50cc limitation for a 
moped. That appears to be Garden City's first reference to this "style" of vehicle, calling that 
vehicle a "motorized bicycle", being the same language they used to describe the appearance of 
the vehicle operated by Mr. Udeochu, as described in Garden City's Briefing. Such a verbal 
characterization to the effect they appear to be "motorized bicycles" is a reasonable "descriptive" 
reference, but that "language" was not included within the Legislative amendments to Title 49, 
and had the Legislature elected to describe these "cycles" by appearance rather than mechanical 
composition, the phrase "motorized bicycle" would connote an accurate descriptive reference, as 
a "moped", is a "small motor driven cycle", physically unique, in that it is fitted with a very small 
engine (gas or electric), has pedals, and can operate with human power or mechanical power, but 
cannot operate in excess of 30 mph. 
To use the phrase "motorized bicycle" as in both the Davis and Udeochu cases, though 
reasonable by physical appearances, is not the "legal" definition, and in the Davis case, it had an 
engine displacement of 67.22 cc in size, slightly greater than the allowed maximum size (50 cc) 
for a moped, so it did not fit the lawful classification of a moped. Consequently, referring to a 
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moped as a "motorized bicycle", though physically descriptive, has not been the phraseology 
incorporated within the statute when the exclusionary provisions of J.C. §49-114(M)(9) (a)&(b) 
were enacted, or the exclusions announced in J.C. §49-123(2)(h) when adopted, defining what is 
a "motor vehicle", and what is not a "motor vehicle". 
The definition of a "motor vehicle" is expressed in J.C. §49-123(2)(h), which states: 
"(h) Motor vehicle. Every vehicle which is self-propelled, and for the purpose of 
titling and registration meets federal motor vehicle· safety standards as defined in 
section 49-107, Idaho Code. MOTOR VEHICLE DOES NOT INCLUDE 
VEHICLES moved solely by human power, electric personal assistive 
mobility devices and motorized wheelchairs or other such vehicles that are 
specifically exempt from titling OR registration requirements under title 49, 
Idaho Code." (Emphasis added) 
This McKie case, just like in the Udeochu case, specifically involves a "moped", by legal 
definition, as it is precisely constructed as defined and described within the statute, and in 
Udeochu, that Magistrate declared "mopeds" are not "motor vehicles", as a matter ofldaho law, 
and could not subject the operator to criminal acts associated with the operation of "motor 
vehicles", as a moped is a non-titled, limited speed, motor driven cycle, expressly excluded from 
the definition of a "motor vehicle" and exempt from titling or registration requirements. 
This should have been the ruling announced in McKie, as all courts in Idaho are bound 
to accept the plain, ordinary, and unambiguous language used by the Legislature in their statutory 
definitions, and a vehicle that is specifically "excluded" and "exempted" from the definition of 
"motor vehicle", as defined in the Idaho Code, is binding on the courts, and our Lower Court 
was in error when deciding to call a "moped" a "motor vehicle", merely because it had a "self-
propelled" component by virtue of a small single cylinder 49cc engine, when it is a limited 
speed, motor driven cycle, clearly not a "motor vehicle" as the courts have declared a UTV, ATV, 
motorcycle, motorbike, and snowmobile, etc. to be, as a moped is separately addressed with 
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specific exclusions by its definition, and though "somewhat" self-propelled, 1s speci[icallv 
exempt from titling or registration requirements under title 49, Idaho Code. 
ISSUE 2. 
The Magistrate Court Erred - As A Matter Of Law - In Refusing To 
Apply The Statutory Definition That Excludes "Mopeds" From The 
Statutory Class of "Motor Vehicles" For Purposes Of Determining 
Whether The Defendant McKie Could Be Convicted Of DU Under 
I.C. § 18-8004 While Operating A Moped 
For a lower court to propose a Jury instruction that is contrary to the effects of the 
specific exclusionary language addressed and expressly contained within LC. §49-123(2)(h), and 
specifically exempted by the defining words expressed in I.C. §49-114(M)(9) (a)&(b), would 
constitute a fundamental error if the case had gone to trial upon the erroneous jury instructions 
and appealed on the issue as to the insufficiency of the jury instructions. Arguably, to deny a 
motion to dismiss, when the statutory language precludes any statutory authority to bring a 
criminal charge for operating a moped, could be viewed as an abuse of discretion, as the 
exclusionary effects of the Legislative enactments compel all courts to apply their exclusionary 
language as declared within the statute, and not pass judgment upon the Legislature's reasoning 
or wisdom for the decisions made by the Legislature. It remains the Legislature's exclusive 
prerogative to enact laws, and the constitutional duty of the judiciary to uphold, defend, and 
enforce the laws enacted and adopted by the Legislative branch, to the extent they are 
constitutionally sound. The judiciary is unconditionally required to give to the statutory language 
the plain and ordinary meaning(s) that are expressed thereby, and when the legislature 
incorporates specific language to expressly state what a "motor vehicle" is defined to be, and 
what is expressly excluded from that specific definition, the courts are bound to enforce that 
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definition and each exclusion and exemption. The exclusionary effects under the statutory 
definition requires a lower court to apply all exclusionary language, and all exceptions in the 
application of the definition, which this 2008 Legislature clearly and unambiguously undertook 
to accomplish, and did expressly exclude specific forms of slow moving, limited speed, motor 
driven cycles, notwithstanding the fact they may be capable of being "somewhat" "self-
propelled", and specifically described to be exempt from titling and/or registration mandates, as 
a "moped", is not to be titled/registered, and specifically declared to be excluded/exempt. 
Though Garden City accepted the decision rendered by Magistrate Michael J. Oths, that 
Agency felt nonetheless compelled (before eventually dismissing the case altogether) to amend 
their charge against Mr. Udeochu, and allege a possible infraction, alleging the possible violation 
of I.C. §49-402(10), questioning ifthere was the presence of certain safety accessory criteria, such 
as lights, tum signals, brake lights, reflectors, etc., which could present a safety issue during 
operation. In Mr. McKie's case, however, his constructive talents sought to incorporate each of 
these safety features, and his moped would meet the equivalence of the Federal Motor Vehicle 
Safety Standard (FMVSS) Certification. He assembled the moped from other manufactured 
components, just as others have done, and if it were inspected, as the State was afforded the 
opportunity to do so, it would be found to be FMVSS compliant, in both the spirit and physical 
presence of the criteria. He chose to incorporate those features for the very purpose of avoiding 
any argument to the effect his moped would ever constitute a safety hazard on the streets of Boise, 
Idaho, though (arguably) he may not be required to do so. His taillight issue, the sole reason for 
which he was stopped, was the consequence of an electrical short, no the absence of a tail light 
fixture, evidenced by the flickering presence in the accessory, revealing an electrical shortage 
developing in his electrical wiring system, but despite being the reason he was stopped, he was 
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never cited for that concern by the Officer, as he also had attached reflectors and a headlight, 
adequately visible as he travelled along the side of the street (in a bike lane when available). 
(a). The Law On "Mopeds" And "Motor Vehicles 
The fundamental issue before this court is not whether a "moped" has a capable 
component that may allow it to be somewhat "self-propelled", but rather to confirm a "moped" 
has been specifically defined to be a slow moving, limited speed, motor driven cycle, expressly 
excluded from the "definition" of "motor vehicle", and exempted from any titling requirements, 
as expressed in the definitions under Idaho's Motor Vehicle law, adopted within the Legislative 
amendments in 2008. 
As stated previously, the Lower Court took the posture that if a moped has within it a 
"self-propelling" feature, such as the term "self-propelled" was being discussed in State v. 
Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 318 P.3d 955 (Idaho App. 2014), then it was a "motor vehicle", and 
that's the beginning and end of the conversation. It may have been an unfortunate consequence 
that the Court of Appeals chose to merely focus only on the component of being "self-propelled" 
in the analysis of the Trusdall case, supra, when a UTV, the subject of discussion in that case, 
became specifically defined to be a "recreational motor vehicle" under the provisions of the 
statute, referring to it as a "recreational" motor vehicle". Clearly, the discussion did not include 
any analysis of a moped, and a UTV, was not excluded from the definition of motor vehicle as a 
moped was by the Legislative amendments that were enacted in 2008. A moped is expressly 
excluded from the meaning and definition of a motor vehicle, and that was never at issue raised in 
Trusdall. Equally compelling in Trusdall is that the operation of a UTV is subject to its own DUI 
statute, and when it comes to alcohol, that "recreational motor vehicle is identified in LC. §67-




"67-7114. Operation under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other 
intoxicating substance. Any person driving or operating a snowmobile, motorbike, 
utility type vehicle, specialty off-highway vehicle or all-terrain vehicle under the 
influence of alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating substance on a public 
roadway or highway or off-highway shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." 
The court will note that statute was added in 1999, and never included a moped, or ever 
thereafter amended it to include a moped. A UTV is further defined in LC. §67-7101(17) to be a 
"recreational motor vehicle", that are to weigh at least 900 lbs, but no greater than 2000 lbs., and 
knowing the specifications of a Polaris Ranger UTV that was being discussed in Trusdall, the 
focus must now be that a Polaris Ranger, being a utility type vehicle (UTV), is statutorily 
regarded to be a " motor vehicle", rendering it subject to prosecution under the general DUI 
statute, and not otherwise limited just to the application of LC. §67-7114, which became the 
actual issue in Trusdal/, as Ms. Trusdall was arguing that Title 67 should bar the State from 
charging her under LC. § 18-8004. The Court of Appeals ruled the State could charge her under 
either of the statutes, though focusing upon the language a UTV is "self-propelled", but the better 
analysis would be that a UTV is a "motor vehicle", by specific statutory definition. A UTV is 
defined to be a recreational "motor vehicle", a clear distinction that Trusdall must be construed 
that it involved a motor vehicle by definition, not something that has been specifically excluded 
and exempt from the definition of "motor vehicle", as a moped is so categorically and expressly 
classified and declared excluded from "motor vehicle", irrespective of being a slow, somewhat 
"self-propelled", as they are a "slow moving" "limited speed" "motor driven cycles" expressly 
excluded from the definition of motor vehicle as they are expressly exempted from titling 
requirements. 
A Polaris Ranger UTV ( depending upon the vanous model), as traditionally 
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manufactured, have an engine displacement in excess of 500 cc's, and typically 750 to 900 cc's, 
thereby exceeding a moped definition by a factor exceeding tenfold (or more) the allowable cc's, 
and potentially attain speeds over 30 mph, and weight typically 1000 lbs. to 1500 lbs., within the 
defining weight allocations as stated above. Furthermore, UTV's are typically titled and may be 
registered, when FMVSS compliant, though not specifically to be used on city streets, roads or 
highway travel, for which reason they may be without FMVSS certification, since not expressly 
authorized for use on the roads. 
Without debate, a UTV is not a "moped", is not a specifically enumerated vehicle 
excluded from the definition of motor vehicle by LC. §49-123(2)(h), and is not exempted by LC. 
§49-114(M)(9) (a)&(b), and more to the point, a UTV is classified as a recreational "motor 
vehicle" by definition, so the lower court's reference to Trusdall, supra, in analyzing what to label 
a "moped", is factually distinguished, and in 2014, the appellate court in Trusdall was not asked to 
address the exclusionary status of a moped that took effect in 2008, and that court never discussed 
the operation of a "moped", which is statutorily defined to be a limited speed motor driven cycle, 
expressly excluded from the definition of "motor vehicle" because it is specifically declared to be 
exempt from titling or registration requirements. The plain and ordinary language used to 
specifically exclude a moped from what is defined to be a "motor vehicle" is unambiguous, and 
that exclusion must now be given the legislative effects intended by the 2008 Legislative 
amendments, as is expressed in J.C. §49-123(2)(h), and identified in LC. §49-114(M)(9) (a)&(b), 
as cited above .. 
As noted in Trusdall, it has been the custom of the appellate courts in all prior years, such 
as when the Supreme Court then rendered their decisions in State v. Carpenter, 113 Idaho 882, 749 
P. 2d 501 (1988) and State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 987 P. 2d 290 (1999), to acknowledge and 
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express the fact that Title 18, Chapter 80, did not have any definition of "motor vehicle", for the 
purpose of applying a definition to the application ofl.C. § 18-8004, (Idaho's DUI laws), so the 
Appellate Courts went to the statutory codification contained within Title 49 of the statutes, where 
the established definition for "motor vehicle" was found, and the Supreme Court used that 
definition when rendering decisions by the appellate courts. The appellate courts relied upon Title 
49 when those cases were decided, and thereafter, and when the amendments were made to Title 
49 by the Legislature in 2008, that still remains the only source to define "motor vehicle", and 
what is excluded from the definition of "motor vehicle" since 2008, must be considered in what 
is now to be declared a "motor vehicle" under Idaho law. 
The Carpenter and Barnes Decisions established where Courts must go to find the 
definition of"motor vehicle", and it remained true in Trusdall in 2014, as it is today, and the only 
definition available to apply to Title 18 is that expressed within Title 49, and that constitutes the 
only definition for a "Motor Vehicle" for purposes of Title 18, Statutes of the State of Idaho. The 
Idaho lower courts are required to accept that definition, and required to accept the exclusionary 
language the Legislature has expressly used to declare what is not a motor vehicle, as the 
Legislature did choose in 2008 to so declare. 
The statute distinguishes among various vehicles, (and now to include cycles) as certain 
modes of transportation are no longer within "motor vehicle". A "moped" is not a "motorcycle", 
and not a "motor bike", being described and defined separately. A motorcycle and a motorbike 
are "titled" and "registered" vehicles, while a moped is not titled, and appears not intended to be 
registered, according to the Senate Transportation Committee minutes in March, 2008. Moped 
was specifically excluded because it is a "slow moving, limited speed, motor driven cycle", that 
has a motor displacement under 50 cc in size, cannot attain a speed in excess of 30 mph, and has 
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pedals to start it, can be operated with pedals (thereby human driven) or assisted by a small 
motor/engine ( electrical or internal combustion), having a limited capability of being slightly 
"self-propelled", but not the "defining" characteristic to make it a "motor vehicle". 
The 2008 Legislative exclusions are controlling in this controversy, and it was within 
the Legislature's exclusive right (as the legislative branch of government) to adopt exclusions 
and exemptions to the definition of motor vehicle, and the courts are bound by such statutory 
definition crafted in 2008, and our Lower Court was bound to instruct a jury accordingly, no 
differently than was identified in the Udeochu case announced by Magistrate Michael J. Oths in 
his Order entered December 8, 2011, of which this appellate court shall take judicial notice. 
Of further interest, when Garden City elected to amend the citation in the Udeochu case, 
supra, that sparked further discussion as to the effect of the statutory application of LC. §49-
402(10), suggesting that some mopeds might not meet certain FMVSS safety criteria, and as the 
defense then proffered, if that could be proven in Mr. Udeochu's case, then it would present even 
further reasoning that the moped, in addition to not being titled, is additionally exempted from 
registration, if unable to show it was FMVSS compliant, or had compliance equivalency, as no 
vehicle (under the statute) is allowed to be registered in Idaho if it does not meet Federal Motor 
Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS). If a moped cannot meet FMVSS, it became axiomatic that it 
could not be registered, in addition to a moped not being eligible to be titled, the argument then 
turned to the issue that if there existed no FMVSS compliance, then a moped could not be 
registered, as a matter of law, and then the dispute turned to whether a person should be allowed 
to even operate a moped on public streets in Idaho, because of what is defined by LC. §49-117. 
As those arguments pro!,,rressed over the potential application of LC. §49-402(10), along 
with the effects of FMVSS compliance ( or lack thereof), and the applicable effects of LC. §49-
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117, further debate ensued in Udeochu over the specific "authorization" that stated: "unless 
otherwise specifically authorized", and with that declared language, a further question was raised 
as to the application of the provision within LC. §49-402(10), which states: 
"(l 0) Any vehicle that does not meet federal motor vehicle safety 
standards shall not be registered and shall not be permitted to operate on public 
highways of the state, as defined in section 40-117, Idaho Code, unless otherwise 
specifically authorized." (Emphasis added). 
J.C. §49-123(V)(2)(h) adopted the exclusions of certain vehicles from "motor vehicle", 
and then J.C. §49-114(M)(9)(b) "specifically authorized" the operation of a moped on Idaho 
roads, without any form of "endorsement", and nothing within the precise description and 
makeup of a moped, as described in (M)(9)(a) (regarding small internal combustion engines of 
50cc or less) required "certified" FMVSS compliance in subpart (a). Mopeds are excluded from 
the definition of "motor vehicle" by their exempt status from "titling or registration" requirements 
expressed in J.C. §49- l 14(M)(9)(b ), and the statutory language in (M)(9)(b) says the "operator" of 
a "moped" may "operate" it "without a motorcycle endorsement". Because the statute expressly 
"authorizes" an "operator" of a "moped" to "operate" it, the operation would typically occur upon 
public roads, as where else would you operate it. There is no logical meaning to say you can 
operate a moped without a motorcycle endorsement ( especially given the Senate Transportation 
Committee comments a moped was not intended to be registered, and we find no express 
requirement under J.C. §49-114(M)(9)(a) that it must have "certified" FMVSS compliance), 
when ordinary meaning of "operate" would include operation on the streets; therefore the 
operation of a moped is "otherwise specifically authorizetL ", as indicated by J.C. §49-402(10). 
It remains important to review the Senate Transportation Committee comments when the 
Legislature adopted House Bill 3 65, as it was intended to "authorize" the "operation" of a 
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"moped", on "Idaho streets and roadways", but no one said "upon Federal Interstate Highways". 
It would seem logical you should not face an infraction offense when you operate a "moped" on 
an Idaho public roadway, especially if the moped is constructed with the functional equivalence of 
FMVSS compliance by the way it was assembled, and especially when "specifically authorized" 
for use on Idaho roadways, without requiring any endorsement, and no requirement it be 
specifically "certified" FMVSS compliance with such a manufacture label attached to it. 
Idaho gets federal funding for maintenance and construction of Idaho's portion of the 
Interstate Highway System. Non-Federal roadways do not raise a funding concern. Thus, if a 
limitation were placed on moped locations for travel, such a prohibition of mopeds on highways 
that are "federally funded", such as the Federal Interstate Highways, as opposed to what may be 
non-federally funded Idaho roadways in general, would be logical, and Boise Avenue is a non-
federally funded City street. It may be reasonable to restrict slow-moving "vehicles-cycles" on 
Federal Highways, where non-conventional slow moving cycles, with no acceleration capabilities, 
travel slowly, could cause a traffic hazard or risk to fast moving "Motor Vehicles" travelling at 
speeds over twice the maximum speed of a moped. 
To support that concept, the March 6, 2008, Senate Transportation Committee minutes 
confirmed "mopeds will not be required to be registered because people use them "in town" 
and they are not a "highway" vehicle. (See Garden City's Briefing in the Udeochu case, supra). 
The distinction about "in town", compared to "freeway" use, further supports an authorized use in 
town, by virtue of the discussions that the Senate Transportation Committee had on March 6, 2008. 
However, none of the provisions of LC. §49-402( I 0) are an issue in this appeal, but the 
above discussion confirms that a moped is not only excluded from being titled by the statutory 
exemption, but by virtue of the Senate Transportation Committee minutes entered March 6, 2008, 
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a moped is not intended to be registered. 
These "In town" roadways are recognized to be public roadways, and because they are 
likely not maintained by federal funding allocations, these city roadways and streets may simply 
fall off the "radar" when it comes to State applications for Federal Highway Funding. 
It appears to have been clearly recognized by Idaho's Senators that "mopeds" would be 
"operated" "in town", and to that end, another "fact" stipulated to by the Parties was that this 
Defendant was cited by the Boise City Officer while operating his moped along Boise Avenue in 
the City of Boise in the "bike lane", where you would expect to find a two wheel, slow moving 
means of transportation, travelling along a roadway in "town". Mr. McKie was operating his 
moped within the Boise City limits, on Boise Avenue, where there is a limited speed of 35 mph or 
less, and that location is an "in town" location. 
(b). Mopeds Are Unique Under Idaho Law 
A "moped", defined exclusively in I.C. §49-l 14(M) (9)(a)&(b), is described to be a 
"limited-speed motor-driven cycle", which exists in several different forms, described in detail to 
be: 
"Moped" means a limited-speed motor-driven cycle having: 
(a) Both motorized and pedal propulsion that is not capable of propelling the 
vehicle at a speed in excess of thirty (30) miles per hour on level ground, 
whether two (2) or three (3) wheels are in contact with the &'found during 
operation. If an internal combustion engine is used, the displacement shall not 
exceed fifty (50) cubic centimeters and the moped shall have a power drive 
system that functions directly or automatically without clutching or shifting by 
the operator after the drive system is engaged; or 
(b) Two (2) wheels or three (3) wheels with no pedals, which is powered solely 
by electrical energy. has an automatic transmission, a motor which produces less 
than two (2) gross brake horsepower, is capable of propelling the device at a 
maximum speed of not more than thirty (30) miles per hour on level ground and 
as originally manufactured, meets federal motor vehicle safety standards for 
motor-driven cycles. A moped is not required to be titled and no motorcycle 
endorsement is required for its operator. (Emphasis added). 
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Mopeds can be in several forms, two wheel, three wheel, and depending on its 
energy source, may be a small fuel powered engine, or an electrical powered motor. 
Boise City has confirmed, and therefore has stipulated to the fact this mechanism 
meets the definition of"Moped", under Idaho law. Since a moped is a "limited speed motor 
driven cycle", it is not labeled to be a "motor vehicle", it becomes a unique mechanism 
under Idaho law. Most mopeds, because of the way they are typically assembled, come as 
"originally manufactured", so when it comes to safety accessories, whether assembled out 
of state or assembled through a retro-kit in state, they typically meet Federal Motor Vehicle 
Safety Standards (FMVSS) compliance, as they are the product of an industrial 
manufacturer, and conveniently equipped with headlight, tail light, reflectors, brake light, 
turn signals, etc. It appears also to be the case with "electrical" powered mopeds, as that is 
specifically mentioned in part (b) of LC. §49-l l 4(M)(9), where it is not specifically stated in 
part (a), recognizing there may be retro fitted mopeds constructed into two wheel frames 
from re-cycled parts that incorporate a 49cc engine, specifically for in-town movement, 
characteristic of a bicycle that is now not only pedal-activated, but also has other "moped" 
benefits. 
From the statutory definition of "moped", it becomes impossible for it to be called a 
"motor vehicle", as it is separately defined as a "limited speed motor driven cycle", not allowed to 
be titled. 
Because a moped was not intended for titling or registration mandates, it carmot be called 
a "motor vehicle" under the law's definition, and is therefore excluded from the "licensing" 
requirements under LC. §49-301, as it is expressly exempt from being a "motor vehicle". 
There is no issue being raised by the State in this appeal that a moped must be "titled" or 
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"registered". The State accepts the definition of moped that specifically states it is not to be 
"titled" LC. (§49-114(M)(9)(b), ["A moped is not required to be titled and no motorcycle 
endorsement is required for its operator."], and there is no indication the State would dispute the 
fact the Senate Transportation Committee has stated a moped was not intended to be "registered", 
because there is no purpose to register such a slow moving unit when it is not to be considered a 
"motor vehicle", as identified in the Senate Transportation Committee minutes reflected in their 
March 6, 2008 committee session. 
A moped is exempt from "titling" and "registration" requirements, and by virtue of the 
statutory definition of "motor vehicle", set forth in LC. §49-123(V)(2)(h), ["Motor vehicle does 
not include vehicles moved solely ..... or other such vehicles that are specifically exempt from 
titling or registration requirements under title 49, Idaho Code.], it then becomes a question of 
statutory interpretation as to the exclusionary language, wherein it is specifically excludes mopeds 
from being a "motor vehicle", when LC. §49-123(V)(2)(h) expressly states: 
(h) Motor vehicle. Every vehicle which is self-propelled, and for the purpose of 
titling and registration, meets federal motor vehicle safety standards as defined in 
section 49-107, Idaho Code. Motor vehicle does not include vehicles moved solely 
by human power, electric personal assistance mobility devices and motorized 
wheelchairs or other such vehicles that are specifically exempt from titling or 
registration requirements under title 49. Idaho Code. 
Thusly, since a moped is specifically exempt from the title requirements, by statute, and 
not required to be registered by the Senate Transportation Committee, as declared on March 6, 
2008, and that express "exclusion" is contained within the definition of a "motor vehicle", as 
defined by LC. §49-123(2) (h), it was upon that basis that Magistrate Michael J. Oths determined 
in the Udeochu case, supra, that a driver's license cannot be required to "operate" a "limited 
speed-motor driven cycle", classified as a "moped" and typically used in town, on in-town 
40 
000121
roadways and City streets. A "driver's license" is required only of those who drive "a motor 
vehicle", since the law mandates a driver's license is required only for those drivers who operate a 
"motor vehicle" as defined by J.C. §49-301. 
The Legislature took the specific opportunity in 2008 to eliminate confusion over the 
possibility that some police officials in Idaho might think a "moped" might be a "motorcycle" or a 
"motor bike" or possibly referred to as a "motorized bicycle" because of its appearance, and in 
order to dispel that possible confusion over that subject matter, the Legislature took the extra step 
to exempt the moped from any requirement to have a "motorcycle endorsement", as the law 
appears to embrace the logic that if no license is required, then no endorsement is required to 
operate it. People who do not have a driver's license, but operate a limited speed-motor-driven 
cycle, meeting the criteria of a "moped", may operate the unit on Idaho roadways, and in town for 
sure, without fear of being cited for DWP or failing to carry a certificate of liability insurance, or 
a DUI. 
( c). No Certificate Of Liability Insurance Is 
Required To Operate A Moped Under Idaho Law 
Because of the combined definitions, exclusions, exemptions, and exceptions found in the 
law, a moped does not meet the definition of "motor vehicle", and an operator of a moped need not 
carry a policy of liability insurance, as a moped is not a motor vehicle. 
Since moped is excluded from the "motor vehicle" definition, there can be no lawful basis 
to require an operator to have a policy of "motor vehicle" liability insurance under Idaho's 
"Motor Vehicle" Financial Responsibility Act and to emphasize the point, the "Motor Vehicle 
Financial Responsibility Act", provided for in Title 49, Chapter 12, enacted the requirement under 
§49-1229, Idaho Code, which identified the criteria for a "motor vehicle" policy of liability 
insurance. The Statute provides: 
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"Required MOTOR VEHICLE insurance. (1) Every owner of a MOTOR 
VEHICLE which is REGISTERED and operated in Idaho by the owner or with 
his permission shall continuously, except as provided in section 41-2516, Idaho 
Code, provide insurance against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for 
bodily injury or death or damage to property suffered by any person caused by 
maintenance or use of MOTOR VEHICLES DESCRIBED THEREIN in an 
amount not less than that required by section 49-117 Idaho Code, and shall 
demonstrate the existence of any other coverage required by this title or a certificate 
of self-insurance issued by the department pursuant to section 49-1224, Idaho 
Code, for each MOTOR VEHICLE TO BE REGISTERED." (Emphasis added). 
As indicated in that provision, the mode of transportation that requires insurance 1s a 
"registered motor vehicle". That "motor vehicle" must be "registered" in Idaho in order to come 
within the statutory requirements and neither the "motor vehicle" definition, nor the "registration" 
requirements exist with respect to a moped. When a moped need not be registered, and it is 
"excluded" from the definition of a "motor vehicle" because it is not titled, it cannot be the 
subject of the provisions of any "insurance" requirement, as only registered motor vehicles are to 
be insured under Idaho's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act. 
Conclusion 
This Defendant, Chad C. McKie, did not operate a "motor vehicle" while under the 
influence of alcohol, but rather, as the facts establish, was operating a "slow moving" "limited 
speed" "motor driven cycle" specifically meeting the criteria defined to be what the Idaho 
Legislature has declared to be a "moped", within the 2008 Legislative amendment(s), which is 
specifically excluded from the definition of "motor vehicle" and under Idaho law, such a "cycle" 
is specifically exempted because it is not required to be titled, not intended to be registered, and 
an operator need not possess a current driver's license, nor any motorcycle endorsement, nor 
have any policy of liability insurance coverage, or carry any certificate to demonstrate liability 
coverage exists. 
The Lower Court's conviction upon Mr. McK.ie's conditional plea must be set aside, as Mr. 
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McKie was operating a "moped", not a "motor vehicle", and the matter must be remanded to the 
lower court with instruction to dismiss the citation and the amended complaint filed in the case, 
alleging that Defendant, Chad C. McKie, on August 23, 
City of Boise, Idaho, while under the influence of alcoho , · 
Respectfully submitted this 11 th day of January, 2017 
Vernon K. Smit , 
Attorney for Appellant 
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proportion that the reappropriation of the Office of the Attorney 
General bears to the total General Fund reappropriation authority 
granted to all state agencies. 
Approved March 19, 2008. 
CHAPTER 198 
(H.B. No. 365, As Amended) 
AN ACT 
RELATING TO TRANSPORTATION; AMENDING SECTION 49-105, IDAHO CODE, TO 
REVISE DEFINITIONS; AMENDING SECTION 49-107, IDAHO CODE, TO DEFINE A 
TERM AND TO MAKE TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS; AMENDING SECTION 49-114, 
IDAHO CODE, TO REVISE DEFINITIONS, TO DEFINE TERMS AND TO MAKE A 
TECHNICAL CORRECTION; AMENDING SECTION 49-123, IDAHO CODE, TO REVISE 
DEFINITIONS AND TO DEFINE A TERM; AMENDING SECTION 49-402, IDAHO 
CODE, TO REQUIRE COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STAN-
DARDS FOR CERTAIN VEHICLES SUBJECT TO REGISTRATION AND TO PROHIBIT 
REGISTRATION AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN VEHICLES ON PUBLIC HIGHWAYS OF 
THE STATE; AMENDING SECTION 49-501, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE AN EXEMP-
TION FROM TITLING REQUIREMENTS; AMENDING SECTION 49-1606, IDAHO 
CODE, TO REVISE DEALER LICENSING PROVISIONS; AND AMENDING SECTION 
49-1608, IDAHO CODE, TO REVISE DEALER LICENSE BOND PROVISIONS. 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
SECTION l. That Section 49-105, Idaho Code, be, and the same is 
hereby amended to read as follows: 
49-105. DEFINITIONS -- D, (1) "Dealer" means every person in the 
business of buying, selling or exchanging five (5) or more new or used 
vehicles, new or used neighborhood electric vehicles, new or used motor-
cycles, motor-driven cycles, snow machines or motor-scooters motorbikes, 
travel trailers, all-terrain vehicles, utility type vehicles or motor 
homes in any calendar year, either outright or on conditional sale, 
bailment, lease, chattel mortgage, or otherwise, or who has an estab-
lished place of business for the sale, lease, trade, or display of these 
vehicles. No insurance company, bank, finance company, public utilities 
company, or other person coming into possession of any vehicle, as an 
incident to its regular business, who shall sell that vehicle under any 
contractual rights it may have, shall be considered a dealer, See also 
"salvage pool," section 49-120, Idaho Code, 
(2) "Dealer's selling agreement." (See "Franchise," section 49-107, 
Idaho Code) 
(3) "Department" means the Idaho transportation department acting 
directly or through its duly authorized officers and agents, except in 
chapters 6 and 9, title 49, Idaho Code, where the term means the Idaho 
state police, except as otherwise specifically provided. 
(4) "Designated family member" means the spouse, child, grandchild, 
parent, brother or sister of the owner of a vehicle dealership who, in 
the event of the owner's death, is entitled to inherit the ownership 
interest in the dealership under the same terms of the owner's will, or 
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who has been nominated in any other written instrument, or who, in the 
case of an incapacitated owner of a dealership, has been appointed by a 
court as the legal representative of the dealer's property, 
(5) "Director" means the director of the Idaho transportation 
department, except in chapters 6, 9 and 22, title 49, Idaho Code, where 
the term means the director of the Idaho state police, 
(6) "Disclose" means to engage in any practice or 
available and make known personal information contained 
the department about a person to any other person, 
entity, by any means of communication, 
conduct to make 
in records of 
organization or 
(7) "Disqualification" as defined in 49 CFR part 383, means with-
drawal by the department of coonnercial vehicle driving privileges. 
(8) "Distributor" means any person, firm, association, corporation 
or trust, resident or nonresident, who has a franchise from a manufac-
turer of vehicles to distribute vehicles in this state, and who in whole 
or in part sells or distributes new vehicles to dealers or who maintains 
distributor representatives. 
(9) "Distributor branch" means a branch office similarly maintained 
by a distributor for the same purposes a factory branch is maintained, 
(10) "Distributor representative" means any person, firm, associa-
tion, corporation or trust, and each officer and employee thereof 
engaged as a representative of a distributor or distributor branch of 
vehicles for the purpose of making or promoting the sale of vehicles, or 
for supervising or contacting dealers or prospective dealers. 
( 11) "District" means: 
(a) Business district. The territory contiguous to and including a 
highway when within any six hundred (600) feet along the highway 
there are buildings in use for business or industrial purposes, 
including hotels, banks or office buildings, railroad stations and 
public buildings which occupy at least three hundred (300) feet of 
frontage on one side or three hundred (300) feet collectively on 
both sides of the highway. 
(b) Residential district. The territory contiguous to and including 
a highway not comprising a business district when the propert~ on 
the highway for a distance of three hundred (300) feet or more 1s in 
the main improved with residences, or residences and buildings in 
use for business. 
(c) Urban district. The territory contiguous to and including any 
highway which is built up with structures devoted to business, 
industry or dwelling houses. For purposes of establishing speed lim-
its in accordance with the provisions of section 49-654, Idaho Code, 
no state highway or any portion thereof lying within the boundaries 
of an urban district is subject to the limitations which otherwise 
apply to nonstate highways within an urban district. Provided, this 
subsection shall not limit the authority of the duly elected offi-
cials of an incorporated city acting as a local authority to 
decrease speed limits on state highways passing through any district 
within the incorporated city. 
(12) "Documented vessel" means a vessel having a valid marine docu-
ment as a vessel of the United States. 
(13) "Drag race" means the operation of two (2) or more vehicles 
from a point side by side at accelerating speeds in a competitive 
attempt to outdistance each other, or the operation of one (1) or more 
vehicles over a cOIIDJJOn selected course, from the same point to the same 
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point, for the purpose of comparing the relative speeds or power of 
acceleration of the vehicles within a certain distance or time limit, 
(14) "Driver" means every person who drives or is in actual physical 
control of a vehicle, 
05) "Driver's license" means a license or permit issued by the 
department or by any other jurisdiction to an individual which author-
izes the individual to operate a motor vehicle or cornnercial motor vehi-
cle on the highways in accordance with the requirements of title 49, 
Idaho Code, 
(16) "Driver's license -- Classes of" are issued for the operation 
of a vehicle based on the size of the vehicle or the type of load and 
mean: 
{a) Class A. This license shell be issued and valid for the opera-
tion of any combination of motor vehicles with a manufacturer's 
gross combination weight rating {GCWR) in excess of twenty-six thou-
sand {26,000) pounds, provided the manufacturer's gross vehicle 
weight rating {GVWR) of the vehicle(s) being towed is in excess of 
ten thousand (10,000) pounds, Persons holding a valid class A 
license may also operate vehicles requiring a class B, C or D 
license., 
(b) Class B. This license shall be issued and valid for the opera-
tion of any single vehicle with a manufacturer's gross vehicle 
weight rating (GVWR) in excess of twenty-six thousand (26,000) 
pounds, or any such vehicle towing a vehicle not in excess of ten 
thousand {10,000) pounds manufacturer's gross vehicle weight rating 
(GVWR). Persons holding a valid class B license may also operate 
vehicles requiring a class C license or a class D license. 
(c) Class C, This license shell be issued and valid for the opera-
tion of any single vehicle or combination of vehicles that does not 
meet the definition of class A or class B, es defined in this sec-
tion, but that either is designed to transport sixteen (16) or more 
people including the driver, or is of any size which does not meet 
the definition of class A or class 8 end is used in the transporta-
tion of materials found to be hazardous according to the hazardous 
material transportation act and which requires the motor vehicle to 
be placarded under the federal hazardous materials regulations 49 
CFR part 172, subpart F. Persons holding a valid class C license may 
also operate vehicles requiring a class D license. 
{d) Class D, This license shall be issued and valid for the opera-
tion of a motor vehicle that is not a comnercial vehicle as defined 
in section 49-123, Idaho Code, 
(e) "Seasonal driver's license" means a special restricted class B 
or C driver's license to operate certain cornnercial vehicles in 
farm-related industries under restrictions imposed by the depart-
ment. As used in this definition, "farm-related industry" shall mean 
custom harvesters, farm retail outlets and suppliers, egri-chemicel 
businesses and livestock feeders, Seasonal driver's licenses are not 
valid for driving vehicles carrying any quantities of hazardous 
material requiring placarding, except for diesel fuel in quantities 
of one thousand {1,000) gallons or less, liquid fertilizers, i.e., 
plant nutrients, in vehicles or implements of husbandry with total 
capacities of three thousand (3,000) gallons or less, end solid fer-
tilizers, i.e., solid plant nutrients, that are not mixed with any 
organic substance, 
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( 17) "Ori ver record" means any record that pertains to an 
individual's driver's license, driving permit, driving privileges, driv-
ing history, identification documents or other similar credentials 
issued by the department. 
(18) "Driver's license endorsements" means special authorizations 
that are required to be displayed on a driver's license which permit the 
driver to operate certain types of conmercial vehicles or commercial 
vehicles hauling certain types of cargo, or to operate a motorcycle or a 
school bus. 
(a) "Endorsement T -- Double/Triple trailer" means this endorsement 
is required on a class A, B or C license to permit the licensee to 
operate a vehicle authorized to tow more than one (1) trailer, 
(b) "Endorsement H -- Hazardous material" means this endorsement is 
required on a class A, B or C license if the driver is operating a 
vehicle used in the transportation of materials found to be hazard-
ous according to the hazardous material transportation act and which 
requires the motor vehicle to be placarded under the federal hazard-
ous materials regulations 49 CFR part 172, subpart F. 
(c) "Endorsement P -- Passenger" means this endorsement is required 
on a class A, B or C license to permit the licensee to operate a 
vehicle designed to transport sixteen (16) or more people including 
the driver. 
(d) "Endorsement N -- Tank vehicle" means this endorsement is 
required on a class A, B or C license to permit the licensee to 
operate a vehicle which is designed to transport any liquid or gas-
eous materials within a tank that is either permanently or temporar-
ily attached to the vehicle, Such vehicles include, but are not lim-
ited to, cargo tanks and portable tanks, as defined in federal regu-
lations 49 CFR part 171. This definition does not include portable 
tanks having a rated capacity under one thousand (1,000) gallons. 
(e) "Endorsement M -- Motorcycle" means this endorsement is 
required on a driver's license to permit the driver to operate a 
motorcycle or motor-driven cycle. 
(f) "Endorsement S School bus" means this endorsement is 
required on a class A, B or C license to permit the licensee to 
operate a school bus in accordance with 49 CFR part 383, to trans-
port preprimary, primary or secondary school students from home to 
school, from school to home, or to and from school-sponsored events. 
School bus does not include a bus used as a conmon carrier. 
(19) "Driveway" means a private road giving access from a public way 
to a building on abutting grounds. 
(20) "Dromedary tractor" means every motor vehicle designed and used 
primarily for drawing a semitrailer and so constructed as to carry mani-
fested cargo in addition to a part of the weight of the semitrailer. 
SECTION 2, That Section 49-107, Idaho Code, be, and the same is 
hereby amended to read as follows: 
49-107. DEFINITIONS F. (1) "Factory branch" means a branch 
office maintained by a person who manufactures or assembles vehicles for 
sale to distributors or to dealers, or for directing or supervising, in 
whole or in part, its representatives. 
(2) "Factory representative" means any person and each officer and 
employee engaged as a representative of a manufacturer of vehicles or by 
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a factory branch for the purpose of making or promoting a sale of their 
vehicles, or for supervising or contacting their dealers or prospective 
dealers. 
( 3) "Farm tractor" means every motor vehicle designed or adapted 
and used primarily as a farm implement power unit operated with or 
without other farm implements attached in any manner consistent with the 
structural design of that power unit. 
(4) "Farm vehicle." (See "Vehicle ... "; section 49-123, Idaho Code) 
(5) "Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FHVSS)" means those 
safety standards established by the national highway traffic safety 
administration, under title 49 CFR part 500-599 1 for the safe const.ruc-
tion and manufacturing of self-propelled motorized vehicles for opera-
tion on public highways, Such vehicles as originally designed and manu-
factured shall be so certified by the manufacturer to meet the federal 
motor vehicle safety standards or the standards in force for a given 
model year or as certified by the national highway traffic safety admin-
istration, 
(6) 11Felony" means any offense under state or federal law that is 
punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one (1) year, 
(61) "Fifth wheel trailer, 11 (See "Trailer.,_", section 49-121, Idaho 
Code) 
('JS) "Financial institution" means any bank that is authorized to 
do business in the state of Idaho and any other financial institution 
that is registered with the department of finance. 
(6~) "Flammable liquid" means any liquid which has a flash point of 
70 degrees Fahrenheit, or less, as determined by a tagliabue or equiva-
lent closed-cup test device, 
(910) "Fleet" means one (l) or more apportionable vehicles. 
(19_!) "Fleet registration" means an optional form of registration 
through the department rather than a county assessor for registration of 
twenty-five (25) or more commercial or farm vehicles or any combination 
thereof, This registration is not an option for fleets of rental vehi-
cles, Terms and conditions are further specified in section 49-434(5), 
Idaho Code. 
(1¼2) "Fold down camping trailer." (See "Trailer.,_", section 49-121, 
Idaho Code) 
02;!) "Foreign vehicle," (See ''Vehicle.,_"; section 49-123, Idaho 
Code) 
(1:14) "Franchise" means a contract or agreement between a dealer and 
a manufacturer of new vehicles or its distributor or factory branch by 
which the dealer is authorized to engage in the business of selling any 
specified make or makes of new vehicles. 
o•i> "Full-time salesman" means any person employed as a vehicle 
salesman on behalf of a dealer for thirty (30) or more hours per week, 
and who sells, purchases, exchanges or negotiates for the sale, purchase 
or exchange of five (5) or more vehicles during each year in which his 
license is in effect, 
SECTION 3, That Section 49-114, Idaho Code, be, and the same is 
hereby amended to read as follows: 
49-114. DEFINITIONS -- M. (1) "Major component part" means a rear 
clip, cowl, frame or inner structure forward of the cowl, body, cab, 
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front end assembly, front clip or such other part which is critical to 
the safety of the vehicle. 
(2) "Manifest" means a form used for identifying the quantity, com-
position, origin, routing, waste or material identification code and 
destination of hazardous material or hazardous waste during any trans-
portation within, through, or to any destination in this state. 
(3) "Manufactured home." (See section 39-4105, Idaho Code) 
(4) "Manufacturer" means every person engaged in the business of 
constructing or assembling vehicles of a type required to be registered 
at an established place of business in this state. The term, for pur-
poses of sections 49-1613 through 49-1615, 49-1617, 49-1622 and 49-1623, 
Idaho Code, shall include a distributor and other factory representa-
tives. 
(5) "Manufacturer's year designation" means the model year desig-
nated by the vehicle manufacturer, and not the year in which the vehicle 
is, in fact, manufactured. 
(6) "Maximum gross weight" means the scale weight of a vehicle, 
equipped for operation, to which shall be added the maximum load to be 
carried as declared by the owner in making application for registration. 
When a vehicle against which a registration fee is assessed is a combi-
nation of vehicles, the term 11maximUl1l gross weight" means the combined 
maximum gross weights of all vehicles in the combination. 
(7) "Metal tire." (See "Tires," section 49-121, Idaho Code) 
(8) "Mileage" means actual distance that a vehicle has traveled. 
(9) "Moped" means a limited-speed motor-driven cycle having: 
(a) Both motorized and pedal propulsion that is not capable of pro-
pelling the vehicle at a speed in excess of thirty (30) miles per 
hour on level ground, whether two (2) or three (3) wheels are in 
contact with the ground during operation. If an internal combustion 
engine is used, the displacement shall not exceed fifty (50) cubic 
centimeters and the moped shall have a power drive system that func-
tions directly or automatically without clutching or shifting by the 
operator after the drive system is engaged; or 
(b) Two (2) wheels or three (3) wheels with no pedals, which is 
powered solely by electrical energy, has an automatic transmission, 
a motor which produces less than two (2) gross brake horsepower, is 
capable of propelling the device at a maximum speed of not more than 
thirty (30) miles per hour on level ground and as originally manu-
factured, meets federal motor vehicle safety standards for motor-
driven cycles. A moped is not required to be titled and no motor-
c cle endorsement is re uired of its o erator 
(10 'Motorbike means a vehicle as defined in section 67-7101 1 
Idaho Code. Such vehicle shall be titled and may be approved for motor-
cycle registration under section 49-402 1 Idaho Code, upon certification 
by the owner of the installation and use of conversion components that 
make the motorbike compliant with federal motor vehicle safety stan-
dards. 
-:IT!.2 "Motorcycle" means every motor vehicle having a seat or saddle 
for the use of the rider and designed to travel on not more than three 
(3) wheels in contact with the ground, that meets the federal motor 
vehicle safety standards as originally designed, and includes a con-
verted motorbike, but exeiodrng does not include a motor-driven cycle, a 
motorbike, a tractor and~ moped. 
(l¼~) "Motor carrier" means an individual, partnership, corporation 
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or other legal entity engaged in the transportation by motor vehicle of 
persons or property in the furtherance of a business or for hire. 
13 "Motor-driven c cle" means a c cle with a motor that roduces 
five (S brake horse ower or less as ori inall manufactured that meets 
federal motor vehicle safety standards as originally designed I and does 
not include mopeds. Such vehicle shall be titled and a motorcycle 
endorsement is re uired for its o eration. 
li1 Motor home means a vehicular unit designed to provide tempo-
rary livi .. g qaa,te,s, built into an integral part or permanently 
attached to a self-propelled motor vehicle chassis. The vehicle must 
contain pennanently installed independent life support systems which 
meet the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) All9,7 Standard 
for Recreational Vehicles, and provide at least four (4) of the follow-
ing facilities: cooking, refrigeration or ice-box icebox, self-contained 
toilet, heating and/or air conditioning, a potable water supply system, 
including a faucet and sink, separate 110-125 volt electrical power sup-
ply and/or LP-gas supply, 
(1:35) "Motorized wheelchair" means a motor vehicle with a speed not 
in excess of eight (8) miles per hour, designed for and used by a handi-
capped person, 
(11,6) "Motor number. 11 (See "Identifying number, 11 section 49-110, 
Idaho Code) 
(1S7) "Motor vehicle." (See "Vehicle," section 49-123, Idaho Code) 
(16]) "Motor vehicle liability policy" means an owner's or 
operator's policy of liability insurance, certified as provided in sec-
tion 49-1210, Idaho Code, as proof of financial responsibility, and 
issued by an insurance carrier duly authorized to transact business in 
this state, to or for the benefit of the person named therein as 
insured. 
(H9) "Motor vehicle record" means any record that pertains to a 
motor vehicle registration, motor vehicle title or identification docu-
ments or other similar credentials issued by the department or other 
state or local agency, 
SECTION 4. That Section 49-123, Idaho Code, be, and the same is 
hereby amended to read as follows: 
49-123. DEFINITIONS -- V. (1) "Variable load suspension axle" means 
an axle or axles designed to support a part of the vehicle and load and 
which can be regulated to vary the amount of load supported by such an 
axle or axles and which can be deployed or lifted by the operator of the 
vehicle, See also section 49-117, Idaho Code, 
(a) "Fully raised" means that the variable load suspension axle is 
in an elevated position preventing the tires on such axle from hav-
ing any contact with the roadway, 
(b) "Fully deployed" means that the variable load suspension axle 
is supporting a portion of the weight of the loaded vehicle as con-
trolled by the preset pressure regulator valve. 
(2) "Vehicle" means: 
(a) General. Every device in, upon, or by which any person or prop-
erty is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, excepting 
devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks. 
(b) Authorized emergency vehicle. Vehicles operated by any fire 
department or law enforcement agency of the state of Idaho or any 
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political subdivision of the state, ambulances, vehicles belonging 
to personnel of voluntary fire departments while in performance of 
official duties only, vehicles belonging to, or operated by EMS per-
sonnel certified or otherwise recognized by the EMS bureau of the 
Idaho department of health and welfare while in the performance of 
emergency medical services, sheriff's search and rescue vehicles 
which are under the immediate supervision of the county sheriff, 
wreckers which are engaged in motor vehicle recovery operations and 
are blocking part or all of one (1) or more lanes of traffic, other 
emergency vehicles designated by the director of the Idaho state 
police or vehicles authorized by the Idaho transportation board and 
used in the enforcement of laws specified in section 40-510, Idaho 
Code, pertaining to vehicles of ten thousand (10,000) pounds or 
greater. 
(c) Commercial vehicle or commercial DlOtor vehicle. For the pur-
poses of chapter 3 of this title, (driver's licenses), a motor vehi-
cle or combination of motor vehicles designed or used to transport 
passengers or property if the motor vehicle: 
1. Has a manufacturer's gross combination weight rating (GCWR) 
in excess of twenty-six thousand (26,000) pounds inclusive of a 
towed unit with a manufacturer's groaa vehicle weight rating 
(GVWR) of more than ten thousand (10,000) pounds; or 
2. Has a manufacturer's gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) in 
excess of twenty-aix thousand (26,000) pounda; or 
3. Is designed to transport sixteen (16) or more people, 
including the driver; or 
4. Is of any size and is used in the transportation of mate-
rials found to be hazardous for the purposes of the hazardous 
material transportation act and which require the motor vehicle 
to be placarded under the hazardous materials regulations (49 
CFR part 172, subpart F). 
For the purposes of chapter 4, title 49, Idaho Code, (motor vehicle 
registration), a vehicle or combination of vehicles of a type used 
or maintained for the transportation of persons for hire, compensa-
tion or profit, or the transportation of property for the owner of 
the vehicle, or for hire, compensation, or profit, and shall include 
fixed load specially constructed vehicles exceeding the limits 
imposed by chapter 10, title 49, Idaho Code, and including drilling 
rigs, construction, drilling and wrecker cranes, log jammers, log 
loaders, and similar vehicles which are normally operated in an 
overweight or oversize condition or both, but shall not include 
those vehicles registered pursuant to sections 49-402 and 49-402A, 
Idaho Code, or exempted by section 49-426, Idaho Code. A motor vehi-
cle used in a ridesharing arrangement that has a seating capacity 
for not more than fifteen (15) persons, including the driver, shall 
not be a "coumercial vehicle" under the provisions of this title 
relating to equipment requirements, rules of the road, or registra-
tion. 
(d) Farm vehicle. A vehicle or combination of vehicles owned by a 
farmer or rancher, which are operated over public highways, and uaed 
exclusively to transport unprocessed agricultural, dairy or live-
atock products raised, owned and grown by the owner of the vehicle 
to market or place of storage; and shall include the transportation 
by the farmer or rancher of any equipment, supplies or product• pur-
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chased by that farmer or rancher for his own use, and used in the 
farming or ranching operation or used by a farmer partly in trans-
porting agricultural products or livestock from the farm of another 
farmer that were originally grown or raised on the farm, or when 
used partly in transporting agricultural supplies, equipment, mate-
rials or livestock to the farm of another farmer for use or consump-
tion on the farm but not transported for hire, and shall not include 
vehicles of husbandry or vehicles registered pursuant to sections 
49-402 and 49-402A, Idaho Code, 
(e) Foreign vehicle. Every vehicle of a type required to be regis-
tered under the provisions of this title brought into this state 
from another state, territory or country other than in the ordinary 
course of business by or through a manufacturer or dealer and not 
registered in this state, 
(f) Glider kit vehicle. Every large truck manufactured from a kit 
manufactured by a manufacturer of large trucks which consists of a 
frame, cab complete with wiring, instruments, fenders and hood and 
front axles and wheels. The "glider kit" is made into a complete 
assembly by the addition of the engine, transmission, rear axles, 
wheels and tires. 
(g) Motor vehicle. Every vehicle which is self-propelledi and e•ery 
•ehrcte--whieh-rs-properred-by-ereetrre-power-obtai-l,ed-£rc,m-o•erhead 
troH,ey-wire-s--b11t-not-op.,rattd-upon-Taiis-;-except for the purpose of 
titlins and registration meets federal motor vehicle safety Btllll-
dards as defined in section 49-107 1 Idaho Code. Motor vehicle does 
not include vehicles moved solely by human power, electric personal 
assistive mobility devices and motorized wheelchairs or other such 
vehicles that are spedf.ically exempt from titliDg or registration 
re uirements under title 49, Idaho Code. 
h Multipurpose passenger vehicle (MPV). For the purposes of sec-
tion 49-966, Idaho Code, a motor vehicle designed to carry ten (10) 
or fewer persons which is constructed either on a truck chassis or 
with special features for occasional off-road operation. 
(i) Neighborhood electric vehicle (NEV). A self-propelled, 
electrically-powered, four-wheeled motor vehicle which is emission 
free end conforms to the definition and requirements for low-speed 
vehicles es adopted in the federal motor vehicle safety standards 
for low-speed vehicles under federal regulations at 49 CFR part 571. 
An NEV shall be titled, registered and insured according to law es 
provided respectively in chapters 4, 5 and 12, title 49, Idaho Code, 
end shall only be operated by a licensed driver, Operation of an NEV 
on a highway shall be allowed as provided in section 49-663, Idaho 
Code. 
(j) Noncommercial vehicle, For the purposes of chapter 4, title 49, 
Idaho Code, (motor vehicle registration), a noncommercial vehicle 
shall not include those vehicles required to be registered under 
sections 49-402 and 49-402A, Idaho Code, and means all other vehi-
cles or combinations of vehicles which are not commercial vehicles 
or farm vehicles, but shall include motor homes. A noncolllllercial 
vehicle shell include those vehicles having a combined gross weight 
not in excess of sixty thousand (60,000) pounds and not held out for 
hire, used for purposes related to private use end not used in the 
furtherance of e business or occupation for compensation or profit 
or for transporting goods for other than the owner. 
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(k) Passenger car. For the purposes of section 49-966, Idaho Code, 
a motor vehicle, except a multipurpose passenger vehicle, motorcycle 
or trailer, designed to carry ten (10) or fewer persons. 
(1) Reconstructed or repaired vehicle. Every vehicle that has been 
rebuilt or repaired using like make and model parts and visually 
appears as a vehicle that was originally constructed under a dis-
tinctive manufacturer. This includes a salvage vehicle which is dam-
aged to the extent that a "reconstructed vehicle" or "repaired vehi-
cle" brand is required, and other vehicles which have been recon-
structed by the use of a kit designed to be used to construct an 
exact replica of a vehicle which was previously constructed under a 
distinctive name, make, model or type by a generally recognized man-
ufacturer of vehicles. A glider kit vehicle is not a reconstructed 
vehicle. 
(m) Replica vehicle. A vehicle made to replicate any passenger car 
or truck previously manufactured. using metal, fiberglass or other 
composite materials. Replica vehicles must look like the original 
vehicle being replicated but may use a more modem drive train. At a 
minimum, replica vehicles shall meet the same federal motor vehicle 
safety and emission standards in effect for the year and type of 
vehicle being replicated. 
(n) Salvage vehicle. Any vehicle for which a salvage certificate, 
salvage bill of sale or other documentation showing evidence that 
the vehicle has been declared salvage or which has been damaged to 
the extent that the owner, or an insurer, or other person acting on 
behalf of the owner, detertnines that the cost of parts and labor 
minus the salvage value makes it uneconomical to repair or rebuild. 
When an insurance company has paid money or has made other monetary 
settlement as compensation for a total loss of any motor vehicle, 
such motor vehicle shall be considered to be a salvage vehicle. 
(n£) Specially constructed vehicle. Every vehicle of a type 
required to be registered not originally constructed under a dis-
tinctive name, make, model or type by a generally recognized manu-
facturer of vehicles and not materially altered from its original 
construction and cannot be visually identified as a vehicle produced 
by a particular manufacturer. This includes: 
1. A vehicle that has been structurally modified so that it 
does not have the same appearance as a similar vehicle from the 
same manufacturer; or 
2. A vehicle that has been constructed entirely from homemade 
parts and materials not obtained from other vehicles; or 
3. A vehicle that has been constructed by using major compo-
nent parts from one (1) or more manufactured vehicles and can-
not be identified as a specific make or model; or 
4. A vehicle constructed by the use of a custom kit 
not be visually identified as a specific make or 
specially constructed vehicles of a type required to 
tered shall be certified by the owner to meet all 
federal motor vehicle safety standards in effect at 







title 49 1 Idaho Code. 
(op) Total loss vehicle. Every vehicle that is deemed to be uneco-
nomical to repair due to scrapping, dismantling or destruction. A 
total loss shall occur when an insurance company or any other person 
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pays or makes other monetary settlement to the owner when it is 
deemed to be uneconomical to repair the damaged vehicle. The compen-
sation for total loss as defined herein shall not include payments 
by an insurer or other person for medical care, bodily injury, vehi-
cle rental or for anything other than the amount paid for the actual 
damage to the vehicle. 
(3) "Vehicle identification number." (See "Identifying number," 
section 49-110, Idaho Code) 
(4) "Vehicle salesman" means any person who, for a salary, conmis-
sion or compensation of any kind, is employed either directly or indi-
rectly, or regularly or occasionally by any dealer to sell, purchase or 
exchange, or to negotiate for the sale, purchase or exchange of vehi-
cles. (See also "full-time salesman," section 49-107, Idaho Code, and 
"part-time salesman," section 49-117, Idaho Code) 
(5) "Vessel." (See section 67-7003, Idaho Code) 
(6) "Veteran." (See section 65-502, Idaho Code) 
(7) "Violation" means a conviction of a misdemeanor charge involv-
ing a moving traffic violation, or an admission or judicial determina-
tion of the conmission of an infraction involving a moving traffic 
infraction, except bicycle infractions. 
SECTION 5. That Section 49-402, Idaho Code, be, and the same is 
hereby amended to read as follows: 
49-402. ANNUAL REGISTRATION. (1) The annual fee for operating each 
pickup truck, each neighborhood electric vehicle and each other motor 
vehicle having a maximum gross weight not in excess of eight thousand 
(8,000) pounds and that complies with the federal motor vehicle safety 
standards as defined in section 49-107 1 Idaho Code 1 shall be: 
Vehicles one (l} and two (2) years old•••••••••••••••••••••• $48.00 
Vehicles three (3) and four (4) years old ••••••••••••••••••• $36.00 
Vehicles five (5) and six (6) years old••••••••••••••••••••• $36.00 
Vehicles seven (7) and eight (8) years old•••••••••••••••••• $24.00 
Vehicles over eight (8) years old ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• $24.00 
There shall be twelve (12) registration periods, starting in January 
for holders of validation registration stickers numbered 1, and proceed-
ing consecutively through December for holders of validation registra-
tion stickers numbered 12, each of which shall start on the first day of 
a calendar month and end on the last day of the twelfth month from the 
first day of the beginning month. Registration periods shall expire mid-
night on the last day of the registration period in the year designated 
by the validation registration sticker. The numeral digit on the valida-
tion registration stickers shall, as does the registration card, fix the 
registration period under the staggered plate system of Idaho for the 
purpose of reregistration and notice of expiration. 
A vehicle that has once been registered for any of the above desig-
nated periods shall, upon reregistration, be registered for the period 
bearing the same number, and the registration card shall show and be the 
exclusive proof of the expiration date of registration and licensing. 
Vehicles may be initially registered for less than a twelve (12) month 
period, or for more than a twelve (12) month period, and the fee pro-
rated on a monthly basis if the fractional registration tends to fulfill 
the purpose of the monthly series registration system. 
(2) For all school buses operated either by a nonprofit, nonpublic 
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school or operated pursuant to a service contract with a school district 
for transporting children to or from school or in connection with school 
approved activities, the annual fee shall be twenty-four dollars 
($24.00). 
(3) For all motorcycles and motor-driven cycles which comply with 
the federal motor vehicle safety standards 1 and all-terrain vehicles 
operated upon the public highways the annual fee shall be nine dollars 
($9.00). For operation of an all-terrain vehicle or motorcycle off the 
public highways, the fee specified in section 67-7122, Idaho Code, shall 
be paid. Registration exemptions provided in section 49-426(2), (3) and 
(4), Idaho Code, apply to all-terrain vehicles and motorcycles used for 
the purposes described in subsections (2), (3) and (4) of section 
49-426, Idaho Code. 
(4) For all motor homes the fee shall be as specified in subsection 
(1) of this section and shall be in addition to the fees provided for in 
section 49-445, Idaho Code, 
(5) Registration fees shall not be subject to refund. 
(6) A financial institution or repossession service contracted to a 
financial institution repossessing vehicles under the terms of a secu-
rity agreement shall move the vehicle from the place of repossession to 
the financial institution's place of business on a repossession plate, 
1he repossession plate shall also be used for demonstrating the vehicle 
to a prospective purchaser for a period not to exceed ninety-six (96) 
hours. The registration fees for repossession plates shall be as 
required in subsection (1) of this section for a vehicle one (1) and two 
(2) years old. All other fees required under chapter 4, title 49, Idaho 
Code, shall be in addition to the registration fee, The repossession 
plate shall be issued on an annual basis by the department, 
(7) In addition to the annual registration fee in this section, 
there shall be an initial program fee of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) 
and an annual program fee of fifteen dollars ($15,00) for all special 
license plate programs for those license plates issued pursuant to sec-
tions 49-404A, 49-407, 49-408, 49-409, 49-414, 49-416, 49-418 and 
49-418D, Idaho Code, For special plates issued pursuant to sections 
49-406 and 49-406A, Idaho Code, there shall be an initial program fee of 
twenty-five dollars ($25.00) but there shall be no annual renewal fee, 
For special plates issued pursuant to sections 49-415C, 49-415D, 
49-416A, 49-4168, 49-416C, 49-416D, 49-416E, 49-417, 49-417A, 49-4178, 
49-417C, 49-418A, 49-4188, 49-418C, 49-418E, 49-419, 49-419A, 49-4198, 
49-419C, 49-419D, 49-420, 49-420A, 49-4208, 49-420C, 49-420D, 49-420E 
and 49-420G, Idaho Code, there shall be an initial program fee of 
thirty-five dollars ($35,00) and an annual program fee of twenty-five 
dollars ($25.00). The fees contained in this subsection shall be appli-
cable to all new special plate programs. The initial program fee and the 
annual program fee shall be deposited in the state highway account and 
shall be used to fund the cost of administration of special license 
plate programs, unless otherwise specified by law, 
(8) Any vehicle that does not meet federal motor vehicle safety 
standards shall not be registered and shall not be permitted to operate 
on public highways of the state, as defined in section 40-117 1 Idaho 
Code 1 unless otherwise specifically authorized, 
SECTION 6. That Section 49-501, Idaho Code, be, and the same is 
hereby amended to read as follows: 
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49-501. TITI.ING REQUIREMENTS -- EXEMPTIONS, (1) The provisions of 
this chapter shall apply to every vehicle required to be registered with 
the department in chapter 4, title 49, Idaho Code, 
(2) In addition, the titling requirements of this chapter shall 
apply to the following vehicles which are not required to be registered 
under the provisions of chapter 4, title 49, Idaho Code: 
(a) All-terrain vehicles, motorbikes, snowmobiles and utility type 
vehicles as defined in section 67-7101, Idaho Code 1 except that such 
vehicles havin an internal combustion en ine with a dis lacement of 
less than fifty 50 cubic centimeters will not be titled; and 
(b) Manufactured homes as defined in section 39-4105, Idaho Code. 
(3) Certain vehicles which are required to be registered under the 
provisions of chapter 4, title 49, Idaho Code, shall be exempt from the 
titling requirements of this chapter as follows: 
(a) Utility trailers whose unladen weight is less than two thousand 
(2,000) pounds; and 
(b) The board may, by rule, exempt vehicles and motor vehicles reg-
istered under the provisions of sections 49-434 and 49-435, Idaho 
Code, from the titling requirements of this chapter, 
(4) Vehicles exempt from registration under the provisions of sec-
tion 49-426, Idaho Code, are exempt from the titling requirements of 
this chapter, unless otherwise specifically required by the provisions 
of subsection (2) of this section. 
SECTION 7, That Section 49-1606, Idaho Code, be, and the same is 
hereby amended to read as follows: 
49-1606, CLASSES OF LICENSES NONRESIDENT DEALERS, Licenses 
issued under the provisions of this chapter shall be as follows: 
(1) A dealer's license shall permit the licensee to engage in the 
business of selling or exchanging new and used vehicles, new and used 
motorcycles, motor-driven cycles and motor-scooters motorbikes 1 new and used all-terrain vehicles, utility tyPe vehicles, snow machines and 
travel trailers, and new and used motor homes. This form of license 
shall permit licensees who are owners or part owners of the business of 
the licensee to act as vehicle salesmen. 
(2) A vehicle salesman's license shall permit the licensee to 
engage in the activities of a vehicle salesman, 
(3) A wholesale dealer's license shall permit the licensee to 
engage in the business of wholesaling used vehicles to Idaho vehicle 
dealers, The holder of this license must meet all the requirements for a 
principal place of business, except for the requirement of display area 
and adequate room to repair vehicles, 
(4) A vehicle manufacturer's license shall permit the licensee to 
engage in the business of constructing or assembling vehicles, of the 
type subject to registration under this title at an established place 
of business within Idaho, 
(5) A distributor, factory branch, or distributor branch license 
shall permit the licensee to engage in the business of selling and dis-
tributing vehicles, parts, and accessories to their franchised dealers. 
(6) A representative (factory branch or distributor, etc.) license 
shall permit the licensee to engage in the business of contacting his 
respective authorized dealers, for the purpose of making or promoting 
the sale of h~s, its, or their vehicles, parts, and accessories, 
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(7) Pending the satisfaction of the department that the applicant 
has met the requirements for licensure, it may issue a temporary permit 
to any applicant for a license. A temporary permit shall not exceed a 
period of ninety (90) days while the department is completing its inves-
tigation and determination of facts relative to the qualifications of 
the applicant for a license. A temporary permit shall terminate when the 
applicant's license has been issued or refused. 
(8) The department may issue a probationary vehicle salesman's 
license, subject to conditions to be observed in the exercise of the 
privilege granted either upon application for issuance of a license or 
upon application for renewal of a license. The conditions to be attached 
to the exercise of the privilege shall not appear on the face of the 
license but shall, in the judgment of the department, be in the public 
interest and suitable to the qualifications of the applicant as dis-
closed by the application and investigation by the department. 
(9) A nonresident dealer who is currently authorized to do business 
as, and has an established place of business as a vehicle dealer in 
another state, is not subject to licenaure under the provisions of this 
chapter as long as the sales are limited to.the exportation of vehicles 
for sale to, and the importation of vehicles purchased from, licensed 
Idaho vehicle dealers. 
SECTION 8, That Section 49-1608, Idaho Code, be, and the same is 
hereby amended to read as follows: 
49-1608. LICENSE BOND. (1) Before any dealer's license shall be 
issued by the department to any applicant, the applicant shall procure 
and file with the department good and sufficient bond in the amount 
shown, conditioned that the applicant shall not practice any fraud, make 
any fraudulent representation or violate any of the provisions of this 
chapter, rules of the department, or the provisions of chapter 5, title 
49, section 49-1418, or chapter 6, title 48, Idaho Code, or federal 
motor vehicle safety standards, or odometer fraud in the conduct of the 
business for which he ia licensed. 
(a) All dealers, including wholesale, but excluding a dealer exclu-
aively in the business of motorcycles, motor-driven cycles and ffl!ltor 
scooters motorbikes, all-terrain vehicle•, utility type vehicles and 
snow machine sales, twenty thousand dollars ($20,000). 
(b) A dealer exclusively in the businesa of motorcyclei motor-
driven cycle and motor-scooter motorbike sales, all-terrain vehi-
cle•, utility type vehicle• and snow machine sales, ten thousand 
dollars ($10,000). 
(2) The bond required in thia section may be continuous in form and 
the total aggregate liability on the bond ahall be limited to the pay-
ment of the amounts aet forth in this section. The bond ahall be in the 
following form: 
(a) A corporate surety bond, by a surety licensed to do business in 
this state; or 
(b) A certificate of deposit, in a form prescribed by the director; 
or 
(c) A cash deposit with the director. 
(3) If a bond is canceled or otherwise becomes invalid, upon 
receiving notice of the cancellation or invalidity, the department shall 
irrmediately suspend the dealer's license and take possession of the 
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license itself, all vehicle plates used in the business and all unused 
title applications of the licensee. The licensee is entitled to shear-
ing which shall be held within twenty (20) days of the suspension. Upon 
receiving notice that s valid bond is in force, the department shall 
inrnedistely reinstate the license, 
(4) The bond requirements of this section shall be satisfied if the 
applicant is a duly licensed manufactured home dealer in accordance with 
chapter 21, title 44, Idaho Code, and the bond required by section 
44-2103, Idaho Code, otherwise meets the requirements of this section. 
The amount of the bond shall be in the amount as required in this sec-
tion or that required in section 44-2103, Idaho Code, whichever is 
greater, The applicant shall furnish a certified copy of the bond as 
required in section 44-2103, Idaho Code, to the department, 
Approved March 19, 2008. 
CHAPTER 199 
(H.B. No, 398) 
AN ACT 
RELATING TO VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION; AMENDING SECTION 33-2308, IDAHO 
CODE, TO PROVIDE FOR THE BOARD FOR PROFESSIONAL-TECHNICAL EDUCATION 
TO ASSIST PERSONS SUFFERING FROM CHRONIC RENAL DISEASE TO OBTAIN 
OTHER SERVICES, INCLUDING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, FOR SPECIFIED 
EXPENSES AND TO PROVIDE FOR RULEMAKING AUTHORITY, 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
SECTION 1, That Section 33-2308, Idaho Code, be, and the same is 
hereby amended to read as follows: 
33-2308. ESTABLISHMENT OF VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION PROGRAM TO PRO-
VIDE TREATMENT TO PERSONS SUFFERING FROM CHRONIC RENAL DISEASES. The 
board for professional-technical education shall establish a vocational 
rehabilitation program to provide treatment to persons suffering from 
chronic renal diseases, including dialysis and other medical procedures 
and techniques which will have a lifesaving effect in the care and 
treatment of persons suffering from these diseases. The board shall 
extend financial assistance to persons suffering from chronic renal dis-
eases to assist such persons in obtaining the medical, nursing, pharma-
ceutical, and technical and other services necessary to care for such 
diseases, including financial assistance for the rental or purchase of 
home dialysis equipment and supplies 1 the payment of medical insurance 
premiums and patient travel expenses. Provided that the board shall not 
provide financial assistance to such persons for expenses that are cov-
ered by medicare, 1be board shall promulgate rules that establish stan-
dards for determining eligibility for care and treatment under this pro-
gram in order that treatment shall be provided to those who are finan-
cially unable to obtain such treatment without causing severe economic 
imbalance in the family economic unit. Such standards shall be estab-
lished without reference to maximum or minimum income levels. 





STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
RS 17359Cl 
This legislation will incorporate the "federal motor vehicle safety standards" (FMVSS) as 
prescribed by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) into Idabo's vehicle 
registration code, clearly defining motor vehicles for the purpose of registration and titling, and 
which vehicles are allowed to be operated on public roads. Manufacturers who produce vehicles 
made for use in the United States are required by federal law to certify to NHTSA, that their vehicles 
comply with the FMVSS. 
More frequently, vehicles are created or imported from other countries that were not 
manufactured to comply with federal safety standards to be operated on public roads in the U.S. 
Typically they were not built with the intent to import them to the U.S. The authority is needed in 
Idabo code to prohibit the registration and use of public roads for these types of vehicles. 
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Rep Moyle commented he was not going to make a motion to 
amend this bill, however he thinks it would be wise to adjust the 
year length cycle in the future. Also that ITD should look at the big 
picture and not nickle and dime fee increases, i.e. increases for 
plates, fuel gas increase and registration fees, which all pertains to 
additional revenue for ITD and costs the consumer more money. 
Chairman Wood asked for further debate and there being none, 
the committee voted. Motion approved by voice vote. 
INCORPORATION OF THE "FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE 
SAFETY STANDARDS" INTO IDAHO'S VEHICLE 
REGISTRATION CODE: Amy Smith, ITD reported to the 
committee this bill incorporates the Federal Motor Safety 
Standards into the Idaho Vehicle Registration Code. This prohibits 
registration of unsafe vehicles that cannot or do not meet the 
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards. Ms. Smith said that some 
imported vehicles not intended for use on public roads (i.e. midget 
race cars, sand rails, rock crawlers) come into the U.S. in parts and 
then are assembled here and do not meet standards. After Ms. 
Smith's presentation, Chairman Wood asked for questions from 
the committee. Rep. Hagedorn asked Ms. Smith if she had a copy 
of the code and paperwork that an individual would need to have to 
self-certify their vehicle. Ms. Smith handed him the information. 
Rep. Hagedorn asked if what we are saying is that an individual 
has to go through all of the paperwork she just handed him to self-
certify their vehicle. Ms. Smith said there is a shorter list within the 
list with extraneous information and that they would need to know 
what is expected of them when self-certifying their vehicle. 
Chairman Wood asked if when someone buys parts for their 
vehicle if the store and salesman would know what was needed for 
the individual to comply. Ms. Smith said that there are DOT 
conversion kits available that have equipment that can be 
purchased and put on bikes to be street legal. Rep Hagedorn 
asked if there are EPA requirements. Ms. Smith said there are 
EPA requirements, but not within Idaho's Code. Rep Nonini asked 
Ms. Smith the difference between motor driven bike and a 
motorcycle. Ms. Smith said that a motor driven bike is a smaller 
version and has few requirement than a motorcycle. 
MOTION: Rep. Wills made a motion to send H 365 to the floor with a "Do 
Pass" recommendation. A voice vote was taken with Rep. 
Shepherd(2) asking that her "Nay" vote be recorded. Motion 
approved by voice vote. 
PRESENTATION IDAHO ASSOCIATION OF COUNTY ENGINEERS AND ROAD 
SUPERVISORS (IACERS): David Babbitt, member of the 
legislative committee for IACERS and the Public Works Director for 
Bingham County reported there are a lot of entities that deal with 
highways and associations and each have their own ideas. There 
are 290 local highway districts in Idaho and today he wants to 
present their viewpoint. There are 33,382 local highways that the 
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NAME CHANGE ON LICENSE PLATES: Rep. Diana Thomas reported the 
name change is for a license plate that is already part of our system. The 
College of Idaho was changed sixteen (16) years ago to Albertson College of 
Idaho and it has now been changed back to the College of Idaho. This 
program allows those who want to donate money back to the college through 
the license program to do so. This is not a new license plate and won't 
require those who currently have ii to go and get a new one. 
Rep Roberts made a motion to send S 1259 to the floor with a "Do Pass" 
recommendation. Motion approved with a voice vote. 
INCORPORATION OF THE "FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY 
STANDARDS" INTO IDAHO'S VEHICLE REGISTRATION CODE: 
Chairman Wood reported that at the last meeting the committee had made 
a recommendation to send the bill to the floor with a "Do Pass" 
recommendation, and that the Speaker of the House referred the bill back to 
the committee for further discussion. Julie Pipal, ITD stated that on page 8, 
line 33 the way it was worded would put law enforcement in the position of 
not being able to enforce DUl's. Ms. Pipal said she spoke with the Deputy 
Attorney General and he suggested the language before the committee, 
which would allow the distinction to be made for law enforcement. The 
amended language will read: "(g) Motor Vehicle. Every vehicle which is self-
propelled, and for the purpose of titling and registration meets federal motor 
vehicle safety standards as defined in section 49-107, Idaho Code. Motor 
vehicle does not include ... ". 
Rep. Moyle made a motion to send H 365 to general order with the 
amendment attached. 
Rep. Moyle stated that there are no committee amendments, so when this 
goes to general orders it's free game and they can do what they want. 
Chairman Wood asked ITD to explain the part about A TV's on page 11, line 
7. Ms. Pipal said in the discussion with the Deputy Attorney General they 
discussed about a conflict in code and he said he doesn't believe there is a 
conflict because of the language in lines 48 and 49. 
Motion approved by voice vote. 
Chairman Wood announced that the Idaho Highway Users are conducting 
their Annual Legislative Reception/Luncheon on Tuesday, Feb 5th , and 
invited the committee members to attend. They are asking for an RSVP at 
383-6471 no later than today. 
There being no further business before the committee, Chairman Wood 
adjourned the meeting at 2:48 p.m. 
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motion carried by voice vote. Senators Corder, Little and Geddes 
voted nay. 
Relating to Temporary Registration of Vehicles and Combination of 
Vehicles; amending Section 49-432, to increase temporary permit fees 
and to provide for application of certain permit fees to an annual 
registration if the annual registration is purchased within thirty calendar 
days of issuance of the permit. 
Senator Corder said there is nothing new to present about this bill since 
the print hearing, but to review, this bill doubles the fee for temporary 
permit fees and allows those registering withing 30 days to receive credit 
for that fee against their registration. There is no fiscal impact on the 
State's general fund. 
Senator Little moved to send S 1460 to the Senate floor with a do pass 
recommendation. The motion was seconded by Senator Hammond. The 
motion carried by voice vote. 
Julie Pipal, Legislative Liaison for the Idaho Transportation Department, 
explained that this proposal incorporates the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 
Standards as prescribed by the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration into Idaho's motor vehicle registration code. 
Ms. Pipal said these amendments are needed to clearly define that only 
vehicles which are certified to meet the federal motor vehicle safety 
standards will be allowed registration to operate on Idaho's public roads. 
She stated this proposal will prohibit the registration and operation of 
unsafe vehicles that do not meet these federal safety standards such as 
toy scooters, motorized skateboards, mini motorcycles and similar types 
of vehicles. This legislation does not impact the current exception of the 
registration of all-terrain vehicles (ATVs). It also allows motorbikes to be 
converted to street legal motorcycles through the use of Federal 
Department of Transportation (DOT) approved conversion components. 
Supporting documents related to this testimony have been archived and 
can be accessed in the office of the Committee secretary [see Attachment 
1] 
Senator Little said the way he understands this bill is that the federal 
government requires that vehicles operating on roads that the federal 
government subsidize pass some safety standards, and that is what this 
does. He asked if that is correct. Ms. Pi pal said that is correct. Senator 
Little said the bottom line is that there are individuals who currently have 
a license for their A TVs who won't have a license as a result of this 
legislation. Ms. Pipal said if the federal government were to come in and 
audit, they would find that Idaho has an exception for A TVs and that Idaho 
is probably in violation of federal code. However, this bill will take care of 
everything else. Chairman McGee asked if this excluded ATVs. Ms. 
Pipal said that is correct. Senator Little asked if this bill makes Idaho 
compliant with federal code. Ms. Pi pal said with the exception of ATVs. 
Senator Langhorst asked if this prevents the people who currently have 
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an ATV with a license plate on it from renewing that license plate. Ms. 
Pipal said that no, it will not. 
Senator Little asked if the federal government is alright with the fact that 
this code allows Idaho to say that these vehicles are not going to meet the 
safety standard. Ms. Pipal stated that if Idaho was audited they would 
probably find what ITD has proposed here lacking because we have not 
addressed A TVs which are not federal vehicle safety standard compliant, 
nor were they ever manufactured or intended to be used on public roads. 
However, because of the political climate and because ITD really needs 
this clarified for rural areas where they are getting all kinds of things on 
roads that don't have that certificate that says federal motor vehicle safety 
standard compliant, this allows them to properly title and register those 
vehicles that do meet the federal motor vehicle safety standard. This 
legislation provides an exception for A TVs because there is great concern 
about the fact that we currently issue plates on them today and there is a 
county by county decision making process that happens on where those 
vehicles can operate. 
Senator Little asked about the reciprocity with other states. He said there 
is some concern about taking an A TV into Oregon or Utah without a 
license. He asked if every state licenses A TVs even though the federal 
government doesn't want them on the roads. Ms. Pi pal said in the 
preliminary research they have done they found that each state does it 
differently. Her understanding from the users is that if ITD gives them a 
plate, that is all they need in another state. When they come to Idaho, if 
they have a plate on the A TV, they can operate. 
Steve Frost, Recreation Resources Bureau Chief for the Idaho 
Department of Parks and Recreation, said that other states will allow 
Idaho ATV users to ride in their states if they have a license plate. 
Senator Little asked if someone from another state comes in with their 
license plate on an A TV, is there also reciprocity on the park's permit. Mr. 
Frost said yes, statute allows 30 days. 
Ms. Pipal referred to page 11, Section 49-402 (8), and in Section 49-402 
(3) where the bill uses "and" to include ATVs. The intent was to keep 
"and" in there to include ATVs. 
Vice Chairman Hammond asked what does this do to classic cars and 
hot rods that don't necessarily meet that safety standard. Ms. Pi pal said 
this does not effect those vehicles built prior to the federal motor vehicle 
safety standard being put in place. Vehicles are only required to comply 
with federal motor vehicle safety standards for the year in which the 
vehicle was made. 
Senator Little said the part of the code that Ms. Pi pal referred to was 
referring to registration. He asked if this part of the code says they are 
allowed to drive on the road. Ms. Pipal said this has been reviewed by 
their legal counsel and the language was inserted so that A TVs were not 
touched. 
Senator Little asked about liability insurance for ATV operators and 
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whether they are or are not licensed to be operating on the road. Ms. 
Pipal said she understands that there are concerns in the insurance 
industry with regard to that question. From an enforcement standpoint 
these vehicles are intended to be operated off road. She said she knows 
from those who have an exemption, such as an agricultural exemption, 
that ISP officers have given people tickets for driving ATVs on State 
highways. So it is an enforcement issue. If someone is operating that 
vehicle and it is not expressly provided for in that county they can still get 
a ticket. 
Senator Corder said this bill would at least provide consistency from 
county to county. Ms. Pi pal said this will provide consistency for the other 
types of vehicles. This does not in any way effect consistency across 
counties as to what those individual counties will do. 
Vice Chairman Hammond said essentially this bill is trying to prevent any 
person from building a vehicle on his own which doesn't meet safety 
standards and licensing that vehicle. Ms. Pipal said it is to provide 
clarification for the public for county offices as to what will be titled and 
registered. It is very clear that the person who does what Senator 
Hammond just said cannot title and register the vehicle. 
Senator Little referred to another bill that is coming on this issue and said 
he would like to see a process where there is only one tag instead of two. 
Ms. Pipal said she was trying not to talk about the other bill because this 
is really designed to address issues the transportation department has. 
ITD does not want to put a license plate on anything that doesn't meet 
federal motor vehicle safety standards. There is an effort by the people 
working on the other bill to make it consistent. ITD is going to issue plates. 
They are not going to turn that over; the Department of Parks and 
Recreation is not going to start issuing license plates. ITD will continue to 
do that and then provide that people can get the annual renewal for Parks 
and Recreation at regular vendors. They can come to the county office 
and get everything they need. The only problem with that is that the 
county office hours are from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. Monday through Friday. 
Senator Little said motor driven cycles which comply with federal motor 
vehicle safety standards is the new language. He asked what the 
difference is between motor cycles and motor driven cycles. Ms. Pipal 
said she believes that is the difference between the output. In order to be 
defined as a motor cycle you have some output, but motor driven cycles 
would have turn signals, headlights, tail lights, but might be more of a 
scooter. 
Senator Hammond moved to send H 365 to the Senate floor with a do 
pass recommendation. The motion was seconded by Senator Keough. 
The motion carried by voice vote. 
Relating to Scrap Dealers; amending Section 54-2702, to revise the 
content of records required for purchases of scrap for ten dollars or less. 
Representative Robert Schaefer said this is a simple bill. He stated 
there is in law a requirement that every purchase of scrap be recorded 
and be retained. Scrap dealers would like to be excused from keeping 
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COMES NOW, the Respondent by and through Kimberly E. Smith, Deputy City 
Attorney, and hereby files its Respondent’s Brief in the above-captioned matter. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
 Appellant, Chad Christopher McKie (McKie), appeals from the Judgment of Conviction 
following McKie’s conditional plea to a charge of Driving Under the Influence (DUI) 
(Excessive). The conditional plea was not in writing as required by Rule 11. McKie did not 
provide a transcript of the plea hearing, so the record does not provide a basis to determine the 
issues preserved for appeal. However, the State requested audio recordings of the plea hearing, 
and the hearing on McKie’s Motion to Dismiss, which was denied by the trial court as untimely.1 
From those recordings, it appears that the issue McKie preserved for appeal was the trial court’s 
assertion following its dismissal of McKie’s Motion to Dismiss, that should the case proceed to 
trial, the court would instruct the jury that a moped is a motor vehicle for the purposes of 
enforcing Idaho’s DUI statute, essentially addressing the merits of McKie’s untimely Motion to 
Dismiss. As such, the State will presume that the issue on appeal is whether or not the trial court 
erred when it determined that a moped is a motor vehicle for the purposes of Idaho’s DUI 
statute.2 
The meaning and effect of a statute is a question of law over which appellate courts 
exercise free review. See State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 103 (2008). 
1 For the convenience of this Court, the State has filed a Motion to Augment contemporaneously 
with this brief to include the audio recordings of the hearings held on February 18, 2016, and 
June 28, 2016. 
2 There is no indication in McKie’s briefing that McKie is challenging on appeal the trial court’s 
ruling that the Motion to Dismiss was untimely.  Given that the issue was not preserved for 








Course of Proceedings and Disposition 
 The State charged McKie with a violation of Idaho Code Section 18-8004C, DUI 
(Excessive). On October 19, 2015, McKe filed a one paragraph, unsupported Motion to Dismiss. 
The filing was fifty-three (53) days after McKie’s entry of plea, and was dismissed pursuant to 
Idaho Criminal Rule 12(e). On November 18, 2015, McKie filed a Memorandum in Support of 
the Motion to Dismiss. The filing was eighty-four (84) days past McKie’s entry of plea, making 
the Motion to Dismiss fifty-six (56) days late. Id. The trial court ruled that the motion was 
untimely and dismissed it. (Audio 2/8/16). Although the motion was dismissed as untimely, the 
trial court addressed the merits of the motion and held that a moped is a motor vehicle for 
purposes of Idaho’s DUI statute because it is self-propelled. (Audio 2/8/16).  
 Multiple jury trial dates were set and continued. On February 25, 2016, and March 31, 
2016, McKie filed a document titled, “Motion to Reconsider Definition of Motor Vehicle Within 
Jury Instructions” and a document titled “Requested Inclusion of Motor Vehicle Definitions, and 
Exclusions Within Jury Instructions” respectively. These documents are a restatement of 
McKie’s arguments from the Motion to Dismiss. A jury trial was set for June 28, 2016. On that 
day, McKie entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charge of DUI (Excessive), reserving his 
right to appeal the trial court’s determination that a moped is a motor vehicle. (Audio 6/28/16). A 









Statement of the Facts 
The following facts are taken from a written stipulation entered into by the Boise City 
Attorney’s Office and McKie on June 28, 2016. The parties stipulated that these would be the 
facts presented on appeal, and they are copied directly from the written stipulation.  
1. On August 2 rd 37 in the morning, the Defendant, Chad C. McKie, 
date of birth was in actual physical control of and was driving a 
vehicle, in t ne, westbound on Boise Ave. near Beacon St. in 
Boise, Ada County, Idaho, which is a publicly maintained roadway and open 
to the public. 
 
2. As he drove he was wobbling in his lane and the tail light of the vehicle was 
not functioning properly. 
 
3. A traffic stop was initiated by Officer Adam Schloegel of the Boise Police 
Department. Officer Schloegel observed what he perceived to be signs of 
intoxication exhibited by the Defendant.  
 
4. The vehicle driven by the Defendant is a self-propelled vehicle as defined by 
Idaho Code 49-123(h). 
 
5. The vehicle driven by the Defendant is a moped as defined by Idaho Code 49-
114(M)(9). It is a limited-speed motor-driven cycle having both motorized 
and pedal propulsion that is not capable of propelling the vehicle at a speed in 
excess of thirty (30) miles per hour on level ground, with two (2) wheels in 
contact with the ground during operation. Its internal combustion engine does 
not exceed fifty (50) cubic centimeters in displacement, and its power drive 
system functions directly or automatically without clutching or shifting by the 
operator after the drive system is engaged. 
 
6. The moped driven by the Defendant was neither titled nor registered. 
 
7. Officer Steve Moore of the Boise Police Department responded to the scene, 
and subjected the Defendant to the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests (SFSTs). 
Officer Steve Moore is trained and certified to perform those tests. 
 
8. The Defendant met the decision points for arrest on all SFSTs, and was 
arrested for driving under the influence (DUI). 
 
9. Officer Moore attempted to have the Defendant provide a breath sample, but 






(15) minute waiting period. 
 
10. The Defendant would not consent to a blood draw, so Officer Moore obtained 
a warrant to draw the Defendant’s blood, and the Defendant’s blood was 
drawn pursuant to that warrant. 
 
11. Laboratory analysis revealed his blood alcohol concentration to be 0.253 g of 
ethyl alcohol per 100 ccs of blood, in excess of the .20 limit provided by 
Idaho Code 18-8004C(1). 
 
The State requests that all alleged facts stated in McKie’s Brief that are not contained in this 
stipulation be stricken as they are not supported by testimony of any kind. Specifically, the State 
requests that this Court strike and completely disregard: references to conversations that 
allegedly occurred in judge’s chambers (Appellant’s Br. pp. 7, 11-14); references to statements 
that a defense expert would have made had the case proceeded to trial (Appellant’s Br., pp. 13-
14); information outside of the stipulation regarding McKie’s moped and “typical” 
characteristics of a moped (Appellant’s Br., p.25); and statements regarding McKie’s alleged 
motivations and justifications for building the moped. (Appellant’s Br., pp.30-31.)  
ISSUE 
Respondent restates the issue on appeal as: 
Did the trial court err when it determined that a moped is a motor vehicle for the purposes 




A MOPED IS A “MOTOR VEHICLE” FOR THE PURPOSES OF IDAHO’S DUI 
STATUTE. 
 
McKie was charged with Driving Under the Influence (Excessive) in violation of Idaho 






It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol . . . or who has 
an alcohol concentration of 0.08 . . . or more, as shown by analysis of his blood, 
urine, or breath, to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within 
this state, whether upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private 
property open to the public (emphasis added).  
 
The term “motor vehicle” is not defined in Idaho Code Section 18-8004 or anywhere else in Title 
18 of the Idaho Code. However, in State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 381 (1999), the Idaho 
Supreme Court stated that, for purposes of Idaho Code Section 18-8004, a “motor vehicle” is one 
that meets the statutory definition of “motor vehicle” set forth in Idaho Code Section 49-
123(2)(g), which was later revised and renumbered and is now reflected in Idaho Code Section 
49-123(2)(h). A “motor vehicle” is defined as: 
Every vehicle which is self-propelled, and for the purpose of titling and 
registration meets federal motor vehicle safety standards as defined in section 49-
107, Idaho Code. Motor vehicle does not include vehicles moved solely by human 
power, electric personal assistance mobility devices and motorized wheelchairs or 
other such vehicles that are specifically exempt from titling or registration 
requirements under title 49, Idaho Code.  
 
The parties have stipulated that McKie was driving a “moped,” as defined in Idaho Code 
Section 49-114(9), on the date in question. McKie argues on appeal that a moped is not a “motor 
vehicle” for purposes of Idaho Code Section 18-8004 (DUI). McKie’s argument revolves around 
the notion that because a moped need not be titled or registered, it does not comport with the 
definition of “motor vehicle” found in Idaho Code Section 49-123(2)(h). The State contends that 
the plain language of Idaho Code Section 49-123(2)(h) defines a motor vehicle as any vehicle 
that is “self-propelled,” and provides for a limited exception for electric personal assistance 
mobility devices, motorized wheelchairs, and other such vehicles that are exempt from titling or 
registration requirements. Contrary to McKie’s assertion, this category of exceptions does not 






personal assistance mobility device, electric personal wheelchair or other such vehicle. 
Therefore, a moped is not exempt from the definition a “motor vehicle,” and is subject to the 
provisions of Idaho’s DUI statute.  
1. Idaho Code Section 49-123(2)(h) is Not Ambiguous, and the Plain Language of 
the Statute Does Not Exempt Mopeds from the Definition of “Motor Vehicle”.  
 
Where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, legislative history and other 
extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent 
of the legislature. See City of Sun Valley v. Sun Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665, 667 (1993). The 
words of a statute must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, and the statute must be 
construed as a whole. See Hoskins v. Howard, 132 Idaho 311, 315 (1998). 
 The plain language of Idaho Code Section 49-123(2)(h) defines a “motor vehicle” as 
“every vehicle which is self-propelled.” The second section of the statute discusses a narrow 
exception to the general rule for “vehicles moved solely by human power, electric personal 
assistance mobility devices, motorized wheelchairs, and other such vehicles that are exempt from 
titling or registration requirements.” McKie’s entire argument revolves around the language of 
the second section. McKie argues that the phrase “other such vehicles that are exempt from 
titling or registration requirements” means any and all vehicles that are exempt from titling and 
registration, and not just electric personal assistance mobility devices, motorized wheelchairs, 
and other such vehicles. 
 Statutory language is not ambiguous “merely because the parties present differing 
interpretations to the court.” Payette River Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Valley 
Cnty., 132 Idaho 551, 557 (1999). McKie’s interpretation of Idaho Code Section 49-123(2)(h) is 






interpretation that a statute must be interpreted so that effect is given to its every word and 
clause. State v. Baer, 132 Idaho 416, 417-18 (Ct. App. 1999). Had the Legislature intended to 
exclude all vehicles that are exempt from titling or registration from the definition of “motor 
vehicle,” it could have clearly done so by adding the word “all” or, alternatively, not including 
the word “such.” Grammatically, use of the word “such” refers the reader back to the other 
examples listed in the sentence, namely, electric personal assistance mobility devices and 
motorized wheelchairs. When interpreting a statute, courts may engage in grammatical 
construction, including the rule of the last antecedent clause. State v. Troughton, 126 Idaho 406, 
411 (Ct. App. 1994). This rule of interpretation states that relative and qualifying words and 
phrases are to be applied solely to the words or phrases immediately preceding them, absent a 
showing of contrary intent. Id. Further, one of the maxims of statutory construction is the rule 
that holds that “where general words of a statute follow an enumeration of persons or things, 
such general words will be construed as meaning persons or things of like or similar class or 
character to those specifically enumerated, usually designated the ejusdem generis rule.” Pepple 
v. Headrick, 64 Idaho 132 (1942); see also State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 481 (2007) 
(“Where a general provision in a statute has certain limited exceptions, all doubts should be 
resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exceptions”) (quoting Norman J. 
Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction, § 47:11 (6th Ed.2002)). Here, the general 
provision is that a vehicle is a “motor vehicle” if it is self-propelled.  
As such, the only question is whether McKie’s vehicle in this case is included in the 
“other such vehicles” exemption from the definition of motor vehicle. The “rule of the last 






qualifies the list of vehicles immediately preceding it, specifically “vehicles moved solely by 
human power, electric personal assistive mobility devices and motorized wheelchairs.” Any 
other interpretation renders the word “such” as mere surplusage. This Court must assume that the 
Idaho Legislature had a purpose in using the language it did. The question to be answered is 
whether a moped is a vehicle of the same type and kind as an electric personal assistive mobility 
devise or a motorized wheelchair.  
2. A Moped is Not Exempted as a Motor Vehicle Under the Exceptions in Idaho 
Code Section 49-123(2)(h). 
 
Title 49 of the Idaho Code defines “motor vehicle” as every vehicle which is self-
propelled …” and then provides exemptions for: 1) solely human-powered vehicles (which by 
definition are not self-propelled); 2) electric personal assistive mobility devices and motorized 
wheelchairs or other such devices.  
Solely human-powered vehicles are self-explanatory. An example is found in the 
definition of bicycle. "Bicycle" means every vehicle propelled exclusively by human power upon 
which any person may ride, having two (2) tandem wheels, and except scooters and similar 
devices. See Idaho Code Section 49-103(1). McKie’s gasoline-engine powered moped is not 
solely human-powered, so it cannot be exempt under the solely human-powered vehicles 
exemption.   
The definition of "electric personal assistive mobility device" (hereinafter “EPAMD”) 
means a self-balancing, two (2), non-tandem wheeled device designed to transport only one (1) 
person, with an electric propulsion system that limits the maximum speed of the device to fifteen 
(15) miles per hour or less (e.g. a Segway). See I.C. § 49-106(1). McKie’s gasoline-engine 






electricity, but rather internal combustion. Additionally, McKie’s vehicle is capable of more than 
fifteen (15) miles per hour. Therefore, his vehicle cannot be exempted under the EPAMD 
definition.  
The definition of “motorized wheelchair” means a motor vehicle with a speed not in 
excess of eight (8) miles per hour, designed for and used by a person with a disability. McKie’s 
gasoline powered vehicle is not a wheeled chair as it is not designed as a mobility tool for a 
person with a disability.  Further, McKie’s moped is capable of exceeding the motorized 
wheelchair speed limit of eight (8) miles per hour. McKie’s gasoline-powered vehicle cannot be 
exempted under the definition of motorized wheelchair.  
As stipulated above, McKie’s gasoline-powered vehicle is a moped as defined in Idaho 
Code Section 49-114(9): 
(a) Both motorized and pedal propulsion that is not capable of propelling the 
vehicle at a speed in excess of thirty (30) miles per hour on level ground, whether 
two (2) or three (3) wheels are in contact with the ground during operation. If an 
internal combustion engine is used, the displacement shall not exceed fifty (50) 
cubic centimeters and the moped shall have a power drive system that functions 
directly or automatically without clutching or shifting by the operator after the 
drive system is engaged; or 
 
(b) Two (2) wheels or three (3) wheels with no pedals, which is powered solely by 
electrical energy, has an automatic transmission, a motor which produces less 
than two (2) gross brake horsepower, is capable of propelling the device at a 
maximum speed of not more than thirty (30) miles per hour on level ground and 
as originally manufactured, meets federal motor vehicle safety standards for 
motor-driven cycles. A moped is not required to be titled and no motorcycle 
endorsement is required for its operator. 
 
Because McKie’s vehicle is gasoline powered, it meets the definition in subpart (a). A moped is 
capable of traveling up to thirty (30) miles per hour, which well exceeds the speed limitations of 






a moped indicates its more likely use as a mode of transportation upon a highway, rather than a 
method of providing mobility for persons in need of such assistance. McKie’s gasoline powered 
moped’s speed and disposition to be used more as a motor vehicle than an assistive device for 
those with a disability, excludes it from being one of the limited exempted categories in the 
motor vehicle definition.  
3. If this Court Finds that Section 49-123(2)(h) Is Ambiguous, the Legislative 
History Clearly Demonstrates that the Purpose of the 2008 Amendment Was to 
Limit the Types of Vehicles that Could Be Driven On a Highway, Not to Shield 
All Non-Titled and Non-Registered Vehicles from DUI Enforcement. 
 
If the language of the statute is capable of more than one reasonable construction it is 
ambiguous. Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 142 Idaho 804, 807 (2006). An 
ambiguous statute must be construed to mean what the Legislature intended it to mean. Id. To 
ascertain legislative intent, a court examines not only the literal words of the statute, but the 
reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, the policy behind the statute, and its legislative 
history. Id. The State maintains that the plain language of the statute is clear. However, even 
assuming ambiguity in the statute, the legislative history and public policy do not support 
exempting mopeds, and therefore all non-registered or non-titled vehicles, from DUI 
enforcement.  
The definition of a motor vehicle was changed in the 2008 legislative session to include 
the language at issue. See 2008 House Bill No. 365.3 A review of the discussions surrounding the 
titling and registration of mopeds during the 2008 session is telling on the issue of whether the 
Legislature intended to exclude mopeds from the definition of motor vehicle, and therefore all 
the rules of the road applying to “motor vehicles,” including DUI and DWP laws.  
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During the 2008 session, the House Transportation and Defense Committee had a 
discussion about incorporating the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards4 into Idaho’s vehicle 
registration code. See January 16, 2008, House Transportation and Defense Committee Minutes.5 
The discussed reason for not requiring a moped to be titled is because of the expectation that 
mopeds would not be allowed on controlled access highways. See id. Likewise, the discussion in 
the Senate Transportation Committee focused on the expectation that mopeds are used in town 
and not on controlled access highways. See March 25, 2008, Committee Minutes.6 The 
discussion, referring to mopeds, motorbikes, and all-terrain vehicles, then concluded that 
nevertheless “[s]tandard rules of the road will apply so that law enforcement can chase down 
drunk drivers and enforce the rest of the rules that apply to the roads.” Id.7 
Furthermore, a review of the House Transportation Committee and the Senate 
Transportation Committee minutes regarding House Bill No. 365, adding the exception language 
4 Idaho Code Section 49-107(5) defines “Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards” (hereinafter 
“FMVSS”) to mean, “those safety standards established by the national highway traffic safety 
administration [(“NHTSA”)], under Title 49 CFR part 500-599, for the safe construction and 
manufacturing of self-propelled motorized vehicles for operation on public highways.” The 
FMVSS are found at Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations Part 571 (49 CFR 571).  
5 A copy of these minutes can be found at 
http://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2008/standingcommittes/htranmin.pdf#page=12. 
6 A copy of these minutes can be found at 
http://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2008/standingcommittees/stranmin.pdf#page=89. 
7 The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration does not define moped or motorized bike, 
because those terms have no relevance to the classification of a vehicle for the purpose of 
determining which FMVSS would apply to it. Rather, a powered cycle is either: 1) a motorcycle, 
“a motor vehicle with motive power having a seat or saddle for the use of the rider and designed 
to travel on not more than three wheels in contact with ground” (49 CFR 571.3); or 2) a “motor 
driven cycle” as a motorcycle with a motor that produces 5-brake horsepower or less. A motor 
driven cycle is exempted from certain, but not all, requirements of the FMVSS that apply to 
motorcycles. The NHTSA Office of Chief Counsel has determined that mopeds and motor-
driven bicycles fall into the category of motor-driven cycle. 49 U.S.C. 30112 requires all motor 
vehicles (including motorcycles and motor-driven cycles), to comply with all applicable FMVSS 
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to the motor vehicle definition, show that the focus was on compliance with federal standards not 
the exclusion of vehicles from criminal rules of the road. See January 16, 2008, House 
Transportation Committee Minutes; January 30, 2008, House Transportation Committee 
Minutes; March 6, 2008, Senate Transportation Committee Minutes.8 The Legislature was 
focused on coming into compliance with federal standards so as not to open Idaho up to liability 
for titling and registering vehicles that are unfit under the federal standards to operate on Idaho 
roads. Id. The Legislature was also focused on not losing federal funding for this same reason. 
Id. In fact, when brought to the attention of the House Transportation Committee that the 
wording of the first sentence – regarding application of federal standards – might affect the 
enforcement of DUI statutes, the first sentence was rewritten. See January 28, 2008, House 
Transportation Committee Minutes. It logically follows that if the Committee had had any notion 
that the second sentence outlining the exception language would be used to affect the 
enforcement of the DUI statutes, that language would have been modified as well.  
The above legislative discussions show that the Legislature never intended that the 
revised definition of “motor vehicle” would prohibit law enforcement from enforcing the 
criminal rules of the road against those drivers who, though operating vehicles not in compliance 
with federal motor vehicle safety standards, operate a vehicle contrary to Idaho Code. It is 
therefore contrary to legislative intent to interpret the motor vehicle definition of Idaho Code 
Section 49-123(2)(h) to preclude mopeds for purposes of enforcing DUI and other criminal laws 
that depend on the definition of motor vehicle for their enforcement. 
8 A copy of the house committee minutes can be found at 
http://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2008/standingcommittees/htranmin.pdf#page=12.  
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4. Recent Idaho Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Decisions Support the State’s 
Interpretation of the Statute. 
 
 In State v. Trusdall, the Idaho Court of Appeals was asked to consider whether a UTV 
was a “motor vehicle” for purposes of enforcing Idaho’s DUI statute. 155 Idaho 965, 959-60, 
(Ct. App. 2014). The defendant in Trusdall argued that the definition in Idaho Code Section 49-
123(2)(h) required the UTV to be both self-propelled and meet federal motor vehicle safety 
traffic standards in order to be a “motor vehicle.” The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that 
the plain language of Idaho Code Section 49-123(2)(h) clearly defines “motor vehicles as every 
vehicle which is self-propelled.” Id. at 959 (“The UTV Trusdall operated is a motor vehicle 
because it is self-propelled.”) Similar to a UTV, McKie’s gasoline-engine moped is self-
propelled. Also, like a UTV, McKie’s moped does not need to be titled or registered. If the 
second part of Idaho Code Section 49-123(2)(h) exempted all vehicles that did not need to be 
titled or registered, then the Court of Appeals would have found that the UTV was not a motor 
vehicle pursuant to the exception. The Court of Appeals did not make that determination. 
Therefore, whether a vehicle must be titled or registered is not a factor in the application of 
Idaho’s DUI statute, unless the vehicle is an electric personal assistive mobility device, 
motorized wheelchair, or other such vehicle.  
 In Barnes, supra, 133 Idaho at 378, the Idaho Supreme Court discussed whether a 
snowmobile is a “motor vehicle” for the purposes of Idaho’s DUI statute. The defendant in 
Barnes argued that a snowmobile is not a motor vehicle because a person is not required to have 
a driver’s license to operate it unless it is being operated on a public roadway or highway; there 






that a snowmobile clearly fell within the definition of a motor vehicle for the purposes of Idaho’s 
DUI statute: 
The snowmobile definition provided in I.C. § 67–7101(14), although more 
specific and detailed than the definition of motor vehicle provided in I.C. § 49–
123(2)(g), does not remove snowmobiles from the definition of motor vehicles, 
but rather simply shows that a snowmobile is a specific type of motor vehicle. 
Thus, even though the operation of a snowmobile may not require operator 
licensing and liability insurance as does the operation of other types of motor 
vehicles, it does not mean that a snowmobile is not a motor vehicle for purposes 
of I.C. § 18–8004. Further, although snowmobiles are generally restricted from 
being operated on highways, under the certain circumstances described in section 
67–7109 of the Idaho Code, which allow snowmobiles to be operated on 
highways or roadways, the operator must have a valid driver's license. See I.C. § 
67–7110(7). Thus, we hold that a snowmobile shall be treated as a motor vehicle 
under I.C. § 18–8004. 
 
Because Barnes was decided prior to the 2008 legislative amendment, the Court did not discuss 
application of the exclusionary language of Idaho Code Section 49-123(2)(h). However, the facts 
of Barnes provide a situation similar to that here – whether the driver of a vehicle that is exempt 
from titling and registration is still subject to DUI laws when the vehicle is driven on a public 
roadway. Idaho courts have held that such vehicles are subject to the rules of the road, including 
DUI codes. 
McKie’s interpretation of the statute would be a major departure from previous positions 
held by the Idaho Supreme Court and Idaho Court of Appeals. It is reasonable to conclude that 
had the Legislature intended such a sweeping change, they would not have done so without some 
discussion. The Legislature’s complete silence on the issue evidences an intent to maintain the 
status quo.  
McKie cites State v. Udeochu, Case No. CR-MD-2011-0005485 (4th District Court, Ada 






found that a moped was not a motor vehicle for licensing purposes. For the first time on appeal, 
McKie appears to be arguing that he relied on this decision when building his moped in order to 
avoid DUI consequences. This argument was not preserved for appeal, and none of the alleged 
facts supporting this argument are in the record. Therefore, the State requests that this 
unsupported argument be stricken. See Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6) (The argument shall 
contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the 
reasons therefor, with citations to authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and the record 
relied upon); Woods v. Sanders, 150 Idaho 53, 58 (2010) (I.A.R. 35(a)(6) is not satisfied when a 
party fails to provide sufficient citation to the record); Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 127 (Ct. 
App. 1997) (“[I]t is the appellant's responsibility to provide a sufficient record to substantiate his 
or her claims on appeal. In the absence of an adequate record on appeal to support the appellant's 
claims, we will not presume error.”).  Further, for the reasons discussed in this brief the State 
asserts that the decision in Udeochu, as it pertains to the definition of a motor vehicle, was 
incorrect and the magistrate court’s rationale unpersuasive.  
5. Appellant’s Position that a Moped is Not a Motor Vehicle is Contrary to Public 
Policy. 
 
To hold that a moped is not subject to the rules and laws regulating the operation of 
motor vehicles would lead to an absurd result.  Such a holding would render an entire class of 
vehicles that are driven on Idaho’s roadways unregulated by any laws at all. A moped is not a 
bicycle – that is, moved exclusively by human power – when the motor is engaged and therefore 
is not subject to regulations applying to bicycles. See e.g. I.C. § 49-605 and Idaho Code Title 49, 
Chapter 7. If a moped is not subject to the rules of road applying to bicycles, and not subject to 






whatsoever. This makes sense in the context of electric personal assistance mobility devices and 
motorized wheelchairs or other such vehicles, because they are not permitted on the roadways. 
While a person who is intoxicated in a motorized wheelchair may be a danger to pedestrians on 
the sidewalk, such persons are not subject to the rules governing motor vehicles. On the contrary, 
mopeds are essentially low-powered motorcycles that are driven on the road with other motor 
vehicles. The notion that the Legislature intended that a person could drive a moped (with speed 
capability as high as 30 m.p.h.) on the road while intoxicated is untenable. The danger to the 
public resulting from such actions is clear and concerning.   
The State asserts that a moped is a motor vehicle for purposes of Idaho’s DUI statute 
because it is self-propelled and does not fall under the exception that applies to wheelchairs, 
mobility assist devices or other such vehicles.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully requests that the Judgment of Conviction for DUI (Excessive) 
entered upon McKie’s conditional guilty plea be affirmed on appeal.  
DATED this 8th day of February 2017. 
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I. 
REPLY STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. REPLY TO THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The question presented upon this appeal, both from the perspective of the State-
Respondent and the Defendant-Appellant, is whether a "moped" operated upon the streets of 
Boise, Idaho, in a bike lane, satisfies the statutory requirement of the definition of "motor 
vehicle" under the criminal statute, so as to be charged with DUI under J.C. § 18-8004, or 
whether the amendments affecting that mode of transportation (mopeds) has been excluded by 
the amendatory definitions as to what constitutes a "motor vehicle" under Idaho's current Motor 
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Vehicle Code, and what vehicles are excluded from that definition. 
B. REPLY TO THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
There is no dispute from the State-Respondent that on August 23, 2015, at 2:37 a.m., Mr. 
McKie was charged with two traffic offenses when stopped by an Officer for a perceived tail 
light failure while operating his moped in the bicycle lane along Boise Avenue in Boise, Idaho. 
The charges were based upon the Officer's belief Mr. McKie was operating a "motor vehicle", 
an element required for both I.C. § 18-8004 and LC. §49-1232(3). 
Though the motion to dismiss was deemed untimely, that motion raised concerns that 
"mopeds" could not meet the definition of "motor vehicle" under Idaho's current motor vehicle 
code, and the absence of that element persisted throughout the proceedings, then to become an 
issue to be addressed by the lower court as to what instructions were to be given to the jury 
regarding the application of the law. During the course of developing those jury instructions for 
trial, that issue persisted in the context of the statutory exceptions and the limiting phrase within 
the applicable statute, as it referenced the phrase "self-propelled." The magistrate concluded a 
''moped" was within the applicable definition of a "motor vehicle" because it was capable of 
being "self-propelled". Defense counsel presented a contrary view, based upon application of 
the amendments to the motor vehicle code by the Idaho Legislature in 2008 and the analysis 
addressed in the case of Armstrong v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 143 Idaho 135, 139 P.3d 737 
(2006). The Armstrong case undertook to discuss the fact in 2006 that a moped is not considered 
to be a motor vehicle in California, and the Idaho Legislature expressly declared in 2008 the 
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Legislature's intent to exclude "mopeds" from the definition of "motor vehicle" by virtue of the 
exclusionary clauses(s) from any titling requirements in the amendments. In California, mopeds 
were excluded from registration, as the basis of their status of being a non-motor vehicle. 
Though the State-Respondent seeks to strike the in-chambers discussion, it nonetheless 
was the discussion held the morning of the scheduled jury trial, whereupon the magistrate and 
counsels discussed the differences over the interpretation of the applicable law to be given to the 
jury, and the outcome of that in-chambers conference was an agreement later placed upon the 
record in open court, the effect of which avoided a trial and the consequent dispute over jury 
instructions instead advanced the case upon an appellate review through the entry of a 
conditional plea, as based upon the stipulated facts, thereby eliminating need for a jury trial. 
Based upon this agreement, as identified on the record made in open court of June 28, 
2016, the conditional plea of guilty was entered, disposition followed September 30, 2016, and 
the appeal taken to the District Court on October 4, 2016, with Stay of Execution entered 
October 14, 2016. 
C. REPLY TO ST A TEMENT OF FACTS 
The "stipulated facts", as were filed with the magistrate court to identify the 
record for appellate purposes, may be simply stated by a succinct and relevant abbreviation, 
citing the relevant aspects of the facts for purposes of this appeal, simply being the following: 
On August 23, 2015, at 2:37 a.m. Mr. McKie was operating a self-
propelled vehicle as it is defined by Idaho Code 49-123(V)(2)(h), and as further 
defined to be a moped under Idaho Code 49-l l 4(M)(9), being a limited-speed 
motor-driven cycle having both motorized and pedal propulsion not capable of 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - PAGE 7 
000189
propelling in excess of thirty (30) miles per hour on level ground, two (2) wheels 
in contact with the ground during operation, and an internal combustion engine 
less than fifty (50) cubic centimeters in displacement when activated, and has a 
power drive system that functions directly or automatically without clutching or 
shifting after the drive system is engaged. The moped was neither titled nor 
registered, as such slow moving vehicles-cycles are not titled nor registered by the 
State of Idaho, Department of Transportation. 
As to the abbreviated relevant portions of the stipulated facts, there is no dispute Mr. 
McKie was operating a moped, within the above-cited statutory definitions, at the time the 
above-cited offenses were charged. See, Stipulated Facts Nos. 4, 5, & 6. Mr. McKie was 
operating his own "slow-moving," "limited-speed," "motor-driven cycle," he personally 
constructed within the provisions of Idaho law. Had the case gone to trial, Mr. McKie would 
have testified he built his moped for in-town transportation use, from a modified bicycle-cycle 
frame with a small engine, to create a motorized bicycle, blending parts of an old discarded 
bicycle frame with parts of a Honda Trail bike frame, incorporating the bike peddling 
mechanism for the required "pedal starting process", and a 49 cc single cylinder gas engine, 
creating a bike-motor combination comparable to the conversion kits available on the market 
through bike shops in the Boise Valley. These "kits" are called "motorized bikes," with 
commercial kits available with an engine between 41cc to 49 cc, which are called "Motor 
Bicycle," and these engine assembly kits are called "Motorized Bike Gas Engine Assembly Kit." 
Applicable to the resolution of this appeal is the controlling definitions found in 
Idaho's motor vehicle code, as amended by the Idaho Legislature in 2008, which exempted 
certain "vehicles" from the definition of "motor Vehicle". That was accomplished by specific 
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reference to certain modes of transportation, and then generally by exempting certain vehicles 
from the "titling" or "registration" requirements, and that exempt status was expanded in 2008 
to then include "mopeds" from the definition of "motor vehicle", as they were then made exempt 
from the "titling" requirement. As a consequence of the 2008 amendments, a person who 
operated a "moped" was not capable of being charged with DUI, or failure to have liability 
insurance, or failure to have a driver's license, because a moped was no longer a "motor vehicle" 
as defined by statute, as a matter of law. See, Chapter 198 of the Laws of 2008, pp. 630-644. 
D. REPLY TO THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Since there is complete agreement throughout these proceedings that the vehicle operated 
by Mr. McKie was a "moped", clearly described and defined under the Motor Vehicle Code, this 
appeal presents a clear question of law as to whether "mopeds" no longer constitute a "motor 
vehicle," under the motor vehicle code, and if not, then whether Mr. Mc Kie was indeed 
incapable of being charged with the offense of DUI and no proof of Insurance. Because this 
appeal presents a question of law in respect to statutory interpretation, it is the concurrence of the 
parties that this issue is one of free review for this Court to decide, as that standard was most 
recently stated in St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. Gooding County, 159 Idaho 84, 86, 
356 P.3d 377, 379 (2015). The State-Respondent has identified in their Responsive Brief a 
series of case citations for this appellate court to consider in the process of statutory construction 
and interpretation, which Appellant will undertake to discuss in the course of this Reply Brief, 
but suffice it to say the general rules of statutory interpretation were most recently summarized 
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by the Idaho Supreme Court in Hoffer v. Shappard, 160 Idaho 870,380 P.3d 681 (2016), stating 
the following: 
"The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative 
intent." State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007). 
"When interpreting a statute, the Court begins with the literal words of the statute . 
. . . " Williams v. Blue Cross of Idaho, 151 Idaho 515, 521, 260 P.3d 1186, 1192 
(2011 ). "If the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of 
the legislative body must be given effect. ... " Idaho Youth Ranch, Inc. v. Ada 
Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 157 Idaho 180, 184-85, 335 P.3d 25, 29-30 (2014) 
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting St. Luke's Reg' I Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. of 
Comm 'rs of Ada Cnty., 146 Idaho 753, 755, 203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009)). This 
Court does not have the authority to modify an unambiguous legislative 
enactment. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg' l 1'vfed. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889,895,265 
P.3d 502, 508 (2011) (quoting Berry v. Koehler, 84 Idaho 170, 177, 369 P.2d 
1010, 1013 (1962)). 
160 Idaho at 884,380 P.3d at 695. 
The "general rule" with respect to "amendatory" acts of the legislature is that 
amendments of existing statutes are presumed to change the law. IA Sutherland Statutory 
Construction § 22:30 Construction of amendatory acts - Presumption of Change. See e.g., St. 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. Gooding County, 159 Idaho 84, 89, 356 P.3d 377, 382 
(2015) ("When a statute is amended, it is presumed that the legislature intended it to have a 
meaning different from that accorded to it before the amendment." (citations omitted)). 
As before addressed in Appellant's Opening Brief, if a criminal statute is constitutionally 
vague, such when there is a legitimate difference of opinion with respect to the interpretation of 
statutory language that specifically affects a criminal act, that fact serves to create a concern the 
statute may be constitutionally flawed. See State v. Lopez, 98 Idaho 581, 570 P.2d 259 (1976), 
(wherein a statute was held unconstitutionally vague, because it did not further define the terms 
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used in the statute, nor apprise the defendant what conduct violated the statute). If a criminal 
statute is determined to be ambiguous, then the "rule of lenity," applies, as stated in State v. 
Alley, 155 Idaho 972,318 P.3d 962 (Ct.App.2014), where the Idaho Court of Appeals held: 
Additionally, if a criminal statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity applies 
and the statute must be construed in favor of the accused. State v. Dewey, 131 
Idaho 846, 848, 965 P.2d 206, 208 (Ct.App.1998); State v. Martinez, 126 Idaho 
801,803,891 P.2d 1061, 1063 (Ct.App.1995). However, where a review of the 
legislative history makes the meaning of the statute clear, the rule of lenity will 
not be applied. State v. Bradshaw, 155 Idaho 437, 440, 313 P.3d 765, 768 
(Ct.App.2013); State v. Jones, 151 Idaho 943, 947, 265 P.3d 1155, 1159 
(Ct.App.2011). The rule of lenity applies only when grievous ambiguity or 
uncertainty in a criminal statute that is not resolved by looking at the text, context, 
legislative history, or underlying policy of the statute allows for multiple 
reasonable constructions. Bradshaw, 155 Idaho at 441,313 P.3d at 769. 
155 Idaho at 976,318 P.3d at 966. 
The State-Respondent is in agreement with Appellant-Defendant there is still no 
definition of "motor vehicle" provided in Title 18, and the only definition of "motor vehicle" 
within the Idaho Code is found in Title 49. As stated in State v. Knott, 132 Idaho 476, 974 P.2d 
1105 ( 1999), it was there observed: 
"There is a close interaction between the Title 49 statutes and similar statutory 
provisions in Title 18, particularly the DUI provision found in section 18-8004. 
The statutes relate to the same subject matter and on occasions have been 
addressed by the legislature at the same time. 132 Idaho at 479, 974 P.2d at 
I 008". 
It was in 1984 that the DUI statute was transferred from Title 49 to Title 18, and the 
Court concluded that when identical terms are used in both sections, they should be construed by 
reference to the common definitions provided in the Code: 
Idaho Code § 73-113 [now J.C. § 73-113(3)] indicates that words and 
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phrases used in the Idaho Code are to be "construed according to the context and 
approved usage of the language." Given that identical terms are used in the 
statutes, and the legislature amended the relevant phrase to statutes in both Title 
49 and Title 18 in the same bill after the DUI statute was transferred to the 
criminal code, the "context and approved usage" of the relevant phrase indicates 
that its meaning is the same in both titles. 132 Idaho at 479, 974 P.2d at 1008 
(bracketed reference to change in statutory citation added). 
Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court held in Peterson v. Peterson, 156 Idaho 85, 320 P.3d 
1244 (2014), that under the Idaho Constitution, the operative authority for the declaration of the 
enactment of laws by the Idaho Legislature is the annual compilation known as the Idaho Session 
laws, and while the Court observes that commercially published compilations of the Idaho code 
to be merely "evidence" of the Idaho statutes, the Idaho Code does not represent the law itself. 
("' All general laws enacted at any session of the legislature shall be printed in a volume known 
as the Session Laws.' I.C. § 67-904(1). Immediately after the session laws are printed, they are 
delivered to the secretary of state for distribution and sale. I.C. § 67-906." 156 Idaho at 88, 320 
P.3d at 1247. "Thus, the compilation of statutes in the Idaho Code is merely evidence of the 
laws enacted by the legislature as set forth in the session laws. The Idaho Code is not the law." 
157 Idaho at 90,320 P.3d at 1249). 
As a consequence of this reminder to the courts and practicing bar as to the significance, 
weight, and reliance to be placed upon the various sources of Idaho statutory law, there was a 
separate motion submitted to this court, following presentation of Appellant's Opening Brief, 
requesting this appellate court take judicial notice of the 2008 session laws, relevant to the issues 
(and motor vehicle code) raised in this appeal, and the legislative history that accompanies the 
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enactment of those 2008 amendments. On appeal, an appellate court may take judicial notice of 
any matter on which the court of original jurisdiction could take judicial notice. City of Lewiston 
v. Frary, 91 Idaho 322, 325-27, 420 P.2d 805, 808-10 (1966); J.C.§ 9-101; I.R.E. 201. See also, 
Crawford v. Department of Correction, 133 Idaho 633,636 n. 1,991 P.2d 358,361 n. I (1999) 
("We take judicial notice of House Bill 73, which was not submitted as part of the record on 
appeal, but is contained in the public records maintained by the Office of Legislative Services 
located in the State Capitol Building. I.RE. 201(f). Appellant requests this court engage such 
judicial notice, to be assured of the precise language used by the Idaho Legislature when they 
undertook the 2008 amendments. 
II. 
REPLY TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Though the State has elected to reduce the issues raised in this appeal to the single issue 
being: "Did the trial court err when it determined that a moped is not a motor vehicle for the 
purposes of Idaho's DUI statute", Appellant would still suggest the issues raised by Appellant 
were adequately embraced within the context of the issues identified in the Opening Brief, as that 
allows the appellate court the latitude to address the issue(s) needed to resolve this appeal, and in 
the context of what definitions within Title 49 will apply to Title 18; what the intent of the 2008 
amendments were with respect to the "exemption" created for "mopeds" from the "titling" 
requirement, and the "exclusion" from "motor vehicle" resulting from that exemption. The court 
will note that "mopeds" were before "defined" in the vehicle code before 2008, but never were 
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previously "exempted" from the "titling" requirements until the 2008 amendments. This court 
must dete1mine in what manner the application of that "exemption" from "titling", and the 
resulting "exclusion" of "mopeds" from "motor vehicle" has with respect to the DUI statutes; 
and whether the conviction of Mr. McKie was consequently erroneous, as a matter of law. Those 
issues essentially were cited to be: 
I. Whether Title 49 definitions apply in determining what qualifies as a 
"motor vehicle" for purposes of a DUI conviction under I.C. § 18-8004? 
2. Whether the 2008 amendments to the motor vehicle code eliminated 
"mopeds" from the definition of"motor vehicle" under Idaho law? 
3 Whether the magistrate erred in refusing to find Mr. McKie's moped was 
not a "motor vehicle" under Idaho law, whose operation could not then be 
the basis for a violation ofidaho's I.C. § 18-8004 DUI law? 
4. Whether the magistrate erred in convicting Mr. McKie for DUI under I.C. 
§ 18-8004 while operating a moped? 
III. 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
A. The Magistrate Erred In Convicting Mr. McKie For DUI Under J.C. § 
18-8004 Because A "Moped," Is Not Classified As A "Motor Vehicle" 
Under The Idaho Motor Vehicle Code 
An essential element of a DUI offense, as identified in Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 
1000, is that the accused must drive or be in actual physical control of (4) a motor vehicle upon 
a highway, street or bridge or upon public or private property open to the public, and If any of 
the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury must find the 
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defendant not guilty. 
If any single element is absent ("Motor vehicle"), the charge must be dismissed or the 
defendant acquitted. In a criminal matter the law requires the state prove every element of the 
offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); State v. Felder, 
150 Idaho 269,274, 245 P.3d 1021, 1026 (Ct.App.2010) ("The requirement that the State prove 
every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt is grounded in the constitutional guarantee 
of due process. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313-14, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2786, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 
569-70 (1979); State v. Mubita, 145 Idaho 925, 942, 188 P.3d 867, 884 (2008); Erickson, 148 
Idaho at 685, 227 P.3d at 939. This standard of proof plays a vital role in the American scheme 
of criminal procedure because it provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence-
that bedrock axiomatic and elementary principle whose enforcement lies at the foundation of the 
administration of our criminal law. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 
L.Ed.2d 368, 374-75 (1970); Erickson, 148 Idaho at 685,227 P.3d at 939." (emphasis added)). 
The question presented throughout this appeal is whether the required element of a 
"motor vehicle" exists - as a matter of law - when the vehicle is a "moped", defined under the 
Idaho motor vehicle code to be exempt from titling, and declared excluded from the definition of 
"motor vehicle." 
As stated in Appellant's Opening Brief, this very question was directly addressed by 
another Ada County magistrate in 2011 in the case entitled State of Idaho v. Elijah C. Udeochu, 
Case NO. CR-MD-2011-0005485 (4th District Court, Ada County, 2011), and the focus in that 
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case was specifically the definition of "Motor Vehicle," given the recent amendments by the 
Idaho Legislature in 2008, wherein mopeds were exempted, and thereby excluded from the 
definition of"motor vehicle", such that a driver's license was not required for its operation. 
It was in that case counsel undertook extensive research to address this statutory 
interpretation after the definitions and exceptions had been created and adopted to the motor 
vehicle provisions by the Idaho Legislature in 2008. That case resulted in a decision from the 
Honorable Michael J. Oths, in which that Magistrate announced that a "moped" is specifically 
exempt from Idaho's motor vehicle code "titling" requirements. Idaho law specifically states 
that vehicles at are specifically exempted from titling or registering requirements are not "motor 
vehicles," as defined within Title 49, Idaho Code. 
The Ada county magistrate in Udeochu reasoned that the statutory requirement in Idaho 
that an operator of a "Motor Vehicle" must have a driver's license, was governed by Title 49, 
Chapter 3, and if the mode of transportation (moped) is declared not to be a "motor vehicle," 
then a driver's license is not required for its operation. The requirement for a "Motor Vehicle" 
Driver's License, set forth in LC. § 49-301, provides: 
No person, except those expressly exempted by the provisions of this 
chapter, shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway unless the person has a 
current and valid Idaho driver's license. 
Judge Oths concluded in his Order that: 
"a moped is specifically exempt from titling requirements, that vehicles 
that are specifically exempt from titling are not 'motor vehicles' and that a moped 
is thus not a motor vehicle. Therefore, a driver's license is not required to operate 
a moped on a public highway, nor is liability insurance required. A lingering 
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question remains as to whether it is possible to legally operate a moped on a 
public highway. Trying to read all of the statutes in concert is a daunting task, but 
it appears there is a way to legally ride a moped on a public highway. Idaho Code 
§ 49-402(10) prohibits registration of a vehicle for use on public highways unless 
it meets federal safety standards. Presumably if a moped were to meet the federal 
standards it could be registered and/or used on a public highway. Nothing would 
require the vehicle to be titled, nor would the operator need to be licensed ... 
Should this matter proceed to trial, jury instructions consistent with the above 
opinion would be given." Order Re: Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, at p. 4-5. 
Though the State-Respondent would now argue Judge Oths was in error in his analysis of 
the law, and would now also seek to strike any reference that Mr. McKie relied upon Judge Oths 
Decision when fashioning his moped under the statute, it remains true that it was that Order of 
the Honorable Michael J. Oths, rendered in the Udeochu case, that gave the community, as well 
as Mr. McKie, their basis to rely that mopeds are not motor vehicles, pursuant to the statutory 
definitions and exemptions created by Idaho's 2008 Legislative amendments. 
The Order, issued by Judge Michael J. Oths, reflects the controlling law in Ada County at 
the time Mr. McKie was stopped in the bike lane along Boise Avenue, as that Magistrate 
declared a "moped," as a matter of Idaho law, to be exempted from titling requirements, and 
therefore excluded from what was defined to be a "motor vehicle," following the 2008 
Legislative amendments. The Legislature considered mopeds to be among the slow moving 
"vehicles" and likely influenced by the California legislation, and the case that our Supreme 
Court before discussed in 2006, entitled Armstrong v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 143 Idaho 135, 
139 P.3d 737 (2006), with the likely thought that mopeds were being used for in-town travel, 
similar to that of a bicycle. 
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The definition of"motor vehicle", as now expressed in LC.§ 49-123(V)(2)(h), states: 
(h) Motor vehicle. Every vehicle which is self-propelled, and for the 
purpose of titling and registration meets federal motor vehicle safety standards as 
defined in section 49-107, Idaho Code. Motor vehicle does not include vehicles 
moved solely by human power, electric personal assistive mobility devices and 
motorized wheelchairs or other such vehicles that are specifically exempt from 
titling or registration requirements under title 49, Idaho Code. (All Emphasis 
added) 
This case, like the Udeochu case, specifically involves a "moped," and because it is 
controlled by statute and the legal definition, it becomes a matter of statutory construction and 
interpretation. In Udeochu, the Magistrate declared "mopeds" are not "motor vehicles," as a 
matter of Idaho law, and cannot subject an operator to criminal acts associated with the operation 
of "motor vehicles," as a moped is a non-titled, is a limited speed, motor driven cycle, and is 
expressly exempted from titling requirements, the effect of which excludes them from the 
definition of "motor vehicle". 
The State-Respondent presents the position in their Responsive Brief that mopeds "are 
exempt from both titling and registration" requirements (Responsive Brief, p.5-6,), and although 
that is a reasonable position, upon reviewing both the statute defining mopeds and the Senate 
Transportation Committee Meeting Minutes entered March 6, 2008, the actual "exclusion" from 
"motor vehicles" created within J.C. §49-123(V)(2)(h) applies to all vehicles that are "exempt" 
from "titling QI'. registration" requirements, and in that regard, "mopeds" are excluded by the 
"titling" exemption announced in LC. §49-114(M)(9)(a)&(b), not any "registration exemption. 
However, the concept of a possible "registration" exemption comes about from a review of the 
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Senate Transportation Committee Minutes of March 6, 2008, which did not get "incorporated" 
into the Idaho Code exemption, yet there it states they are not registered as they are slow moving 
vehicles, intended for town use, and not on highways, as it is also addressed in l.C. §49-
120(S)(l 5). 
The exclusionary effects of Legislative amendatory enactments are construed as intended 
to change the prior law from what it was, and as the court will note, the Legislature kept the 
definition of "moped" within its amendment, but the 2008 amendment added the "exemption" 
from the "titling" requirement, and at the same time, the 2008 amendatory enactments also 
created the "exclusion" for certain vehicles from the definition of "motor vehicle", stating that 
certain vehicles are excluded from the definition of "motor vehicle" if they are exempted from 
"titling" or "registration" requirements under the statutes. 
When the "exemption" language is applied to those "vehicles" that are declared exempt 
from titling "or" registration requirements (which now includes mopeds), and when those 
exempt "vehicles" are then removed (excluded) from the definition of "motor vehicles" because 
of the "exclusionary" language that removes exempt "vehicles" from the definition of what 
constitutes a "motor vehicle", the plain and ordinary application and meaning of those 
exemptions and exclusions of those specifically described or category of "vehicles" leaves only 
those vehicles that are self-propelled, titled, and registered as "motor vehicles", as that is what is 
defined in the motor vehicle code, and whether or not the definition of "motor vehicle" is cystal 
clear, a grammatical application of the language used to establish those "exemptions" and 
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resulting "exclusions" from the definition are clear in defining what is not a "motor vehicle", and 
what is not a "motor vehicle" is the crucial issue in this appeal. 
When the 2008 Legislative exemption and exclusionary language is applied, as it 
appears the 2008 Legislature was intending to accomplish, it becomes clear that certain express 
forms and categories of slow moving, limited speed, partially human powered and partially 
motor driven cycles, were to be excluded, notwithstanding some potential "self-propelled" 
component may still be incorporated within the excluded vehicle (small electric or gas driven), 
as they were expressly exempted from the titling requirement. When the statute clearly and 
plainly declares a "moped" is not to be titled, and that title exemptions serves to exclude vehicles 
from the definition of "motor vehicle", it becomes a reasonable and grammatically correct 
interpretation of the statutory language used to conclude mopeds are not motor vehicles, 
especially when you factor in the prior decision and analysis that is expressed within Armstrong, 
supra, where our Supreme Court acknowledged "mopeds" are not "motor vehicles" under the 
California motor vehicle code when that was discussed in 2006. 
(b). The Statutory Construction And Grammatical Interpretation Of the 
Motor Vehicle Code Confirms "Mopeds" Are Not "Motor Vehicles" 
The fundamental issue before this court is not whether a "moped" has some component 
of being "self-propelled," but rather whether a "moped" is EXCLUDED from what constitutes a 
"motor vehicle", stemming from the exempt status from titled vehicles, all of which is consistent 
with the fact mopeds are a slow moving, limited speed, motor driven cycles, expressly exempted 
from titling requirements and excluded from the definition of a "motorcycle" through the 2008 
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amendments, which also brought into the code the re-definition of "motor vehicle," which 
specifically excludes vehicles from "motor vehicles" that have been exempted from titling or 
registration requirements. Because mopeds are expressly exempted from titling requirements, 
that plain and ordinary meaning and effect must be given that purpose which construes the 
intention and purpose to be achieved by the legislative amendments made to the definition of 
"motor vehicle" under Idaho's Motor Vehicle Code, consistent with the California motor vehicle 
code, after so amended by the Legislature in 2008, following Armstrong, supra, in 2006. 
The 2008 Amendments control this controversy, and it was within the Legislature's 
exclusive right, as the legislative branch of government, to adopt whatever exclusions and 
whatever exemptions they may proscribe to the definition of motor vehicle, and whether judges, 
attorneys, prosecutors, and appellate courts are in agreement with either the wisdom or the means 
by which that is being done, that is irrelevant with respect to the consequence of their actions. 
We begin with J.C. § 49-123(V)(2)(h), where the Legislature adopted the criteria for 
exclusions of certain vehicles from the definition of "motor vehicle" (titling or registration), and 
then to J.C. §49-114(M)(9)(b), where the Legislature specifically exempted "vehicles" from 
"titling" (which a moped is among them). Their operation is "specifically authorized" on Idaho 
roads without any endorsements, as they are among the slow moving vehicles, and there is 
nothing contained in the description and makeup of a moped, as described in J.C. §49-
l l 4(M)(9)(a) that requires them to be FMVSS compliant, so is likely their makeup as a slow 
moving vehicle was among the reasons that mopeds are apparently not required to be registered 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF -PAGE 21 
000203
either, as the Senate Transportation Committee Minutes of March 6, 2008 confirms mopeds are 
not intended to be registered. The statute expressly "authorizes" an "operator" of a "moped" to 
"operate" them upon the public streets, "without a motorcycle endorsement", because they are 
not only slow moving, likely not FMVSS compliant, but also excluded from the definition of 
"motorcycles" (LC. § 49-114(M)(ll ). If not FMVSS compliant, the statute says they cannot be 
registered as a matter of express statutory declaration. 
Therefore, it is apparent mopeds are excluded from titling by statute, and not intended to 
be registered by virtue of the Senate Transportation Committee minutes, and there is no "formal 
certification," relating to these assembly kits from FMVSS, so mopeds (for purposes of 
operation) would come under the provisions that says "otherwise specifically authorized," as 
indicated by LC. § 49-402(10). 
As addressed in Appellant's Opening Brief, the March 6, 2008, Senate Transportation 
Committee Minutes made clear "mopeds" will not be required to be registered because people 
use them "in town" and they are not a "highway" vehicle. The distinction about "in town," 
compared to "freeway" use, has support by virtue of the discussions that Senate Committee had. 
These "In town" roadways are recognized to be public roadways, and because they are 
not maintained by federal funding allocations, these roadways and city streets are not considered 
within the Federal Highway Funding criteria. 
It appears to have been clearly recognized by Idaho's Senators that "mopeds" would be 
"operated" "in town," and to that end, another "fact" stipulated to by the Parties was that this 
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Defendant was cited by the City Officer while operating his moped along Boise Avenue in the 
"bike lane," where you would expect to find a two wheel, slow moving means of transportation, 
traveling along a roadway in "town." Mr. McKie was operating his moped within the Boise City 
limits, on Boise Avenue, where there is a limited speed of 3 5 mph or less, and he was well under 
that while operating at this "in town" location. 
Respondent's Brief dwells extensively upon an "interpretative" approach, in reviewing 
the statutory amendments enacted in 2008, focusing upon how this court is to construe the phrase 
"or other such vehicles that are specifically exempt from titling "or" registration requirements 
under Title 49, Idaho Code". In their Brief, Respondent focuses upon three cases that discuss 
various principles of statutory construction. They begin with Pepple v. Headrick, 64 Idaho 132, 
128 P.2d 757 (1942), that interprets the language of a gaming-gambling statute. The court 
addressed one such statutory interpretative doctrine, and then set it aside in their analysis of the 
statute. In that case, the Appellant wanted the statute limited by the use of that doctrine, just as 
the Respondent does here. The court held the doctrine inapplicable, and went beyond what 
otherwise was that limiting doctrine. The court stated: 
I. Under the "ejusdem generis" doctrine, where general words of the 
statute follow an enumeration of persons or things, the general words will be 
construed as meaning persons or things of like or similar class or character to 
those specifically enumerated. 
2. The rule of "ejusdem generis" is merely a rule of construction 
and does not warrant a court in confining the operation of a statute 
within narrower limits than intended by the legislature. 
3. In construing statute making it a misdemeanor to operate 
certain enumerated gambling devices or "any other device" employed in 
gambling, the "ejusdem generis" doctrine was inapplicable, and the 
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prohibition of the statute was not limited to devices similar to those 
enumerated. (LC.A., sec. 17-2301; Const., art. 3, sec. 20.) 64 Idaho 133. 
(All emphasis added) 
That court then stated: 
Statutes which are in their nature penal are strictly construed and should 
not be held to include anything not clearly and plainly within the scope of their 
provisions. (59 C.J., sec. 660, p. 1113; In re Dampier, Supra; State v. Choate, 41 
Idaho 251; In re Moore, 38 Idaho 506.) 
It is a universally recognized rule of construction that where a statute 
specifies certain things upon which it is to operate or forbids certain things, it is to 
be construed as excluding from its effect all those not expressly mentioned. (59 
C.J., sec. 582, p. 984; 25 R.C.L., sec. 229, p. 989; State v. Gossett, 113 P.2d 415; 
Peck v. State of Idaho, 120 P.2d 820.) 
Where general words such as "other" or "any other" follow an enumeration 
of particular classes, such words are construed as applicable only to things of a 
like kind or nature to those enumerated. (59 C.J., sec. 581, p. 981; In re Hull, 
Supra; Denver v. Taylor (Colo.), 292 P. 594, 73 A.L.R. 833; Ex parte Williams 
(Cal.), 87 P. 565; Kirkley v. Portland Electric Power Co., 298 P. 237.) ..... . 
The doctrine of ejusdem generis refers to a similarity of character or 
substance and not to a similarity of form. (Slate v. Hull, supra.), (All emphasis 
added) 
The court then stated: 
The act before us now contains no word of limitation or modification and 
does not pretend to limit its prohibitive terms to only such games and devices as 
previously enumerated, but places a prohibition on "any other device," 
employed in gaming and gambling ..... . 
We recognize and have often invoked the rule of construction that, where 
general words of a statute follow an enumeration of persons or things, such 
general words will be construed as meaning persons or things of like or similar 
class or character to those specially enumerated; usually designated the 
"ejusdem generis" rule. (In re Winton Lumber Co., 57 Idaho 131, 135, 63 P.2d 
664; 28 C.J.S., p. 1049.) 
"This rule is but one of construction and does not warrant a court in 
confining the operation of a statute within narrower limits than intended by 
the legislature." (Commonwealth v. Klucher, 326 Pa. 587, 193 A. 28.) 
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In the case before us, the legislature evidently did not intend that the 
"ejusdem generis" rule should apply in the enforcement of this statute and 
emphasized that intent by the words "or any other device. " Similar terms have 
received a like construction by other courts. (Grafe v. Delgado, 30 N.M. 150, 
228 P. 601; People v. Carroll, 80 Cal. 153, 22 P. 129; Salt Lake City v. Doran, 
42 Utah 401, 131 P. 636, 637.) 
Given the above citation from Pepple, supra, our Supreme Court was aware of the 
limiting effects of the "ejusdem generis" doctrine as an interpretative rule; determined that it was 
inapplicable in that case because of the inclusive language being used in the statute, and 
concluded that the legislature "evidently did not intend that the "ejusdem generis" rule should 
apply in the enforcement of this statute and emphasized that intent by the words "or any other 
device", and then stated that; "Similar terms have received a like construction by other courts". 
In this case, it could also be said: The act before us now contains no word of limitation or 
modification and does not pretend to limit its exclusionary term to only such vehicles as 
previously enumerated, but places an exclusion on "any other such vehicles" that are exempt 
from the titling or registration requirements ..... . 
With the Pepple case in mind, we look to the two statutory amendments to see what the 
Legislature intended. We begin with LC. § 49-123(V)(2)(h), where the Legislature adopted the 
criteria for "exclusions" of vehicles from the definition of "motor vehicle" (titling or 
registration), wherein the Legislature stated: 
h) Motor vehicle. Every vehicle which is self-propelled, and for the 
purpose of titling and registration meets federal motor vehicle safety 
standards as defined in section 49-107, Idaho Code. Motor vehicle does not 
include vehicles moved solely by human power, electric personal assisti ve 
mobility devices and motorized wheelchairs OR other such vehicles that are 
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specifically exempt from titling or registration requirements under title 49, 
Idaho Code. (All emphasis added) 
The emphasis throughout is upon "vehicles". being first the definition and then the 
exclusion, recognizing that what is "self-propelled" may then be excluded, stating that "motor 
vehicle" that are known to move slowly, are exempt, such as those that are human powered, 
those that are electric mobility devices, and those that are motorized wheelchairs, and then the 
exclusion goes on to say "OR" other such vehicles, such as those specifically exempt from 
titling or registration requirements under title 49, Idaho Code. The statute creates a 
category of exclusion: those exempt from titling or registration. 
Upon reading J.C. §49-l 14(M)(9)(b), we see the Legislature specifically exempted a 
class of "vehicles" from "titling" requirement (mopeds), and then "specifically authorized" the 
operation of a "moped" on Idaho roads without any endorsements, since another provision 
excluded mopeds from the definition of motorcycle, beginning with (9), stating: 
(9) "Moped" means a limited-speed motor-driven cycle having: 
(a) Both motorized and pedal propulsion that is not capable of propelling the 
vehicle at a speed in excess of thirty (30) miles per hour on level ground, 
whether two (2) or three (3) wheels are in contact with the ground during 
operation. If an internal combustion engine is used, the displacement shall not 
exceed fifty (50) cubic centimeters and the moped shall have a power drive 
system that functions directly or automatically without clutching or shifting 
by the operator after the drive system is engaged; or 
(b) Two (2) wheels or three (3) wheels with no pedals, which is powered 
solely by electrical energy, has an automatic transmission, a motor which 
produces less than two (2) gross brake horsepower, is capable of propelling 
the device at a maximum speed of not more than thirty (30) miles per hour on 
level ground and as originally manufactured, meets federal motor vehicle 
safety standards for motor-driven cycles. A moped is not required to be titled 
and no motorcycle endorsement is required for its operator. 
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A moped is excluded from "motor vehicles" because it is not a "titled" vehicle, and no 
motorcycle endorsement is required for the operation on the roads because they are exempted 
from the definition ofa motorcycle in J.C. §49-l 14(M)(I0). 
The second case cited by Respondent involved statutory construction in State v. 
Troughton, 126 Idaho 406, 884 P.2d 419 (1994), wherein the court addressed the rules of 
construction in the following manner: 
To answer these questions, we look to the grammatical construction of 
the statute as the legislature intended the statute to be construed according to 
generally accepted principles of English grammar. See State v. Collinsworth, 96 
Idaho 910, 914, 539 P.2d 263, 267 (1975). The Nebraska Supreme Court has 
explained this concept well: "[I]t is the rule of interpretation that relative and 
qualifying words and phrases are to be applied to the words or phrases 
immediately preceding and as not extending to or including other words, phrases, 
or clauses more remote, unless the extension or inclusion is clearly required by 
the intent and meaning of the context, or disclosed by an examination of the 
entire." State v. Jennings, 195 Neb. 434, 238 N.W.2d 477, 481 (1976). Under this 
rule, known as the rule of the last antecedent clause, a referential or qualifying 
phrase refers solely to the last antecedent, absent a showing of contrary intent. 
Id. See also Myer v. Ada County, 50 Idaho 39, 41,293 P. 322,323 (1930). 
The question presented for determination is whether the phrase "having a 
stimulant effect on the central nervous system" in LC. § 37-2707 modifies the 
word "substances" or the word "quantity." The trial court ruled that the phrase 
modifies the word "substances," and we agree. It is clear that the words "having a 
stimulant effect on the central nervous system," immediately following the word 
"substances" modifies that noun, and not the word "quantity" used earlier in the 
sentence. Furthermore, had the Idaho Legislature intended that a quantitative 
analysis be required under LC. § 37-2707(d), the legislature would have set forth 
required amounts as it did for certain substances. See, e.g., LC. §§ 37-2709(e), -
271 l(b), and -2713(c). 
The Legislative intent was to exclude non-titled and non-registered vehicles from the 
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definition of "motor vehicle". Under consideration in this appeal is the statutory language that 
specifically intends to exclude various vehicles from the definition of "motor vehicle", and it 
specifically excludes vehicles that moved solely by human power, vehicles that are electric 
personal assistive mobility devices and vehicles that are motorized wheelchairs OR such 
other vehicles, as those that are specifically exempt from titling or registration 
requirements under title 49, Idaho Code. Nowhere within any of the statutory definitions 
do we find these "vehicles" that "move slowly" ( defined in LC. § 49-120(S)(l 5)), vehicles 
that are "electric personal assistive mobility devices" (defined in LC. § 49-106(E)(l)), and 
vehicles that are "motorized wheelchairs" (define in I.C. § 49-123(M)(l5)), to be among those 
"vehicles" that are specifically exempted from being "titled" or "registered". The "correlative 
conjunction" word - "or" - is being used to include a category of vehicles ("other") that are 
also exempted from "motor vehicle" because they are not titled or registered, which is 
categorically defined to include such other vehicles, [such} as those that are specifically 
exempt from titling or registration requirements under title 49, Idaho Code. The "or" 
serves to create a new category of other slow moving vehicles (mopeds) in their various 
configurations from the specifically described "slow moving vehicles". Furthermore, the 
Idaho Legislature specifically defined a "moped" to be among "slow moving vehicles" as 
mopeds are so defined to mean a limited-speed motor-driven cycle. 
The third case cited by Respondent is State v.Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 163 P.3d 
1183 (2007), involving a statutory construction to determine the intended scope of the 
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"litigation exception" as it relates to calling executive sessions authorized under the open 
meeting law established through l.C. § 67-2345(l)(f). That court there stated: 
"The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to 
legislative intent. Robison v. Bateman-Hall, 139 Idaho 207,210, 76 P.3d 951, 
954 (2003). Because "the best guide to legislative intent is the words of the 
statute itself," the interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal 
words of the statute. In re Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho 819,824,828 P.2d 
848, 853 (I 992); accord McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 
810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006). Where the statutory language is 
unambiguous, the Court does not construe it but simply follows the law as 
written. McLean, 142 Idaho at 813, 135 P.3d at 759. The plain meaning of a 
statute therefore will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent is 
contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd results. Gillihan v. Gump, 
140 Idaho 264, 266, 92 P.3d 514, 516 (2004). In determining its ordinary 
meaning "effect must be given to all the words of the statute if possible, so 
that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant." State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 
108, 109, 138 P.3d 308, 309 (2006) (quoting In re Winton Lumber Company, 
57 Idaho 131, 136, 63 P.2d 664, 666 (1936))." (All emphasis added). 
The court went on to say: 
"If the language of the statute is capable of more than one reasonable 
construction it is ambiguous. Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 142 
Idaho 804, 807, 134 P.3d 655, 658 (2006). An ambiguous statute must be 
construed to mean what the legislature intended it to mean. Id. To ascertain 
legislative intent, the Court examines not only the literal words of the statute, but 
the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, the policy behind the statute, 
and its legislative history. Id." 
The court then said: 
"Ambiguity is not established merely because the parties present differing 
interpretations to the court. In re Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho at 823-24, 828 
P.2d at 852-53. If the language of the statute is reasonably susceptible of only one 
interpretation, the statute is unambiguous and there is no occasion to look beyond 
the text of the statute. See Id. at 822-24, 828 P.2d at 851-53; Carrier, 142 Idaho at 
807, 134 P.3d at 658. The first step is to examine the literal words of the statute to 
determine whether they support the parties' differing interpretations." 
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The court there focused upon what it perceived to be a "careful reading" of the statute, 
undertaken in such a manner so as to find or reveal what would be a "grammatically acceptable 
interpretation". 
With that thought, it would appear the legislative intent with mopeds was to exclude them 
from titling and from the definition of motor vehicle because, among other reasons, the Senate 
Transportation Committee found mopeds to be slow moving vehicles-cycles designed for a 
limited speed in-town use, and excluded them by exempting them from titling, and creating a 
classification through "such other vehicles" exempt from titling or registration requirements. 
"Mopeds" are defined exclusively in J.C. § 49-l 14(M)(9)(a)&(b), described to be 
"limited-speed motor-driven cycles," known to exist in several different forms, described in 
detail to be: 
"Moped" means a limited-speed motor-driven cycle having: 
(a) Both motorized and pedal propulsion that is not capable of 
propelling the vehicle at a speed in excess of thirty (30) miles per hour on level 
ground, whether two (2) or three (3) wheels are in contact with the ground during 
operation. If an internal combustion engine is used, the displacement shall not 
exceed fifty (50) cubic centimeters and the moped shall have a power drive 
system that functions directly or automatically without clutching or shifting by the 
operator after the drive system is engaged; or 
(b) Two (2) wheels or three (3) wheels with no pedals, which is 
powered solely by electrical energy, has an automatic transmission, a motor 
which produces less than two (2) gross brake horsepower, is capable of propelling 
the device at a maximum speed of not more than thirty (30) miles per hour on 
level ground and as originally manufactured, meets federal motor vehicle safety 
standards for motor-driven cycles. A moped is not required to be titled and no 
motorcycle endorsement is required for its operator. (Emphasis added). 
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Mopeds can be two wheel, three wheel, and depending upon its energy source, may be 
petroleum fuel or electrical powered, and depending on the power source, may or may not be 
pedal activated. 
From the statutory definition of "moped," it becomes inconsistent to attempt to call them 
a "motor vehicle," when they are specifically defined to be slow moving "limited speed motor 
driven cycle", or a limited speed vehicle, and are then specifically exempted from titling, and 
given the Senate Transportation Committee Minutes, were not intended to be subject to any 
registration mandates, because of their limited in-town usage, thereby meeting all 
exclusion/exemption criteria from "motor vehicle" since they are "slow moving", have "no title", 
and have "no registration" requirement under the law, and excluded from any "licensing" 
requirements for operation under J.C. § 49-30 I. The Legislature really intended to exclude 
mopeds from the definition of what is a "motor vehicle", in the very footsteps of the California 
Legislature that was discussed in the Armstrong case in 2006. 
Respondent accepts the fact mopeds are specifically exempt from "titling" and/or 
"registration" requirements, having conceded such in their Brief, realizing the clear language that 
mopeds are exempt from "titling" J.C. § 49-l l 4(M)(9)(b ), ["A moped is not required to be titled 
and no motorcycle endorsement is required for its operator."], and further realizing the Senate 
Transportation Committee says it was not intended to be registered because there is no purpose 
to register such a slow moving unit used for in-town purposes, as identified in the Senate 
Transportation Committee minutes reflected in their March 6, 2008 committee session. 
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Not only does a moped escape "titling" and "registration" requirements, but by virtue of 
the statutory definition of "motor vehicle" under the applicable Statute, I.C. § 49-123(M)(2)(h), 
["Motor vehicle does not include vehicles moved solely ..... or other such vehicles that are .. 
specificallv exempt from titling or registration requirements under title 49, Idaho Code.], 
specifically excluded from a "motor vehicle." I.C. § 49-123(M)(2)(h), states: 
(h) Motor vehicle. Every vehicle which is self-propelled, and for the 
purpose of titling and registration, meets federal motor vehicle safety standards as 
defined in section 49-107, Idaho Code. Motor vehicle does not include vehicles 
moved solely by human power, electric personal assistance mobility devices and 
motorized wheelchairs or other such vehicles that are specifically exempt from 
titling or registration requirements under title 49. Idaho Code. 
It would appear that the "only grammatically acceptable interpretation" of the statutory 
language, given the intent of the legislature to exclude certain "slow moving vehicles" and "other 
such [ slow moving] vehicles that are exempt from titling or registration" to be excluded from the 
definition of "motor vehicles", and the legislature specifically intended to include mopeds in that 
exclusion, because a moped is specifically declared to be exempt from titling by statute, was 
specifically excluded from a motorcycle, is not required to be registered by the Senate 
Transportation Committee because they are intended for in-town use, and is defined to be a slow 
moving motor-driven cycle, those are four cumulative reasons that plainly declare mopeds are 
"excluded" from the definition of a "motor vehicle". 
Though Respondent would choose to suggest Judge Oths was incorrect in his ruling 
when declaring that a driver's license cannot be required to "operate" a "limited speed-motor 
driven cycle," classified as a "moped" that is typically used on in-town roadways and City 
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streets, the grammatical considerations and statutory interpretative considerations would appear 
to confirm Judge Oths ruling that a "driver's license" is only required of those who drive a 
"motor vehicle," since the law mandates a driver's license is required only for those drivers who 
operate a "motor vehicle" as defined by I.C. § 49-301. 
It is also to be noted the 2008 Legislature undertook to eliminate mopeds from 
motorcycles, to avoid the possibility police officials might think a "moped" is a small 
"motorcycle" or a "motor bike" because of its appearance, and to dispel that confusion, the 
Legislature took that deliberate act to exempt a moped from "motorcycle", re-affirming the fact a 
"motorcycle endorsement" was not required, as the law starts from the premise that no driver's 
license was being required by the operator, so there was no need for any other specific 
endorsement. People do not need a driver's license to operate any of these limited speed-human 
powered-fuel-motor driven vehicles-cycles on Idaho streets-roadways, and in town for sure, 
without fear of being cited for any criminal conduct associated with DWP, DUI, or failing to 
carry liability insurance or failing to have a current registration. 
Given the combined definitions, exclusions, exemptions, and exceptions found in the law, 
there is no lawful basis to require a moped operator to have a policy of "motor vehicle" liability 
insurance under Idaho's "Motor Vehicle" Financial Responsibility Act, Title 49, Chapter 12, 
enacted under LC. § 49-1229, as the Statute provides: 
Required motor vehicle insurance. (I) Every owner of a motor vehicle 
which is registered and operated in Idaho by the owner or with his permission 
shall continuously, except as provided in section 41-2516, Idaho Code, provide 
insurance against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or 
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death or damage to property suffered by any person caused by maintenance or use 
of motor vehicles described therein in an amount not less than that required by 
section 49-117, Idaho Code, and shall demonstrate the existence of any other 
coverage required by this title or a certificate of self-insurance issued by the 
department pursuant to section 49-1224, Idaho Code, for each MOTOR 
VEHICLE TO BE REGISTERED. (Emphasis added). 
The mode of transportation requiring insurance is a "registered motor vehicle". Neither 
the "motor vehicle" definition, nor the "registration" requirement exists with respect to various 
slow moving vehicles, that now includes a moped since 2008. When a moped is "excluded" 
from the definition of a "motor vehicle" because exempted from titling, and when not required to 
be registered, it cannot be subject to any "insurance" requirement, as only "registered" motor 
vehicles are required to be insured under Idaho's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act. 
Initially, the State contends that: "the plain language of LC. §49-123(2)(h) defines a 
motor vehicle as any vehicle that is "self-propelled," and provides for a limited exception for 
electric personal assistance mobility devices, motorized wheelchairs, and other such vehicles that 
are exempt from titling or registration requirements." (See Responsive Brief, p.5). A reasonable 
question to ask Respondent would be: what did the Legislature intend to include within their 
reference to "other such vehicles" that are ''exempt from titling or registration requirements", 
when none of the previonsly described vehicles (electric personal assistance mobility devices and 
motorized wheelchairs) are declared exempt anywhere in the statute or their definitions from 
titling or registration? Their definitions were cited above, and no exemption is stated in their 
definition. Therefore the "classification" of a vehicle (preceded by the "or" word) is an 
additional classification of another form of slow moving vehicles that are specifically exempted 
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from titling or registration requirements, and that becomes a separate category of other slow 
moving vehicles, identified within the comprehensive statutory definitions of other vehicles 
exempted by the 2008 Legislative amendments. What is not a "motor vehicle," is the focus of 
the 2008 amendments. 
A reasonable grammatical interpretation of the statutory language utilized by the 2008 
Legislative enactments would realistically support a definition of "motor vehicle" to be: must be 
self-propelled, and must be FMVSS compliant, and cannot be exempted from titling 
/registration requirements. Appellant does recognize that the Court of Appeals in State v. 
Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965,318 P.3d 955 (Idaho App. 2014), when considering the definition ofa 
UTV, may have viewed the definition from a different angle, realizing that a UTV was already 
defined to be a "reactional motor vehicle" by a specific statutory definition, but aside from the 
Trusdell analysis by the Court of Appeals, the definition of "motor vehicle" now states: self-
propelled and for purposes of titling and registration requirements, must meet Federal Motor 
Safety Standards (FMVSS), and then excludes certain "vehicles" from the classification of what 
before were considered a "motor vehicle", and then focuses on the exemption created for non-
titled/non-registered vehicles. The new law "re-defined" what a "motor vehicle" will now be, 
and incorporated certain named slow moving vehicles, and created a specific category for other 
such slow moving non-titled/non-registered vehicles, all of which then became excluded from 
the definition of"motor vehicle". 
In defining "motor vehicle," and its application within LC. § 18-8004, the 2008 
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Legislature made amendments to LC. § 49-123 with full knowledge of the existence of all 
criminal statutes, and they included part (V)(2)(h), adding specific "definitions" and specific 
"exclusionary" aspects to the re-definition of what constitutes a motor vehicle, and what does 
not, within the statute, and with that new definition, created and confirmed categories of 
"certain" vehicles or cycles that are specifically exempted, and that began with what is 
specifically defined in J.C.§ 49-107, that now specifically states: 
"Motor vehicle" does not include vehicles that moved solely by human 
power, electric personal assistive mobility devices, and motorized wheelchairs, or 
other such vehicles that are specifically exempt from titling "or" registration 
requirements under Title 49, ldabo Code. 
Continuing with the definitions under the statute, the essential portions of the new 
LC.§ 49-123(V)(2)(h) statute now defines "motor vehicle" with certain exceptions: 
49-123. Definitions -- V .... (2) "Vehicle" means: ... 
(h) Motor vehicle. Every vehicle which is self-propelled, and for the purpose of 
titling and registration meets federal motor vehicle safety standards as defined 
in section 49-107, Idaho Code. Motor vehicle DOES NOT INCLUDE vehicles 
moved solely by human power, electric personal assistive mobility devices and 
motorized wheelchairs or other such vehicles that are specifically exempt from 
titling or registration requirements under title 49, Idaho Code. (All emphasis 
added) 
It is to be noted that a "motorized wheelchair", by definition, is a "motor vehicle". It's 
definition is contained in LC. § 49-123(M)(l 5), which states: "Motorized wheelchair" means a 
MOTOR VEHICLE with a speed not in excess of eight (8) miles per hour, designed for and used 
by a person with a disability. 
It was excluded specifically from "motor vehicle" because it ~ a motor vehicle, and 
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was not otherwise "exempted" within the category of "other such vehicles" from a 
titling/registration requirement, as no such exemption is anywhere stated for "electric personal 
assistive mobility devices and motorized wheelchairs". They have no such exemption within 
their definition. 
Possibly Respondent may be concerned with the placement of the word "such", as though 
its placement should have only an "antecedent reference" to the earlier mentioned vehicles 
(electric personal assistive mobility devices and motorized wheelchairs). The placement of the 
word "or" required the correct focus to be on "motor vehicle does not include", since the 
correlative conjunctive word "or" creates another category of what may also be slow moving 
vehicles, and they are excluded, as it relates to "other such vehicles" if they are exempted from 
titling or registration requirements. Would it make a difference in the grammatical analysis if 
"or" was followed with the phrase "such other vehicles" rather than "other such vehicles"? 
Because the non-inclusion is separated with the word "or", which then addresses an "exemption" 
it appears to create a different category that focuses on an "exempt status" that establishes their 
basis for an exclusion, rather than specifically naming them, because they were not classified as 
a motor vehicle elsewhere in the motor vehicle code, as was a motorized wheelchair. 
It must be remembered the "definition" of "moped" existed before 2008, but its exempt 
status from titling requirements did not exist until the 2008 amendments. It was before addressed 
in J.C. § 49- l l 4(M), through the inclusion of what was then subsection (9), but now provides 
that mopeds are expressly exempted from titling requirements, intending to exclude mopeds 
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from the definition of"motor vehicle" as that phrase is defined in LC.§ 49-107, cited above. 
These exclusions created within LC.§ 49-123(V)(2)(h), with the exemption from titling 
or registration requirements, along with the exempting provision from titling, LC. § 49-
l 14(M)(9)(a)&(b ), continuing with the definition of "motorbike" (sub-part 10), "motorcycle" 
(sub-part 11), "motor-driven cycle" (sub-part 13) [which excludes mopeds from what is required 
of "motor-driven cycles"], and then what is a "'Motorized wheelchair" (sub-part 15), these 
definitions, when considered together, lend an appreciation as to the legislative intent in re-
defining certain vehicles as motor vehicles, what became an exclusion by specific reference, and 
what became an exclusion by virtue of an exemption. They specifically state: 
49-114. Definitions -- M .... 
(9) "Moped" means a limited-speed MOTOR-DRIVEN CYCLE having: 
(a) Both motorized and pedal propulsion that is not capable of 
propelling the vehicle at a speed in excess of thirty (30) miles per hour on level 
ground, whether two (2) or three (3) wheels are in contact with the ground during 
operation. If an internal combustion engine is used, the displacement shall not 
exceed fifty (50) cubic centimeters and the moped shall have a power drive 
system that functions directly or automatically without clutching or shifting by the 
operator after the drive system is engaged; or 
(b) Two (2) wheels or three (3) wheels ,vith no pedals, which is powered 
solely by electrical energy, has an automatic transmission, a motor which 
produces less than two (2) gross brake horsepower, is capable of propelling the 
device at a maximum speed of not more than thirty (30) miles per hour on level 
ground and as originally manufactured, meets federal motor vehicle safety 
standards for motor-driven cycles. A MOPED IS NOT REQUIRED TO BE 
TITLED AND NO MOTORCYCLE ENDORSEMENT IS REQUIRED FOR 
ITS OPERA TOR. 
(10) "Motorbike" means a vehicle as defined in section 67-7101, Idaho 
Code. Such vehicle SHALL BE TITLED and MAY BE APPROVED FOR 
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MOTORCYCLE REGISTRATION pursuant to section 49-402, Idaho Code, upon 
certification by the owner OF THE INSTALLATION AND USE OF 
CONVERSION COMPONENTS THAT MAKE THE MOTORBIKE 
COMPLIANT WITH FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS. 
(11) "Motorcycle" means every MOTOR VEHICLE having a seat or 
saddle for the use of the rider, designed to travel on not more than three (3) 
wheels in contact with the ground or designed to travel on two (2) wheels in 
contact with the ground which is modified by the addition of two (2) stabilizing 
wheels on the rear of the motor vehicle, THAT MEETS THE FEDERAL 
MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS AS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED, 
AND INCLUDES A CONVERTED MOTORBIKE, BUT DOES NOT 
INCLUDE a motor-driven cycle, a motorbike, a tractor OR A MOPED. 
(13) "MOTOR-DRIVEN CYCLE" means a CYCLE with a motor that 
produces five (5) brake horsepower or less AS ORIGINALLY 
MANUFACTURED THAT MEETS FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY 
STANDARDS AS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED. AND DOES NOT INCLUDE 
MOPEDS. Such vehicle SHALL BE TITLED and a MOTORCYCLE 
ENDORSEMENT IS REQUIRED for its operation. 
(15) "Motorized wheelchair" means a MOTOR VEHICLE with a speed not in excess of 
eight (8) miles per hour, designed for and used by a person with a disability. 
Whatever a "motor vehicle" is, we know there are "vehicles" that are not considered to be 
"motor vehicles". It is not Appellant's objective to encourage this court to adopt the reasonable 
position that if a vehicle is self-propelled, but cannot meet the FMVSS requirements, that vehicle 
should not be included in "motor vehicle". Appellant's position is that a moped is not a motor 
vehicle, not by considering what a "motor vehicle" is defined to be, but by what is specifically 
excluded from the definition by virtue of the exemption of the titling/registration requirement. 
That being said, however, it is of passing interest that the definition of "motor vehicle", prior to 
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2008, provided the following in I.C. 49-123(V)(2)(h): 
(g) Motor vehicle. Every vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle which 
is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires but not 
operated upon rails, except vehicles moved solely by human power, electric 
personal assistive mobility devices and motorized wheelchairs. 
Clearly, the Legislature made changes to what is now the definition, and expanded the 
exclusions with a class of exemption. The Legislature intended to expand upon the exclusions, 
based upon the creation OF THEIR EXEMPTIONS that would be addressed and identified 
elsewhere in the motor vehicle code. 
As to what is a "motor vehicle", it is to be noted the Legislature added the word "and" 
when they inserted the FMVSS requirement into the definition, and that should mean something 
different than what it was before. It appears the Legislature deliberately changed the definition of 
what a "motor vehicle" is, by including the FMVSS requirement. With all due respect to the 
Court of Appeals and their Trusdall case, they did not need to ignore the FMVSS requirement in 
their analysis of the definition of a UTV, as there was already a statute in place that addressed 
the operation of UTV's while intoxicated, and UTV's were already defined in 2014 to be a 
"motor vehicle" as a matter of their own specific definition. In 2014, the definition of a UTV in 
I.C. §49-122(0)(8) was as follows: 
(8) "Utility type vehicle" or "UTV" means a utility type vehicle or UTV as 
defined in section 67-7101, Idaho Code. 
LC. §67-7101 (17) provides the following definition of a UTV: 
(17) "Utility type vehicle" or "UTV" means any RECREATIONAL MOTOR 
VEHICLE other than an ATV, motorbike or snowmobile as defined in this 
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section, designed for and capable of travel over designated roads, traveling on 
four (4) or more tires, maximum width less than seventy-four (74) inches, 
maximum weight less than two thousand (2,000) pounds, and having a wheelbase 
of one hundred ten (110) inches or less. A utility type vehicle must have a 
minimum width of fifty (50) inches, a minimum weight of at least nine hundred 
(900) pounds or a wheelbase of over sixty-one (61) inches. Utility type vehicle 
does not include golf carts, vehicles specially designed to carry a disabled person, 
implements of husbandry as defined in section 49-110(2), Idaho Code, or vehicles 
otherwise registered under title 49, Idaho Code. A "utility type vehicle" or "UTV" 
also means a recreational off-highway vehicle or ROV. 
Clearly, a UTV is not a moped, and is not a "slow moving cycle, and they are specifically 
designed and manufactured to come with an engine that is typically 500 cc to 700 cc'c in size, 
given their size and weight, they are heavy and fast, and not specifically exempted or otherwise 
prevented from being titled and registered, as they are manufactured to meet FMVSS. There is 
no comparison of a UTV to a moped, as a moped is statutorily defined to be a limited-speed 
MOTOR-DRIVEN CYCLE specifically exempt from titling requirements, and likely not 
required to be registered. 
As before stated in Appellant's Opening Brief, what may have influenced these 2008 
motor vehicle code alterations is the analysis of the Idaho Supreme Court in their discussion 
rearding mopeds in 2006, when addressing the concept of a mopeds in contrast to motorcycles, 
and specifically recognized mopeds had "exempt" status from "Motor vehicle" in California, 
when discussing what is and what is not a "motor vehicle". In that case, Armstrong v. Farmers 
Ins. Co. of Idaho, 143 Idaho 135, 139 P.3d 737 (2006), our Supreme Court specifically took the 
occasion to state: 
"At issue m Galvin was a prov1s10n excluding coverage for mJunes 
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sustained by a person occupying a motor vehicle owned by the insured but not 
covered in the policy. A father had obtained coverage for his 1979 Dodge, but 
not his moped, and his son was iniured while riding the moped. The father 
contended that the exclusion for other owned motor vehicles did not apply to the 
moped because it was not a motor vehicle. The Galvin court agreed, relying 
upon the facts that mopeds were designed to be propelled by pedaling in 
addition to their nwtorsj that they were exempt from registration under the 
Vehicle Code,· and that while motorcycles were defined as being motor vehicles 
under the Vehicle Code, mopeds were not. It stated that while a motorcycle had 
been held to be motor vehicle under a similar exclusionary clause, "the implied 
analogy between mopeds and motorcycles is tenuous and cannot be relied upon 
as the basis for finding that a moped is a motor vehicle." 170 Cal.App.3d at 
1022, 216 Cal.Rptr. at 846. The instant case involves a motorcycle, not a moped. 
A motorcycle is defined as a motor vehicle under the Idaho motor vehicle code. 
J.C. § 49-114(10). [Now LC. § 49-114(11)] 143 Idaho at 138, 139 P.3d at 740 
(bracketed reference added)" (Emphasis added). 
Now we have not only the California analysis, but also the 2008 Legislative enactments 
that declares mopeds are excluded from "motor vehicle" by their specific exemption. It is this 
case that drew the attention of the Idaho Legislature to consider the exclusionary aspects of 
mopeds when addressing the comprehensive re-defining process of "motor vehicle" that came to 
exclude mopeds from being considered a motor vehicle in 2008, just as in California. Idaho 
elected to specifically exempt mopeds with the titling exclusion, but given the determination by 
the Senate Transportation Committee on March 6, 2008, it appears the Senate did not intend for 
mopeds to be registered either, so they are exempted from motor vehicle through both titling and 
registration exclusions. 
Motorcycles, however, still remain motor vehicles. The current statutory citation for a 
motorcycle, after the 2008 Legislative amendments, as cited above, is LC. § 49-114(M)(l 1 ), and 
that specific definition takes the additional step to expressly exclude mopeds from the definition 
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of motorcycle, which is contained in the clear language m the statute. The statute on 
motorcycles now provides: 
(11) "Motorcycle" means every MOTOR VEHICLE having a seat or 
saddle for the use of the rider, designed to travel on not more than three (3) 
wheels in contact with the ground or designed to travel on two (2) wheels in 
contact with the ground which is modified by the addition of two (2) stabilizing 
wheels on the rear of the MOTOR VEHICLE, THAT MEETS the federal motor 
vehicle safety standards as originally designed, and includes a converted 
motorbike, BUT DOES NOT INCLUDE a motor-driven cycle, a motorbike, a 
tractor OR A MOPED. (All emphasis added) 
Motorcycles are not only called "motor vehicles", but are specifically required to be 
FMVSS complaint, one of the elements of what is thought to be a "motor vehicle" by definition. 
The discussion within Armstrong, supra, in 2006 focused upon definitions of 
"motorcycle", of "motor vehicle," and of California's exclusion of a "moped" from "motor 
vehicle", as a moped was defined (even back in 2006) under California law, to be excluded from 
a "motor vehicle." What Idaho's definition of a motorcycle in 2006 was then identified in LC. § 
49-114(10), and that definition is now contained in LC. § 49-l l 4(M)(l l ). When the Idaho 
Legislature took the initiative in 2008 to amend its definitions of various vehicles and modes of 
transportation, it embraced aspects of California's laws, and benefitted with the analysis set forth 
in Armstrong, supra. Idaho's Legislature embraced these California definition(s), and ·as a 
consequence, Idaho expressly excluded mopeds from its definition of a "motor vehicle" s well as 
from "motorcycle," and a moped would no longer be regarded a "motor vehicle" under Idaho 
law. These new definitions of motor vehicle, motorcycle, and moped deliberately undertook to 
specifically exclude mopeds from motorcycles and motor vehicles, where a moped is now 
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addressed separately in LC. § 49-114(M)(9), as a "limited speed, motor driven cycle," not titled, 
having no motorcycle endorsement requirements, and defined separately from "motor vehicles," 
"motorcycles" and "motorbikes." 
Mopeds, as the law requires, must be constructed with an engine that is 50cc's or less, 
and not "geared" for high speed, as cannot be capable of exceeding 30 mph. A "motorized bike" 
or "motorized bicycle," as used in the context of a "moped," typically has a slip clutch that can 
be hand lever activated or foot activated, or automatically activated in conjunction with the 
rotation of the wheel-engine revolution, and the engine is designed for a pedal/chain start so you 
can start the engine while riding and pedaling the bike. The typical speed that can be achieved 
on a moped type "motorized bike" is closer to 20, as it has very limited speed potential because 
of the limited horse power, weight of the bike and weight of the rider, the friction and drag 
caused through the moving parts from limited power output, torque transition through the chain, 
sprocket friction, and road surface friction consumes the limited power output, causing it to be a 
slow moving vehicle by virtue of its definition. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. McKie did not operate a "motor vehicle" while under the influence of alcohol, but 
rather a "slow moving" "limited speed" "motor driven cycle" exempt from titling requirements 
and excluded by virtue of that exemption from what comprises a "motor vehicle" by the 2008 
Legislative amendment(s). 
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The Lower Court's conviction, entered upon Appellant's conditional plea of guilty, must 
be set aside and vacated, and the matter remanded to the lower court with instructions to dismiss 
the amended complaint filed in the case. 
Respectfully submitted this 28th day of February, 2017. 
Vernon K. Smith /s/ - ---
Vernon K. Smith, 
Attorney for Appellant 
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FILED By: ~IZ-4-.iUJ.--GZ-~!i,,,&_- Deputy Cle rk 
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Case No. CR-MD-2015-12139 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. OPINION ON APPEAL 
CHAD C. MCKIE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
ATTORNEY FOR THE APPELLANT: VERNON K. SMITH, JR. 
ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT: JACK W. RELF 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The defendant appeals his conviction, pursuant to a guilty plea, of Driving Under the 
Influence (with an Excessive Alcohol Concentration). His plea was conditioned on the 
ability to appeal the issue of whether he was operating a "motor vehicle," at the time he was 
under the influence. 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The defendant was arrested on August 23, 2015, for Driving Under the Influence. 
The probable cause affidavit in support of his arrest provides: 
On 8/23/15 at approximately 0237 hours, Officer Schloegel saw a 1975 
red Honda Trail 90 (Idaho license plate #ZFZ027) heading westbound on 
Boise Avenue by Beacon driving in the bicycle lane. As Officer Schloegel 
turned around on the Honda, he saw that there was a non-functioning rear 
tail light on the Honda. Officer Sch[l]oegel stopped the Honda at Donald 
OPINION ON APPEAL - PAGE 1 
000230
and Joyce. I arrived to assist Officer Schloegel with the traffic stop and a 
possible intoxicated driver. 
I made contact with the sole occupant and driver of the vehicle, verbally 
identified as Chad C. McKie. As I was speaking with McKie, I could smell 
the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from his breath/person. 
McKie's eyes were red, bloodshot and watery and his speech was very 
thick tongued and slurred . McKie admitted to consuming 2 Screwdrivers 
earlier in the evening. 
McKie was given 3 standardized field sobriety tests and he met decision 
points in all 3 tests. McKie was placed under arrest and he refused to take 
a breath test on the Lifeloc FC-20. McKie was transported to the Ada 
County Jail where he would not consent to a blood draw. I contacted the 
on call city Prosecutor, Terry Derden and he contacted the honorable 
Kevin Swain. Judge Swain authorized me to sign his name on the 
telephonic search warrant. Jennifer Adkins from 24/7 Pro Solutions drew 
McKie's blood and Sgt. Ruffalo and myself witnessed the blood draw and I 
took possession of the blood kit and booked it into evidence at the Ada 
County Sheriff's Office. McKie was booked in for driving under the 
influence (citation # 1454043). Probable Cause Affidavit in Support of 
Arrest and/or Refusal to Take Test, at 2. 
On October 19, 2015, the defendant, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss on 
the following basis: 
[T]he alleged acts of this Defendant do not come under the purview of § 
18-8004, Idaho Code, as the Defendant was operating a moped, not a 
motor vehicle as defined under the Statutes of the State of Idaho and 
therefore this Defendant is not subject to the provisions of Title 18, 
Chapter 80, Statutes of the State of Idaho regarding the operation of a 
"motor vehicle," under the influence of alcohol. This pending charge 
should be dismissed by the Court, as this Court does not have subject 
matter jurisdiction over this Defendant, as mopeds, as defined by the 
Statute of Idaho are not considered "motor vehicles," and consequently 
not subject to the title or registration requirements, and any person 
operating a moped is not subject to the criminal offense of operating a 
motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. 
Motion to Dismiss, at 1-2. 
The State opposed this motion. 
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On February 8, 2016, a hearing was held in reference to the defendant's motion to 
dismiss. At the conclusion of the hearing the magistrate agreed with the State that the 
motion was untimely and dismissed it. For purposes of the upcoming trial and for a relevant 
jury instruction, the magistrate ruled that a moped is a motor vehicle for purposes of the 
Driving Under the Influence charge, relying upon State v. Trusda/1, 155 Idaho 965, 318 P.3d 
955 (Ct. App. 2014). 
The parties subsequently stipulated to the following facts (internal citations omitted): 
On August 23rd , 2015, at 2:37 in the morning, the Defendant, Chad C. 
McKie, date of birth was in actual physical control of and 
was driving a vehicle e lane, westbound on Boise Ave. near 
Beacon St. in Boise, Ada County, Idaho, which is a publicly maintained 
roadway and open to the public. 
As he drove he was wobbling in his lane and the tail light of the vehicle 
was not functioning properly. 
A traffic stop was initiated by Officer Adam Schloegel of the Boise Police 
Department. Officer Schloegel observed what he perceived to be signs of 
intoxication exhibited by the Defendant. 
The vehicle driven by the Defendant is a self-propelled vehicle as defined 
by Idaho Code 49-123(h). 
The vehicle driven by the Defendant is a moped as defined by Idaho Code 
49-114(M)(9). It is a limited-speed motor-driven cycle having both 
motorized and pedal propulsion that is not capable of propelling the 
vehicle at a speed in excess of thirty (30) miles per hour on level ground, 
with two (2) wheels in contact with the ground during operation. Its internal 
combustion engine does not exceed fifty (50) cubic centimeters in 
displacement, and its power drive system functions directly or 
automatically without clutching or shifting by the operator after the drive 
system is engaged. 
The moped driven by the Defendant was neither titled nor registered. 
Officer Steve Moore of the Boise Police Department responded to the 
scene, and subjected the Defendant to the Standardized Field Sobriety 
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Tests (SFSTs). Officer Steve Moore is trained and certified to perform 
those tests. 
The Defendant met the decision points for arrest on all SFSTs, and was 
arrested for driving under the influence (DUI). 
Officer Moore attempted to have the Defendant provide a breath sample, 
but such sample was not obtained as the Defendant first burped during 
the fifteen (15) minute waiting period. 
The defendant would not consent to a blood draw, so Officer Moore 
obtained a warrant to draw the Defendant's blood, and the Defendant's 
blood was drawn pursuant to that warrant. 
Laboratory analysis revealed his blood alcohol concentration to be 0.253 g 
of ethyl alcohol per 100 ccs of blood, in excess of the .20 limit provided by 
Idaho Code 18-8004C(1). Stipulation to Facts, at 1-2. 
The defendant pied guilty to the charge, conditioned on his ability to appeal the issue 
of whether a moped is a motor vehicle, for purposes of a conviction under I.C. § 18-8004. 
This appeal followed. The appellant has filed a motion for judicial notice, requesting 
the Court take notice of certain legislative history materials. See I.R.E. 201 (b); I.R.C.P. 44 . 
The motion was unopposed and is granted. 
Ill. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The appellant asserts: (1) the Title 49 definitions apply in determining what qualifies 
as a "motor vehicle" for purposes of a DUI conviction under I.C. § 18-8004; (2) the 2008 
amendments to the Idaho motor vehicle code eliminated "mopeds" from the definition of 
"motor vehicles" under Idaho law; (3) the magistrate court erred as a matter of law in 
refusing to find that the moped was not a "motor vehicle" under Idaho law, whose operation 
could be the basis for a violation of Idaho's I.C. § 18-8004 DUI law; and (4) the magistrate 
court erred as a matter of law in convicting the appellant of DUI under I.C. § 18-8004 while 
operating a moped. 
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IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When a district judge considers an appeal from a magistrate judge (not involving a 
trial de novo), the district judge is acting as an appellate court, not as a trial court. State v. 
Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 596, 826 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1992). The interpretation of law or 
statute is a question of law over which the Court has free review. State v. Miller, 134 Idaho 
458, 462, 4 P.3d 570, 574 (Ct. App. 2000). 
V. ANALYSIS 
The defendant asserts that the magistrate court erred in convicting him for DUI 
under I.C. § 18-8004 because a moped is not classified as a "motor vehicle" in the Idaho 
Motor Vehicle Code, and the magistrate court erred in refusing to apply the statutory 
definition that excludes mopeds from the statutory class of "motor vehicles" for purposes of 
determining whether he could be convicted of DUI under I.C. § 18-8004 while operating a 
moped. The defendant relies on several steps in statutory construction. Idaho Code section 
49-123(2)(h) provides the following: 
Motor vehicle. Every vehicle which is self-propelled, and for the purpose of 
titling and registration meets federal motor vehicle safety standards as defined 
in section 49-107, Idaho Code. Motor vehicle does not include vehicles moved 
solely by human power, electric personal assistive mobility devices and 
motorized wheelchairs or other such vehicles that are specifically exempt from 
titling or registration requirements under title 49, Idaho Code. 
Idaho Code section 49-114M(9) defines "moped" and provides in subpart (b) that a moped 
is not required to be titled. There is no dispute that the vehicle involved in his case is a 
moped. 
The defendant also relies on a decision in the magistrates division, State of Idaho v. 
Elijah C. Udeochu, Case No. CR-MD-2011-0005485 (4th District Court, Ada County, 2011) 
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to the effect that mopeds are not motor vehicles for the purposes of the requirement of a 
driver's license or liability insurance. 
Regardless of the defense analysis, the decision of the Idaho Court of Appeals in 
State v. Trusda/1, 155 Idaho 965, 318 P.3d 955 (Ct. App. 2014), leads to a different result. 
Initially the Court of Appeals outlined the appropriate analysis in statutory construction . 
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court 
must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory 
construction. The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and 
rational meaning. If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no 
occasion for the court to resort to legislative history or rules of statutory 
interpretation. When this Court must engage in statutory construction because 
an ambiguity exists, it has the duty to ascertain the legislative intent and give 
effect to that intent. To ascertain such intent, not only must the literal words of 
the statute be examined, but also the context of those words, the public policy 
behind the statute and its legislative history. It is incumbent upon a court to 
give an ambiguous statute, an interpretation which will not render it a nullity. 
Constructions of an ambiguous statute that would lead to an absurd result are 
disfavored . Trusda/1, 155 Idaho at 968-69, 318 P.3d at 958-59 (citations 
omitted). 
Additionally, if a criminal statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity applies 
and the statute must be construed in favor of the accused. However, where a 
review of the legislative history and underlying public policy makes the 
meaning of the statute clear, the rule of lenity will not apply. If the ambiguity 
remains after examining the text, context, history, and policy of the statute, the 
interpretative tie between the two reasonable readings is resolved in favor of 
the defendant. Trusda/1, 155 Idaho at 969,318 P.3d at 959. 
In Trusda/1 the defendant was convicted of Driving Under the Influence, in violation 
of I.C. § 18-8004, 1 which provides that it is unlawful for any person who is under the 
influence of alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating substances, or any combination of 
alcohol, drugs and/or any other intoxicating substances to drive or be in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle within this state, whether upon a highway, street or bridge, or 
1"Idaho Code § 18-8004 is designed to protect the public from the extreme danger presented by intoxicated 
drivers." Trusda/1, 155 Idaho at 971 , 318 P.3d at 961 . 
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upon public or private property open to the public." I.C. § 18-8004(1 )(a). (emphasis added). 
In Trusda/1 the defendant was operating a UTV which did not meet federal motor vehicle 
safety standards. Therefore, according to Trusda/1, it was not a motor vehicle for purposes 
of the driving under the influence law. The Court of Appeals disagreed: 
In defining "motor vehicle" for purposes of I.C. § 18-8004, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has relied on I.C. § 49-123(2)(9) ... the legislature has since amended 
I.C. § 49-123(2)(9), adding the following emphasized language to the statute: 
Motor vehicle. Every vehicle which is self-propelled, and for the purpose of 
titling and registration meets federal motor vehicle safety standards as defined 
in section 49-107. Idaho Code. Motor vehicle does not include vehicles moved 
solely by human power, electric personal assistive mobility devices and 
motorized wheelchairs or other such vehicles that are specifically exempt from 
titling or registration requirements under title 49, Idaho Code. Trusda/1, 155 
Idaho at 969, 318 P.3d at 959 (underline emphasis added).2 
"The plain language of I.C. § 49-123(2)(9) continues to define motor vehicles as 
every vehicle which is self-propelled." Further, "the requirement that a vehicle meet the 
federal standards applies only "for the purpose of titling and registration." Id. 
The defendant's moped is a motor vehicle for purposes of his DUI conviction. It is a 
self-propelled vehicle, as has been stipulated. It is not a vehicle that is moved solely by 
human power, like a bicycle. It is not a vehicle such as a motorized wheelchair or other 
electric assistive device used by disabled individuals, which are specifically excluded from 
the definition of a motor vehicle. 
The defendant states that the "criminal statute is constitutionally vague" and "[a] due 
process right exists to have the description of the offense, and a defendant must be 
adequately apprised regarding the elements of the criminal offense." Appellant's Opening 
Brief, at 15-16. However, it does not appear that issue was asserted in the trial court. See, 
e.g., State v. Fry, 128 Idaho 50, 54-55, 910 P.2d 164, 168-69 (1994) "The long standing 
2This remains the definition of motor vehicle in what is now I.C. § 49-123(1)(h). 
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rule in Idaho is that an appellate court will not consider issues, including constitutional 
issues, that are presented for the first time on appeal." 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The magistrate's finding that the defendant's moped is a motor vehicle for purposes 
of his conviction under I.C. § 18-8004 is affirmed. 
Dated this zj_ day of May 2017. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the __ day of May 2017, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document as notice pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.R.C.P. to each of the parties 
of record as follows: 
VERNON K. SMITH, JR. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
vls59@live.com 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY 
bcao@cityofboise.org 
HON. KEVIN SWAIN 
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
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Clerk of the District Court 
Ada County, Idaho 
By x.ull-. ~,_A 
Deputy Clerk 
000238
VERNON K. SMITH 
ATTORNEYATLAW 
1900 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Idaho State Bar NQ. 1365 
JUL 0·3 2u 
CHRISTOPHER D. 
By GRICELDA TO~CH, Clerk 
DEPUTY RES 
Telephone: (208) 345-1125 
Fax: (208) 345-1129 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN TEJ;E DISJ'RICT COURT OF THE FORTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
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Case No. CR-MD-2015-0012139 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: The CITY OF BOISE, IDAHO, and to the Boise City Attorney, Robert B. Luce, City 
Attorney, and his Deputy City Attorney, Jack W. Ralf: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that: 
1. The above named Defendant-Appellant, Chad C. McKie does appeal against the 
above named Plaintiff-Respondent, City of Boise, Idaho, to the Idaho Supreme Court from 
that Decision rend~fed by the Appellate Decision of the Ada County District Court, acting in 
an appellate capacity, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1 l(c)(IO), I.A.R. the Honorable 
Gerald F. Schroeder, presiding. This appeal is taken from that Appellate Decision filed and 
entered by the District Court, in and for the Fourth Judicial District, County of Ada, on May 
25, 2017, therein affirming the conviction entered by the Magistrate Court, relying upon the 












Court of Appeals:·pecision, State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 318 P.3d, 955 (Idaho App. 
. . . 
2014), which Judg~ent of conviction was entered by the magistrate court pursuant to that 
conditional plea of guilty entered by Defendant-Appellant on September 30, 2016, in the 
Magistrate Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and for the County 
of Ada, the Honoraqle L. Kevin Swain presiding. A copy of the District Court Appellate 
Deci_sion, from which this appeal is taken, is attached to this Notice of Appeal. 
2. . That Defendant-Appellant has a right to appeal the Decision of the 
Appellate Division of the District Court to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Appellate 
Decisio~, describe·4 in paragraph 1 above, is appealable pursuant to Rule 1 l(c)(IO) I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement addressing the issue(s) to be appealed, which 
Defendant-Appellant intends to assert, provided such statement or list shall not prevent 
Defe_ndant-Appellant.from asserting other issues on appeal, consist of those issues as will 
be identified within the following statement: 
a) Th8;t Defendant-Appellant was operating a "Moped" at issue in this 
appeal, an"4:'. although a "Moped" is capable of being partially self-propelled, as 
that phrase.has been referred to in State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 318 P.3d, 955 
(Idaho App:-2014), nonetheless a moped is now listed among those "vehicles" not 
titled or registered in Idaho since the 2008 Legislative enactments, as now defined 
in I. C.' · §49-114 (M)(9), with the limiting effects as to what now constitutes a 
-"Motor Vehicle" as defined in I.C. §49-123(V)(2)(h); that the exclusions include 
non-titled vehicles (mopeds) from the definition of "motor vehicle", initially 
addressed in I.C. §49-114(M)(l 7), therein referring to sub-part "Vehicle" in the 
definitions, therein defined in I. C. §49-123 (V)(2)(h) to state: "Motor vehicle" 
does not include vehicles that move solely by human power, electronic personal 
_assistive mobility devices, motorized wheelchairs, or such other vehicles that are 
specifically exempt from titling "or" registration requirements under title 19, 
Idaho Code,· 
., 
b) That a Moped is exempt from titling requirements pursuant to I.C. §49-
114 (M)(9);·_ consequently exempted from "motor vehicle", pursuant to I.C. §49-
123(V)(2)(h) as a matter of law; that Defendant-Appellant cannot be guilty of 
"operating . a motor vehicle" under the influence of alcohol, when operating a 
"moped", _as_ the fundamental element of I.C. §18-8004 requires the operation or 
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physical contrnl of a "motor vehicle", and a "Moped" is declared to be expressly 
excluded from "moto~ vehicle", as a matter ofldaho law. 
4. No order ~as been entered sealing any portion or all of the record . 
.. 
5. A transcript of the audio-recorded proceedings, as conducted on September 30, 
2016, concerning ·the entry of the conditional plea of guilty and the sentencing held 
thereon, was prepared for the District Court appellate proceedings, lodged with the Clerk 
of the Court, and having already been prepared and lodged with the Court, it is requested 
this lodged transcript of that Hearing shall be submitted as an "Exhibit" to the Record on 
Appear, as permitted by Rule 31(a)(3), I.A.R., as incorporated through Rule 54(q), I.C.R. 
6. In addition to the preparation of the Standard Record on Appeal, as provided by 
Idaho Appellate ·g.ule 28(b)(2), Defendant-Appellant does request certain additional 
documents to be pr~pared and included with the record on this appeal: 
a) The stipulate~- facts contained in the "Stipulation to Facts" entered and filed with the 
cou1t on or about .June 28, 2016; 
b) The previous Notice of Appeal filed with the District Court, therein appealing the 
magistrate co~i:t's Judgment of Conviction, to the District Court Appellate Division on 
.. 
... 
October 4, 20 lq; 
c) The Appellant's.Opening Brief, as filed in the initial appeal to the Appellate Division of 
the District Court; 
d) The Respondent's Responsive Brief, as filed in the initial appeal to _the Appellate 
Division of the District Court; 
e) The Appellant's Reply Brief, as filed in the initial appeal to the Appellate Division of 
the District Court; 
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f) The May 25, ~017 Decision rendered by the Appellate Division of the District Court, 
Honorable Gerald F. Schroeder presiding, affirming the Judgment of Conviction, a copy 
of which Decision is attached to this Notice of Appeal as required by Rule 11, I.AR.: 
7. I HEREBY CERTIFY that: 
a. No .. Reporter's Transcript is required to be prepared, as a Reporter's 
:·. I 
Transcript was bef6re prepared and presented to the District Court, and will be included in 
. ..' 
the Record as an "exhibit" in this appeal to the Supreme Court, and no service of this Notice 
of Appeal is therefore required to be made upon the court Reporter. 
b. That the Clerk of the Court will be paid the initial estimated fee for the 
preparation of the Clerk's Record, and any balance owing thereafter will be paid, as 
requested. 
c. That Defendant-Appellant is not required to pay any criminal case filing fee 
upon the filing of_tpis Notice of Appeal with the Clerk of the District Court; that a copy of 
the District Court's:Appellate Decision in this criminal case is attached thereto. 
d. This Notice of Appeal has been served by faxing a copy thereof to the Boise 
City Prosecuting Attorney's Office, Boise, Idaho, 83701-0500, at the fax number 384-4454, 
directed to the ·attention of Robert B. Luce, City Attorney, and his Deputy City Attorney, 
Jack W. Ralf. 
That service of tli~-~ Notice of Appeal has been made upon those parties required to be 
'• 
served pursuant to.Rule 20, I.AR .. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 3rd day of July, 2017, I caused a true and correct 
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copy of the above and foregoing Notice of Appeal to be delivered to the following persons 
as follows: 
Cl~rk of the Court 
Fourth Judicial District 
Adc!,.'County 
200 West Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Boise City Attorney 
P.O. Box 500 
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Signed: 5/25/201711:16 AM 
FILED By: ~z...L4..""""---~~-- Deputy Clerk 
Fourth Judfcial District, Ada county 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
IN TH.E DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Case No. CR-MD-2015-12139 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. OPINION ON APPEAL 
CHAD C. MCKIE, 
Defend ant-Appe Ila nt. 
ATTORNEY FOR THE APPELLANT: VERNON K. SMITH, JR. 
ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT: JACK W. RELF 
.· .. I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
. The defend~nt appeals his conviction, pursuant to a guilty plea, of Driving Under the 
Influence (with a_n Excessive Alcohol Concentration). His plea was conditioned on the 
ability to appeal the issue of whether he was operating a "motor vehicle," at the time he was 
under the influence. 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The defendant was arrested on August 23, 2015, for Driving Under the Influence. 
The probable cause affidavit in support of his arrest provides: 
On 8/23/15 at approximately 0237 hours, Officer Schloegel saw a 1975 
red Honda Trail 90 (Idaho license plate #ZFZ027) heading westbound on 
Boise Avenue by Beacon driving in the bicycle lane. As Officer Schloegel 
turned around on the Honda, he saw that there was a non-functioning rear 
tail light on ttie Honda. Officer Sch[l]oegel stopped the Honda at Donald 
, , 
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and Joyce. I arrived to assist Officer Schloegel with the traffic stop and a 
possible intoxicated driver. 
I made cor:fr.act with the sole occupant and driver of the vehicle, verbally 
identified a_s Chad C. McKie. As I was speaking with McKie, I could smell 
the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from his breath/person. 
McKie's eyes were red, bloodshot and watery and his speech was very 
thick tongued and slurred. McKie admitted to consuming 2 Screwdrivers 
earlier in the evening. 
McKie was given 3 standardized field sobriety tests and he met decision 
points in all 3 tests. McKie was placed under arrest and he refused to take 
a breath test on the Lifeloc FC-20. McKie was transported to the Ada 
County Jail where he would not consent to a blood draw. I contacted the 
on call city Prosecutor, Terry Derden and he contacted the honorable 
Kevin Swain. Judge Swain authorized me to sign his name on the 
telephonic search warrant. Jennifer Adkins from 24/7 Pro Solutions drew 
McKie's blood and Sgt. Ruffalo and myself witnessed the blood draw and I 
took possession of the blood kit and booked it into evidence at the Ada 
County Sheriff's Office. McKie was booked in for driving under the 
influence (citation # 1454043). Probable Cause Affidavit in Support of 
Arrest and/or Refusal to Take Test, at 2. 
On October 19, 2015, the defendant, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss on 
the fo_llowing basis: 
: [T]he alleged acts of this Defendant do not come under the purview of § 
18-8004,: Idaho Code, as the Defendant was operating a moped, not a 
motor vehicle as defined under the Statutes of the State of Idaho and 
therefore thi.s Defendant is not subject to the provisions of Title 18, 
Chapter ao:--- Statutes of the State of Idaho regarding the operation of a 
"motor vehicle," under the influence of alcohol. This pending charge 
should be dismissed by the Court, as this Court does not have subject 
matter jurisdiction over this Defendant, as mopeds, as defined by the 
Statute of Idaho are not considered "motor vehicles," and consequently 
not subject to the title or registration requirements, and any person 
operating a moped is not subject to the criminal offense of operating a 
motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. 
Motion to Dismiss,_ at 1-2. 
The State opposed this motion. 
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On February-8, 2016, a hearing Was held in reference to the defendant's motion to 
dismiss. At the conclusion of the hearing the magistrate agreed with the State that the 
motion was untimely and dismissed it. For purposes of the upcoming trial and for a relevant 
jury instruction, the magistrate ruled that a moped is a motor vehicle for purposes of the 
Driving Under the·)~tluence charge, relying upon State v. Trusda/1, 155 Idaho 965, 318 P.3d 
955 {Ct. App. 2014). 
The parties subsequently stipulated to the following facts {internal citations omitted): 
On August 23rd , 2015, at 2:37 in the morning, the Defendant, Chad C. 
McKie, date of birth was in actual physical control of and 
was driving a vehicle, in the bicycle lane, westbound on Boise Ave. near 
Beacon St. in Boise, Ada County, Idaho, which is a publicly maintained 
· roadway a11d open to the public. 
As he drove he was wobbling in his lane and the tail light of the vehicle 
. was not functioning properly. 
A.traffic stop was initiated by Officer Adam Schloegel of the Boise Police 
Department. Officer Schloegel observed what he perceived to be signs of 
intoxication exhibited by the Defendant. 
The vehicle driven by the Defendant is a self-propelled vehicle as defined 
by Idaho Code 49-123(h) . 
. The vehiqle driven by the Defendant is a moped as defined by Idaho Code 
. 49-114(M)(9). It is a limited-speed motor-driven cycle having both 
motorized and pedal propulsion that is not capable of propelling the 
vehicle at a .. speed in excess of thirty (30) miles per hour on level ground, 
with two (2).:.yvheels in contact with the ground during operation. Its internal 
combustiori'.:-engine does not exceed fifty (50) cubic centimeters in 
displacement, and its power drive system functions directly or 
automatically without clutching or shifting by the operator after the drive 
system is engaged. 
. . 
·The moped driven by the Defendant was neither titled nor registered. 
Officer Steve Moore of the Boise Police Department responded to the 
scene, and subjected the Defendant to the Standardized Field Sobriety 
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Tests (SFSTs). Officer Steve Moore is trained and certified to perform 
those tests. 
The Defendant met the decision points for arrest on all SFSTs, and was 
arrested for driving under the influence (DUI). 
Officer Moore attempted to have the Defendant provide a breath sample, 
but such sample was not obtained as the Defendant first burped during 
. the fifteen (15) minute waiting period. 
The defendant would not consent to a blood draw, so Officer Moore 
obtained a warrant to draw the Defendant's blood, and the Defendant's 
blood was tjtawn pursuant to that warrant. 
Laboratory-analysis revealed his blood alcohol concentration to be 0.253 g 
of ethyl alcohol per 100 ccs of blood, in excess of the .20 limit provided by 
Idaho Cod~ 18-8004C(1 ). Stipulation to Facts, at 1-2 . 
. The defendant pied guilty to the charge, conditioned on his ability to appeal the issue 
of whether a moped is a motor vehicle, for purposes of a conviction under I.C. § 18-8004. 
This appeal followed. The appellant has filed a motion for judicial notice, requesting 
the Court take notice of certain legislative history materials. See I.R.E. 201(b); I.R.C.P. 44. 
The motion was unopposed and is granted. 
Ill. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The appellant asserts: (1) the Title 49 definitions apply in determining what qualifies 
as a "motor. vehicle" for purposes of a DUI conviction under I.C. § 18-8004; (2) the 2008 
amendments to the Idaho motor vehicle code eliminated "mopeds" from the definition of 
"motor vehicles"· under Idaho law; (3) the magistrate court erred as a matter of law in 
refusing to find tha_t the moped was not a "motor vehicle" under Idaho law, whose operation 
could be the basis.Jar a violation of Idaho's I.C. § 18-8004 DUI law; and (4) the magistrate 
court erred as a matter of law in convicting the appellant of DUI under I.C. § 18-8004 while 
' . 
operating a moped. 
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IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When a district judge considers an appeal from a magistrate judge (not involving a 
trial de novo), the district judge is acting as an appellate court, not as a trial court. State v. 
Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 596, 826 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1992). The interpretation of law or 
statute is a question of law over which the Court has free review. State v. Miller, 134 Idaho 
458, 462, 4 P.3d 570, 574 (Ct. App. 2000). 
V. ANALYSIS 
The defendant asserts that the magistrate court erred in convicting him for DUI 
under I.C. § 18-8004 because a moped is not classified as a "motor vehicle" in the Idaho 
Motor Vehicle Code, and the magistrate court erred in refusing to apply the statutory 
definition that exdµdes mopeds from the statutory class of "motor vehicles" for purposes of 
·.:-
determining wheth~r he could be convicted of DUI under I.C. § 18-8004 while operating a 
moped. The defe~dant relies on several steps in statutory construction. Idaho Code section 
49-123(2)(h) provides the following: 
Motor vehicle. Every vehicle which is self-propelled, and for the purpose of 
. titling and registration meets federal motor vehicle safety standards as defined 
. in section 49-107, Idaho Code. Motor vehicle does not include vehicles moved 
solely by human power, electric personal assistive mobility devices and 
motorized wheelchairs or other such vehicles that are specifically exempt from 
titling or registration requirements under title 49, Idaho Code. 
Idaho Code section 49-114M(9) defines "moped" and provides in subpart (b) that a moped 
is not required to be titled. There is no dispute that the vehicle involved in his case is a 
moped. 
The defendant also relies on a decision in the magistrates division, State of Idaho v. 
Elijah ·C. Udeochu, Case No. CR-MD-201' 1-0005485 (4th District Court, Ada County, 2011) 
:.·: 
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to the effect that mopeds are not motor vehicles for the purposes of the requirement of a 
driver's license or liability insurance. 
Regardless of the defense analysis, the decision of the Idaho Court of Appeals in 
State. v. Trusda/1, 155 Idaho 965, 318 P.3d 955 (Ct. App. 2014), leads to a different result. 
Initially the Court of Appeals outlined the appropriate analysis in statutory construction. 
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court 
must give ·."·_~fleet to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory 
constructioti'. The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and 
rational meaning. If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no 
occasion f~fr the court to resort to legislative history or rules of statutory 
interpretation. When this Court must engage in statutory construction because 
an ambiguity exists, it has the duty to ascertain the legislative intent and give 
effect to that intent. To ascertain such intent, not only must the literal words of 
the statute be examined, but also the context of those words, the public policy 
behind the statute and its legislative history. It is incumbent upon a court to 
give an ambiguous statute, an interpretation which will not render it a nullity. 
· Constructions of an ambiguous statute that would lead to an absurd result are 
disfavored.· Trusda/1, 155 Idaho at 968-69, 318 P.3d at 958-59 (citations 
: ·omitted). 
Additionally, if a criminal statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity applies 
and the statute must be construed in favor of the accused. However, where a 
review of the legislative history and underlying public policy makes the 
meaning of the statute clear, the rule of lenity will not apply. If the ambiguity 
remains after examining the text, context, history, and policy of the statute, the 
interpretative.tie between the two reasonable readings is resolved in favor of 
the defendant. Trusda/1, 155 Idaho at 969, 318 P.3d at 959 . 
. In Trusda/1 the defendant was convicted of Driving Under the Influence, in violation 
of I. C. § 18-8004, 1 which provides that it is unlawful for any person who is under the 
influence of alcoh_pl, drugs or any other intoxicating substances, or any combination of 
alcohol, drugs and/or any other intoxicating substances to drive or be in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle within this state, whether upon a highway, street or bridge, or 
1"1daho Code § 18-8004 is designed to protect the public from the extreme danger presented by intoxicated 
drivers." Trusda/1, 155 Idaho at 971, 318 P.3d at 961. 
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upon public or private property open to the public." I.C. § 18-8004(1 )(a). (emphasis added) . 
. ·:·: 
In Trusda/1 the defendant was operating a UTV which did not meet federal motor vehicle 
safety standards. Therefore, according to Trusda/1, it was not a motor vehicle for purposes 
of the driving under the influence law. The Court of Appeals disagreed: 
In defining "motor vehicle" for purposes of I.C. § 18-8004, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has relied on I.C. § 49-123(2)(9) ... the legislature has since amended 
I.C. § 49-123(2)(9), adding the following emphasized language to the statute: 
Motor vehicle. Every vehicle which is self-propelled, and for the purpose of 
titling and registration meets federal motor vehicle safety standards as defined 
in section 49-107. Idaho Code. Motor vehicle does not include vehicles moved 
solely by human power, electric personal assistive mobility devices and 
motorized wheelchairs or other such vehicles that are specifically exempt from 
titling or registration requirements under title 49, Idaho Code. Trusda/1, 155 
Idaho at 969, 318 P.3d at 959 (underline emphasis added).2 
"The P!ain language of I.C. § 49-123(2)(9) continues to define motor vehicles as 
every vehicle which is self-propelled." Further, "the requirement that a vehicle meet the 
federal standards applies only "for the purpose of titling and registration." Id. 
The defendant's moped is a motor vehicle for purposes of his DUI conviction. It is a 
self-propelled vehicle, as has been stipulated. It is not a vehicle that is moved solely by 
human power, liker·a bicycle. It is not a vehicle such as a motorized wheelchair or other 
electric assistive device used by disabled individuals, which are specifically excluded from 
the definition of a motor vehicle. 
The defendant states that the "criminal statute is constitutionally vague" and "[a] due 
process right exists to have the description of the offense, and a defendant must be 
adequately apprised regarding the elements of the criminal offense." Appellant's Opening 
Brief, at 15-16. However, it does not appear that issue was asserted in the trial court. See, 
e.g., State v. Fry, 128 Idaho 50, 54-55, 910 P.2d 164, 168-69 (1994) "The long standing 
2This remains the definition of ~otor vehicle in what is now I.C. § 49-123(1)(h). 
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rule in Idaho is that an appellate court Will not consider issues, including constitutional 
issues, that are presented for the first time on appeal." 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The magistrate's finding that the defendant's moped is a motor vehicle for purposes 
of his conviction under I.C. § 18-8004 is affirmed. 
Dated ~his z.i__ day of May 2017 . 
. · .. 
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